Monday 29 July 2024

State Bank of India vs. Mamta Apparao - However, the Apex Court also held that such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable. The Apex Court further held that non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect. In the instant case, as stated above, the curable defect of non-stamping or insufficient stamping is attributable to the Respondent and therefore, the Petition cannot be non-suited for that.

 NCLT Mumbai-II (2024.07.24) in State Bank of India vs. Mamta Apparao [CP (IB) No. 101/MB/2021 AND I.A. No. 762 OF 2022] held that; 

  • However, the Apex Court also held that such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable. The Apex Court further held that non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect. In the instant case, as stated above, the curable defect of non-stamping or insufficient stamping is attributable to the Respondent and therefore, the Petition cannot be non-suited for that.


Excerpts of the order;

# 1. This is an application filed under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. 2016 (hereinafter referred to as IBC, 2016") read with Rule 7(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 (‘PG AAA Rules’) by State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as "Financial Creditor" or “SBI” or “Creditor”) for initiating the Personal Guarantor’s Insolvency Resolution Process (‘PGIRP’) against Ms. Mamta Apparao (hereinafter referred to as "Personal Guarantor"). As stated in Part III of the Petition, the date on which the default occurred is March 20, 2019 and the amount in default is INR 372,59,92,769.82/- (Rupees Three Hundred and Seventy-Two Crores, Fifty-Nine Lakhs, NinetyTwo Thousand, Seven Hundred and Sixty-Nine and Eighty-Two Paise only) as on 31st August, 2020. 


Case of the Applicant (in brief): 

# 2. The Corporate Debtor viz. TAG Offshore Limited, is engaged in the business of activities pertaining to travel industry. The Corporate Debtor, at present, is under Liquidation vide Order dated 26.09.2019 passed by this Bench in the matter of R.H. Petroleum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Tag Offshore Limited; C.P. (IB) No. 54 of 2019. 


# 3. The Respondent herein is a Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor in respect of the various loans availed by the Corporate Debtor from the Petitioner. The Petitioner herein granted a cash credit facility and various other term loans to the Corporate Debtor for a total amount of INR 373,59,92,769.82/-. In pursuance of the same, the Respondent furnished various Deeds of Guarantee dated 22.05.2009, 07.12.2009, 09.08.2011, 13.01.2014, 12.02.2015 and 20.08.2015 in favour of the Petitioner herein qua the cash credit facility and various other term loans availed by the Corporate Debtor. 


# 4. In the event of default of payment against the credit facilities availed by the Corporate Debtor, the accounts of the Corporate Debtor were declared as Non-Performing Asset on 28.10.2017 by the Petitioner. 


# 5. On account of the failure of the Corporate Debtor to comply with its obligations towards the cash credit facility and various other term loans availed by the Corporate Debtor, the Petitioner through its counsel issued a Legal Notice dated 06.03.2019 to the Corporate Debtor and the Respondent herein invoking the guarantees issued by the Respondent in favour of the Petitioner in order to realise the dues of the Petitioner qua the cash credit facility and various other term loans availed by the Corporate Debtor. 


# 6. Despite invoking the guarantee, the Respondent failed to satisfy the demand; as a result of which, the Petitioner herein issued a Demand Notice dated 30.09.2020 in accordance with Rule 7(1) of the PG AAA Rules, 2019. However, even after issuing the aforesaid demand notice, the debt due by the Personal Guarantor to the Petition herein continues to remain in default. Hence this Petition. 


# 7. The details of credit facilities availed by the Corporate Debtor remaining in default which are now due from the Respondent after invocation of guarantee are as follows: 


Report of the Resolution Professional u/s 99 of the Code 

# 8. The Resolution Professional has placed on record his Report u/s 99 of the Code by filing IA No. 762/2022. The said Report has recommended for accepting the present application and consequently, admitting the Respondent-Personal Guarantor into PGIRP. The reasons recorded by the Resolution Professional u/s 99(9) of the Code for recommending the acceptance of the application are briefly recapitulated below: 

a. No payment has been made by the Respondent after being served with the Demand Notice dated 30.09.2020 by the Petitioner and the same is evident upon perusal of the Statement of Accounts annexed to the Petition, which is the substantive proof of default. 

b. The Resolution Professional, vide e-mail dated 18.02.2022 and Letter dated 18.02.2022, requested the Respondent herein to provide confirmation for repayment of debt, if any. However, till date, the Respondent has failed to provide her reply on the same, despite the reminder e-mail dated 21.02.2022 sent by the Resolution Professional to the Respondent herein. 

