Kamlesh Rani Singla vs Praveen Kumar Garg - We also note that the Transfer Application specifically raised a threshold and objection of jurisdiction, contending that proceedings under Section 95 IBC against a Personal Guarantor cannot be maintained before NCLT New Delhi when the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor is pending before NCLT Chandigarh, which alone has exclusive territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 60(2) of the Code.

 NCLAT (20126.09.09) in Kamlesh Rani Singla vs Praveen Kumar Garg [(2026) ibclaw.in 1034 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 275 of 2026] held that; 

• We also note that the Transfer Application specifically raised a threshold and objection of jurisdiction, contending that proceedings under Section 95 IBC against a Personal Guarantor cannot be maintained before NCLT New Delhi when the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor is pending before NCLT Chandigarh, which alone has exclusive territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 60(2) of the Code.

• In this case we find that the proceedings against the Corporate Debtor were going on in NCLT Chandigarh in one of the benches and simultaneously proceedings against the personal guarantor have been initiated in NCLT Delhi in another bench. It would have been appropriate that this application should have been dismissed as non-maintainable at the stage of the admission itself and the applicant should have been advised to file it before the appropriate bench, that is in Chandigarh.

Excerpts of the Order; 

The present Appeal of the Suspended Director cum Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor, has been preferred involving Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred as “the Act”) against the order dated 05.12.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Order”) passed by Ld. National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Single Principal Bench in TA(IBC)-50(PB)/2024, arising out of CP(IB) No. 419/ND/2023, titled “Praveen Kumar Garg v. Kamlesh Rani Singla”. By way of the Impugned Order dated 05.12.2025, the Ld. Principal Bench has:

• i) Dismissed T.A. (IBC) No. 50 (PB)/2024, filed under Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 read with Sections 61(1) and 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, seeking transfer of C.P. (IB) No. 419/ND/2023, titled “Praveen Kumar Garg v. Kamlesh Rani Singla”, from the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II to the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench (Court-II); and

• ii) Closed the said transfer application by placing reliance upon the order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in R/Special Civil Application No. 11679 of 2024,

Submissions of the Appellant

# 2. The Appellant submits that, this Appellate Tribunal is empowered under Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 to entertain and adjudicate the present Appeal against the impugned order dated 05.12.2025. It argued that in addition to the statutory appellate jurisdiction, this Hon’ble Tribunal also possesses inherent powers bestowed on it under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016, which enables to exercise inherent powers and to pass such orders as may be necessary for the proper adjudication of the matter and for securing the ends of justice.

# 3. The present Appeal is not barred by limitation and has been filed within the period prescribed under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. The cause of action to prefer the present Appeal arose upon the passing of the Impugned Order on 05.12.2025, and the Appellant has approached this Hon’ble Tribunal within the statutory timeline of 45 days. Accordingly, the Appeal is well within limitation.

# 4. M/s. Laxmi Pipes Ltd., a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, having its registered office at Bhiwani Road, Hansi, District Hisar, Haryana-125033, is presently undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). The affairs of the Corporate Debtor are presently being managed through its Resolution Professional appointed pursuant to initiation of CIRP. The CIRP of Laxmi Pipes Ltd. is pending adjudication before the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench-II, in CP (IB) No. 107/Chd/Hry/2023, titled “Praveen Kumar Garg v. Laxmi Pipes Ltd.”, which was admitted by an order dated 17.05.2023 under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Mr. Deepak Thukral was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional, a moratorium under Section 14 IBC was declared, and