c. The RP report further states that the instant petition filed u/s 95 of the Code is accompanied with details and documents relating to the debts owed by the debtor to the creditor along with the evidence of default. The said Report further states that a copy of the petition has been served upon the Debtor i.e. the Personal Guarantor/Respondent herein, and the application filed u/s 95 of the Code by the Petitioner is in the prescribed format and the requisite fees of Rs.2,000/- has been paid by the Petitioner. 

d. Thus, the Resolution Professional (‘RP’) submits that the present report which is being presented u/s 99(7) of the Code to the Adjudicating Authority with a recommendation of acceptance of the application is based on the reasons recorded above. Reply of the Respondent/Personal Guarantor: The Respondent has contested the petition as well as the Report of the Resolution Professional by filing her affidavit-in-reply in I.A. No. 762 of 2022. The pleadings of the respondent in the above mentioned I.A. are summarily capitulated below: 


# 9. The Deed of Guarantee dated 22nd May 2009, 07th December 2009, 09th August 2011, 13th January 2014, 12th February 2015 and 20th August 2015 at Exhibits 8(A) to 8(G) of the above-captioned Petition are either not stamped or insufficiently and inadequately stamped, and therefore, the aforesaid deeds are inadmissible in evidence as per the provisions of Section 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. 


# 10. The Respondent being a suspended director has no access to the data/information and repayment details of the alleged outstanding dues of the Petitioner Bank. Therefore, as such, the Respondent is not in a position to ascertain the repayment status of the loan in question. 


# 11. The Petitioner Bank’s alleged debt was sufficiently secured by way of securities created in favour of the Bank, more particularly the vessels. The Petitioner Bank could have realised certain amounts towards the alleged outstanding from the sale of vessels charged in its favour. It is imperative upon the Petitioner Bank to disclose on oath as to how much amount it has realised from the sale of vessels charged in its favour. 


# 12. Considering the aforesaid, the Respondent prays for dismissal of the above-captioned Company Petition with costs. 


FINDINGS 

# 13. We have heard the learned counsels for the Petitioner, the Respondent/Personal Guarantor, and the Resolution Professional, and we have gone through the records as well as the report of the Resolution Professional. 


# 14.Counsel for the Petitioner submits that despite the invocation of personal guarantee given by the Respondent to the Petitioner, the same has not been honoured and the Respondent despite service of the demand notice under the provisions of the Code, continues to remain in default. Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the report of the RP and submits that despite the intimation and reminders given by the RP to the Respondent to show the proof of payments made, if any, the Respondent has failed to rebut the factum of default and thus, the learned RP has recommended for acceptance of his report u/s 99 of the Code. In view of the evidence available on record and the RP’s report u/s 99 of the Code, the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner prays that the above-captioned Petition be admitted and the Respondent be subject to the Personal Guarantor’s Insolvency Resolution Process. 


# 15. Per contra, Counsel for the Respondent submits that the Deed of Guarantee dated 22nd May 2009, 07th December 2009, 09th August 2011, 13th January 2014, 12th February 2015, and 20th August 2015 at Exhibits 8(A) to 8(G) of the above-captioned Petition are either not stamped or insufficiently and inadequately stamped, and therefore, the aforesaid deeds are inadmissible in evidence as per the provisions of Section 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. In order to buttress the aforesaid contention, the Respondent has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited v/s. Indo Unique Flame Ltd & Ors. [2023 SCCOnLine SC 1666] wherein it was, inter-alia, held that agreements lacking proper stamping or with inadequate stamping are deemed to be inadmissible in evidence as per Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The learned Counsel for the Respondent avers that since Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act is pari materia with Section 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, the ratio of the above-quoted judgment squarely applies to the facts of this case and consequently, the deeds of guarantees furnished by the Respondent cannot be admitted in evidence and hence, the present petition fails. 


# 16. The learned Resolution Professional (‘RP’) has placed on record his Report u/s 99 of the Code. The RP in his report has recommended the acceptance of the above-captioned Petition in order to admit the Respondent into the Personal Guarantor’s Insolvency Resolution Process (‘PGIRP’). 


# 17. We have carefully weighed, analyzed, and examined the rival submissions canvassed across the bar by the counsels appearing for the Petitioner and the Respondent. 


# 18.The Copies of various Deeds of Guarantee annexed by the Petitioner at Exhibits 8A to 8G to the petition prove the existence of debt. On perusal of the above-stated exhibits, it is evident that the guarantee obligation of the Respondent towards the Petitioner in respect of the debts owed by the Corporate Debtor viz. Tag Offshore Ltd, is as follows: . . . .


# 19. We notice that the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor came to be initiated u/s 9 of the Code vide Order dated 24.04.2019 passed by this Bench in CP(IB) No. 54/2019. Thereafter, the Liquidation Process came to be initiated against the Corporate Debtor vide Order dated 26.09.2019 passed in M.A. No. 2716/2019 in CP(IB) No. 54/2019. Thus, we are satisfied that this Bench has jurisdiction vested in it by virtue of Section 60(2) of the Code to entertain the above-captioned Company Petition filed u/s 95 of the Code. 


# 20. We find that the Central Repository Information on Large Credits (‘CRILC’) Report dated 20.11.2019, annexed by the Petitioner at Exhibit-4 to the petition, establishes the default on the part of the Corporate Debtor (i.e. Tag Offshore Limited) in repayment of the loan to SBI (i.e. the Petitioner) and the date of default stated therein is 06-07-2017. The loan account of the Corporate Debtor was classified as Non-Performing Asset on 28.10.2017. Thus, the default on the part of the Corporate Debtor gave a cause of action to the Petitioner to invoke the personal guarantee furnished by the Respondent pertaining to the financial debts owed by the Corporate Debtor to the Petitioner. Even otherwise, under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the liability of surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. 


# 21. We observe that since the Corporate Debtor defaulted in repayment of loans to the Petitioner Bank, the Petitioner herein had vide Legal Notice dated 06th March 2019, invoked the personal guarantees furnished by the Respondent in relation to the debts owed by the Corporate Debtor, thereby calling upon the Personal Guarantor to pay to the Petitioner a sum of INR 446,59,46,591.44/- within 7 days from the receipt of the aforesaid notice. The Respondent has not contested or denied the receipt of the aforesaid notice. However, despite the service of the aforesaid notice, the Respondent failed to honour its guarantee obligations and hence, in our considered view, the default by the Respondent has been committed in the month of March, 2019. 


# 22. Thereafter, the Petitioner issued a Demand Notice dated 30.09.2020, in Form B to the Respondent under Rule 7(1) of the PG AAA Rules, 2019, calling upon the Respondent to pay the unpaid debt in default of INR 373,59,92,769.82/- in full within 14 days of receipt of the aforesaid notice, failing which the insolvency resolution process against the Respondent/Personal Guarantor would be initiated. On perusal of the record, we find that the Petitioner has filed an Additional Affidavit dated 10th January, 2022 to place on record the proof of service of the Demand Notice dated 30.09.2020. On perusal of the Additional Affidavit referred to above, it is evident that the Demand Notice dated 30.09.2020 came to be served by the Petitioner upon the Respondent/Personal Guarantor by way of e-mail dated October 15, 2020. 


# 23. As discussed hereinbefore, the default was initially committed by the Corporate Debtor on 06.07.2017 and the loan account of the Corporate Debtor was classified as Non-Performing Asset on 28.10.2017. The Personal Guarantee of the Respondent was invoked by the Petitioner vide Legal Notice dated 06th March, 2019, which is within three years from the date when the debt was defaulted by the Corporate Debtor. As held earlier, in the present case, the default has been committed by the Respondent in March, 2019 and the present petition has been filed on 26th October, 2020, which is within 3 years from the date of default. Thus, the instant petition is held to have been filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. 


# 24. The Respondent has placed his objections to the RP Report. The Respondent has not specifically denied or contested the factum of default on her part in respect of the personal guarantee obligations in relation to the debts owed by the Corporate Debtor to the Petitioner Bank. However, the Respondent has objected to the Petition as well as to the RP’s report mainly on the ground that the deeds of guarantees furnished by her to the Petitioner Bank are either unstamped or insufficiently stamped and therefore, the Respondent contends that Guarantee Deeds furnished by her to the Petitioner Bank are not admissible in evidence in view of the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. 


# 25.We have considered the above objection and find the same to be untenable. 


# 26. Section 30 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 fixes the liability upon a person by whom the duty is payable. Section 30 (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: 

  • 30. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expense of providing the proper stamp shall be borne,— 

  • (a) in the case of any instrument described in any of the following articles of Schedule I, namely :— No. 2 (Administration Bond), No. 6 (Agreement relating to Deposit of Titledeeds, Pawn or Pledge), No. 13 (Bond), No. 14 (Bottomry Bond), No. 28 (Customs Bond), No. 33 (Further Charge), No. 35 (Indemnity Bond), No. 40 (Mortgage Deed), No. 52 (Release), No. 53 (Respondentia Bond), No. 54 (Security-Bond or Mortgage-Deed), No. 55 (Settlement), No. 5[59 (a)] (Transfer of debentures, being marketable securities whether the debentures is liable to duty or not, except debentures provided for by section 8 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899), No. 59(b) (Transfer of any interest secured by a bond or mortgage deed or policy of insurance by the person drawing or making such instrument; 

  • (b) in the case of a conveyance (including a re-conveyance of mortgaged property) by the grantee; in the case of a lease or agreement to lease by the lessee or intended lessee; 

  • (c) in the case of a counterpart of a lease by the lessor; 

  • (d) in the case of an instrument of exchange by the parties in equal shares; 

  • (e) in the case of a certificate of sale by the purchaser of the property to which such certificate relates; 

  • (f) in the case of an instrument of partition by the parties thereto in proportion to their respective share in the whole property partitioned, or, when the partition is made in execution of an order passed by a Revenue authority or Civil Court or arbitrator, in such proportion as such authority, Court or arbitrator directs; 

  • (f-a) in case of instruments of works contract as provided in Article 63 of SCHEDULE-I, by the person receiving the contract; 

  • (g) in any other case, by the person executing the instrument. (Emphasis Supplied) 


# 27. On plain reading of Section 30, and more particularly, clause (f) of Section 30, it is evident that the liability to pay stamp duty on the Deeds of Guarantee shall be borne by the person executing the instrument. On perusal of Exhibits 8A to 8G annexed to the Petition, it is seen that the Respondent executed the Deeds of Guarantee in favour of the Petitioner. There is no clause in the above-referred Deed of Guarantee which fastens the liability to pay stamp duty upon the Petitioner. Thus, in view of the provisions of Section 30 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, unequivocally, in the present case, the liability to pay the stamp duty on the above-referred Deeds of Guarantee is on the Respondent and not the Petitioner. Therefore, if the Respondent herself has not paid sufficient stamp duty on the above-referred Deeds of Guarantee, she cannot now resist this Petition on the ground that the aforesaid deeds have not been sufficiently stamped, as it is a settled proposition in law that no party to the Lis can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongs. Hence, we do not find any force in the contention that the Deeds of Guarantee, executed by the Respondent in favour of the Petitioner, are inadmissible in evidence u/s 34 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 for want of sufficient stamp duty. 


# 28. Further, this is not a debt recovery forum where the court before decreeing a suit or a proceeding against the debtor in favour of the creditor has to examine the admissibility of documents. The proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority are summary in nature and the IBC, 2016 being a complete code in itself, we are of the considered view that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not strictly apply to the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority while adjudicating an application u/s 95 read with Section 100 of the Code. In our considered view, what is required to be seen at this stage is whether there is a default on the part of the Personal Guarantor, and in the present case, the same has been satisfactorily established from the pleadings of the parties and the documents other than the deeds of guarantee available on record, which do not require any stamping per se. Accordingly, the objections taken by the Respondent with respect to the admissibility of the Deeds of Guarantee as evidence on account of deficient stamping are irrelevant while adjudicating this petition. 


# 29. 1. Apart from this, a reference can be made to the judgment of Innoventive Industries Ltd. v/s. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: - 

  • “30. On the other hand, as we have seen, in the case of a corporate debtor who commits a default of a financial debt, the adjudicating authority has merely to see the records of the information utility or other evidence produced by the financial creditor to satisfy itself that a default has occurred. It is of no matter that the debt is disputed so long as the debt is “due” i.e. payable unless interdicted by some law or has not yet become due in the sense that it is payable at some future date. It is only when this is proved to the satisfaction of the I adjudicating authority that the adjudicating authority may reject an application and not otherwise.” (Emphasis Supplied) 


29.2. In the context of the instant case, we note that the issue of debt being due and payable is not interdicted by any law but only a technical defect of non-stamping and/or insufficient stamping has been raised which can be cured. Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Innoventive Industries (supra), this Petition cannot be rejected solely on the ground of non-stamping and/or insufficient stamping of the deeds of guarantee especially when the debt does not cease to be due and payable on account of such deficient stamping of documents when the default has otherwise been satisfactorily established from the records. 


# 30. So far as the law laid down in N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited (supra) is concerned, we find that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above cited case, inter-alia, held that an objection as to stamping does not fall for determination u/s 8 or 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the concerned court must examine whether the arbitration agreement prima facie exists. The Apex Court further held that any objections in relation to the stamping of the agreement fall within the ambit of the arbitral tribunal. Thus, we find that the above-referred judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent was in the context of arbitration and the same has no application or relevance to the insolvency proceedings of the personal guarantor before this Tribunal. Hence, we find that the reliance on the aforesaid ruling is misplaced and misconceived. 


# 31. It is true that the Hon’ble Apex Court in N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited (supra) held that the agreements which are not stamped or are inadequately stamped are inadmissible in evidence u/s 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. However, the Apex Court also held that such agreements are not rendered void or void ab initio or unenforceable. The Apex Court further held that non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect. In the instant case, as stated above, the curable defect of non-stamping or insufficient stamping is attributable to the Respondent and therefore, the Petition cannot be non-suited for that. Even otherwise, the Personal Guarantor has failed to even prima facie prove that the deed(s) of guarantee is insufficiently stamped. 


# 32. No other contention has been raised by the Respondent which remains to be addressed. 


# 33. In view of the foregoing analysis and discussions, we are satisfied that the factum of existence of guarantee and its invocation as well as the default committed by the Respondent have been established on record. Therefore, the petition deserves to be admitted. It is ordered accordingly in the following terms: 


ORDER 

I. Initiate Insolvency Resolution Process against the Respondent/Personal Guarantor named Mrs. Mamta Kishore Apparao and moratorium in relation to all the debts is declared, from today i.e. date of admission of the application and shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of 180 days, or this Tribunal passes order on the repayment plan under Section 114, whichever is earlier, as provided under Sec 101 of IBC, 2016. During the moratorium period,

  • a) Any pending legal action or proceeding against the Respondent/Personal Guarantor in respect of any debt shall be deemed to have been stayed; 

  • b) The creditors of the personal guarantor shall not initiate any legal action or proceedings in respect of any debt; and 

  • c) The Personal Guarantor shall not transfer, alienate, encumber, or dispose of any of his assets or his legal rights or beneficial interest therein. 

II. The Resolution Professional viz., Mr. Santanu T. Ray (having Registration No. IBBI/IPA-002/IP-N00360/2017-2018/11055, email: santanutray@aaainsolvency.com ), who was appointed vide Order dated 15.02.2022, is directed to cause a public notice to be published on behalf of the Adjudicating Authority within 7 days of uploading of this order on the website of NCLT, inviting claims from all Creditors within 21 days of such issue. The notice under Sub Section (1) of Section 102(2) shall include: - a) details of the order admitting the application; b) particulars of the resolution professional with whom the claims are to be registered; and c) the last date for submission of claims. 

III. The Petitioner is directed to deposit an advance payment of INR 3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs only) to the bank account of Resolution Professional within one week, so as to initiate the process. This shall be adjusted towards the fee and expenses payable to the Resolution Professional. 

IV. The publication of notice shall be made in two newspapers, one in English and other in Vernacular, which are in circulation in the state where the Personal Guarantor resides. The Resolution Professional shall furnish two spare copies of the notice to the Registry for the record. 

V. The Resolution Professional in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 104 shall prepare a list of creditors on the basis of: a. the information disclosed in the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 95 and b. claims received by the Resolution Professional under Section 102 within 30 days from the date of the notice. 

VI. The Personal Guarantor shall prepare a repayment plan under Section 105, in consultation with the Resolution Professional, containing a proposal to the Creditors for restructuring of his debts or affairs. The Resolution Professional shall submit the repayment plan along with his report on the plan to this Authority within a period of 21 days from the last date of submission of claims, as provided under Section 106. 

VII. The meeting of the creditors shall be conducted in accordance with Sections 108, 109, 110 & 111 of IBC, 2016. The Resolution Professional shall prepare a report of the meeting of the creditors on repayment plan with all details as provided under Section 112 of IBC, 2016 and submit the same to this Tribunal, copies of which shall be provided to the Debtor and the Creditors. It is made clear that the Resolution Professional shall perform his functions and duties in compliance with the Code of Conduct provided under Section 208 of IBC, 2016. 

VIII. The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of order to the Petitioner, the Respondent and the Resolution Professional within three working days from the date of uploading of this order. 

IX. In terms of the above, CP(IB) No. 101/MB/2021 filed under Section 95 of the IBC, 2016 is hereby admitted and the Insolvency Resolution Process stands initiated against the Applicant/Personal Guarantor. I.A. No. 762/2022 is hereby allowed. 

---------------------------------------------


Sanjeeb Ranjeet Das vs. Punjab National Bank and Anr. - The Personal Guarantor has ample opportunity to oppose the date of default and satisfy the Court that it is not the correct date of default and raise all contentions with regard to limitation.

 NCLAT (2024.07.16) Sanjeeb Ranjeet Das vs. Punjab National Bank and Anr. [(2024) ibclaw.in 444 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1278 of 2024] held that; 

  • It is well settled that Financial Creditor is permitted to supplement the Application by filing the additional documents.

  • The Personal Guarantor has ample opportunity to oppose the date of default and satisfy the Court that it is not the correct date of default and raise all contentions with regard to limitation.

  • It is well settled that parties/ Applicants are entitled to bring additional materials on record, which can be accepted by the Adjudicating Authority for adjudication of Application.


Blogger’s Comments; An important observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India about the demand on guarantor. Apparently the question of availability limitation against the borrower, when demand on guarantor was made has not been examined in the present case, in light of the fact that date of default against corporate guarantor has been mentioned as 01.12.2015 & date of default of the personal guarantor has been taken as 22.11.2021.


Supreme Court of India (10.04.2006) in Syndicate Bank vs Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors. [Appeal (civil) 6894 of 1997] 

  • # 14. We have to, however, enter a caveat here. When the demand is made by the creditor on the guarantor, under a guarantee which requires a demand, as a condition precedent for the liability of the guarantor, such demand should be for payment of a sum which is legally due and recoverable from the principal debtor. If the debt had already become time-barred against the principal debtor, the question of creditor demanding payment thereafter, for the first time, against the guarantor would not arise. When the demand is made against the guarantor, if the claim is a live claim (that is, a claim which is not barred) against the principal debtor, limitation in respect of the guarantor will run from the date of such demand and refusal/non compliance. Where guarantor becomes liable in pursuance of a demand validly made in time, the creditor can sue the guarantor within three years, even if the claim against the principal debtor gets subsequently time-barred. To clarify the above, the following illustration may be useful :

  • Let us say that a creditor makes some advances to a borrower between 10.4.1991 and 1.6.1991 and the repayment thereof is guaranteed by the guarantor undertaking to pay on demand by the creditor, under a continuing guarantee dated 1.4.1991. Let us further say a demand is made by the creditor against the guarantor for payment on 1.3.1993. Though the limitation against the principal debtor may expire on 1.6.1994, as the demand was made on 1.3.1993 when the claim was 'live' against the principal debtor, the limitation as against the guarantor would be 3 years from 1.3.1993. On the other hand, if the creditor does not make a demand at all against the guarantor till 1.6.1994 when the claims against the principal debtor get time-barred, any demand against the guarantor made thereafter say on 15.9.1994 would not be valid or enforceable.

  • Be that as it may.


Excerpts of the order;

This Appeal by Personal Guarantor of the Financial Creditor has been filed challenging order dated 03.05.2024 passed by National Company Law Tribunal, Court Room No.1, Mumbai Bench, by which order, the Adjudicating Authority has permitted the Financial Creditor to amend the date of default as pleaded in the rejoinder affidavit, with the liberty to the Personal Guarantor to oppose the new date of default by filing a reply.


# 2. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for deciding this Appeal are:

(i) Punjab National Bank (“PNB”) filed an Application under Section 95, sub-section (1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016  (hereinafter referred to as the “IBC”) against the Appellant –Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor – M/s Poscho Steels Pvt. Ltd., claiming a default of Rs.192,59,70,919.51/- as on 30.04.2022. In the Application filed under Section 95, the Financial Creditor has relied on Demand Notice under Section 13, sub-section (2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 dated 19.01.2022. The copy of the Demand Notice was also annexed as Exhibit-16 of the Application.

(ii) Reply was filed by the Corporate Debtor to the Application, where it was pleaded that Notice under Section 13(2) cannot be noticed for invoking the Personal Guarantee. It was stated that Notice under Section 13(2) was Notice issued by the Bank to enforce its security interest on the mortgage property, hence, cannot be notice for invoking personal guarantee. In the reply, Personal Guarantor has also referred to Notice dated 22.12.2021 received by the Personal Guarantor.

(iii) Rejoinder affidavit was also filed by the Financial Creditor, where the Financial Creditor has brought on record the Demand Notice dated 22.12.2021 issued by the Financial Creditor, calling upon the Personal Guarantor to make payment of the outstanding amount due. With regard to notice dated 19.01.2022, it was mentioned that it was the notice sent to the Guarantors/ Mortgagor of the Corporate Debtor. It was further stated that the date of default mentioned as 01.12.2015, in the Company Petition is date of default in respect of Corporate Guarantor and date of default in respect of Personal Guarantor is 22.12.2021.

(iv) The Adjudicating Authority heard the parties on 03.05.2024 and allowed the Financial Creditor to amend the date of default as pleaded in the rejoinder with liberty to Personal Guarantor to oppose the new date of default by filing a reply.

(v) The Appellant aggrieved by the order has come up in this Appeal.


# 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.


# 4. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that Financial Creditor cannot be allowed to change the date of default as claimed in the Application, which takes away the valuable right of defense available to the Personal Guarantor. It is submitted that the Respondent cannot be allowed to change the date of default in Application.


# 5. The submission of the Appellant has been refuted by the learned Counsel for the Respondent Bank. It is contended that Notice, which was relied in the Application was Notice under Section 13, sub-section (2), which was issued to the Corporate Guarantor and the guarantee was invoked of the Personal Guarantor vide notice dated 22.12.2021, which was served on Personal Guarantor. It is submitted that Financial Creditor is fully entitled to bring additional material on record by means of rejoinder affidavit, which was filed in reply of the Personal Guarantor, where Notice under Section 13, sub-section (2) dated 19.01.2022 was questioned as not been valid invocation of the guarantee.


# 6. Before we proceed to consider the submission of learned Counsel for the parties, it is relevant to notice the pleadings and date of default as mentioned in the Application, which is 01.12.2015. Notice under Section 13, sub-section (2) of SARFAESI Act, which was referred to in the Application dated 19.01.2022, which copy of the Application has been brought on record as Annexure ‘B’ to the Appeal was attached as Exhibit-16 and while referring to Exhibit-16, , following was pleaded:

  • Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 dated 19.01.2022 issued by the Financial Creditor invoking the guarantee given by the guarantors is enclosed herewith and marked as “Exhibit-16”.”


# 7. Exhibit-16, which is part of the Section 95 Application, mentions notice to Guarantors/ Mortgagors. Notice was addressed to M/s. Rockdude Management Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (Guarantors and Mortgager) and M/s Phoenix Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Guarantors and Mortgager). The guarantee given by Guarantors and Mortgagers was invoked and they were asked to pay the amount of Rs.181,27,26,781.51/-. Copy of the said Application was also sent to the Appellant, who was Guarantor. When we look into the Notice dated 19.01.2022, it is clear that it is a Notice addressed to Guarantors and Mortgagers, who were asked to make the payment as demanded.


# 8. In the reply, which was filed by the Appellant to Section 95 Application, in paragraph-5, the Appellant itself has referred to Notice dated 22.12.2021. Paragraph 5 of the reply is as follows:

  • “5. The respondent states that demand notice dated 10.05.2022 in Form B was sent by the applicant to the respondent. In response to the same, the respondent in its reply dated 24.05.2022 stated that a similar notice dated 22.12.2021 was received by him on 28.12.2021, to which he submitted his detailed reply on 07.01.2022. The contents of the reply dated 07.01.2022 shall be treated to be as part and parcel of the present Affidavit in reply. The said contents are not recited below for the sake of conciseness. Copy of reply dated 24.05.2022 along with acknowledged copy of reply dated 07.01.2022, is attached herewith and marked as “Annexure A”.


# 9. The Appellant further questioned the Notice under Section 13, sub-section (2) dated 19.01.2022 and notice for invoking the personal guarantee and objecting to the said notice, it was pleaded that the said notice was not for invoking personal guarantee. In paragraphs 15 and 16 of the reply, following was pleaded:

  • “15. In the present case, sec 13(2) notice dated 19.01.2022 has been issued by the applicant to enforce security interest on the mortgaged property. Further the respondent states that issuance of sec 13(2) notice is a statutory requirement to intimate borrowers/ guarantor about the default and invoking the security interest and it has nothing to do with invocation of guarantee. Further, mere issuance of notice u/s 13(2) under SARFAESI Act cannot be treated as invocation of guarantee. Therefore it can be concluded that demand notice sent by the applicant u/s 13(2) for invoking personal guarantee of the corporate debtor is bad in eye of law.

  • 16. Further, the respondent states that as per clause 17 of the guarantee agreement dated 22.06.2011, in order to invoke personal guarantee, the applicant ought to have sent demand notice under the said guarantee agreement dated 22.06.2011 and not otherwise. Hence the present petition fails for non invocation of guarantee.”


# 10. A rejoinder was filed by the Financial Creditor to the reply of the Personal Guarantor, where notice dated 22.12.2021 was pleaded and brought on record in paragraph 5 (g). It was further pleaded in paragraph 9 (c) that the date of default is mentioned as 01.12.2015, is the date of default in respect of the Corporate Guarantor and date of default in respect of Personal Guarantor is 22.12.2021. Paragraph 9 (c) of the rejoinder is as follows:

  • “9(c) The date of default is mentioned as December 1, 2015 in the Company Petition as it is the date of default in respect of the Corporate Guarantor. It is reiterated and clarified that the date of default in respect of the Respondent/ Personal Guarantor is December 22, 2021, for the reasons stated hereinabove.”


# 11. It was in the above background that Adjudicating Authority permitted the amendment of date of default as pleaded in rejoinder affidavit with liberty to the Personal Guarantor to object to the new date of default. It is useful to extract the entire order dated 03.05.2024 of the Adjudicating Authority, which is as follows:

  • “1. Mr. Yash Dhruva, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner present. Mr. Amey Hadwale. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent present.

  • 2. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner seeks liberty from this Bench to amend the Petition to state the correct the date of default as pleaded in rejoinder. Counsel for the Respondent vehemently objects to it. However, this Bench considers it allow the amendment without prejudice rights and contentions of the Personal Guarantor to oppose the new date of default to be inserted by the Petitioner.

  • 3. The Personal Guarantor is at liberty to file reply to the amended Petition within two weeks after duly serving the copy to the other side.

  • 4. List this matter for further consideration on 13.06.2024.”


# 12. The date of default is relevant for computing the limitation for filing Application under Section 95 for a Court, before whom any Application is filed, to determine as to whether the Application is filed within the limitation. It is well settled that Financial Creditor is permitted to supplement the Application by filing the additional documents. Present is a case where the issue of invocation of guarantee of Personal Guarantor was specifically raised in the reply of the Personal Guarantor. Hence, the Appellant in the rejoinder, brought relevant materials and pleadings on the record. The question of date of invocation of personal guarantee of the Personal Guarantor is yet to be decided by the Adjudicating Authority. The Adjudicating Authority has granted time to the Personal Guarantor to file reply to the amended petition and “to oppose the new date of default to be inserted by the Petitioner”. By virtue of the order dated 03.05.2024, the date of new default, which is inserted by the Appellant is 22.12.2021 and when the Demand Notice was sent to the Personal Guarantor by which the guarantee was invoked. The Personal Guarantor has ample opportunity to oppose the date of default and satisfy the Court that it is not the correct date of default and raise all contentions with regard to limitation.


# 13. In the facts of the present case, we do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority, permitting the Financial Creditor to amend the date of default, specially when the date of default 01.12.2015, which was mentioned in Section 95 Application is date of default of Corporate Guarantor and the Notice dated 19.01.2022, which was relied under Section 13, sub-section (2), was the notice to Guarantors and Mortgagers. It is well settled that parties/ Applicants are entitled to bring additional materials on record, which can be accepted by the Adjudicating Authority for adjudication of Application. Materials brought on the record by rejoinder affidavit, refers to Notice dated 22.12.2021, which is being relied by the Applicant as a date on which guarantee of Personal Guarantor was invoked. All disputes are yet to be decided by the Adjudicating Authority, we see no reason to interfere with the order dated 03.05.2024 as extracted above. The order allowing the amendment is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the Personal Guarantor, as recorded in the order itself. The rights of the Personal Guarantor being fully protected by order impugned, we do not find any ground to entertain this Appeal. The Appeal is dismissed with the above observations.


There shall be no order as to costs.

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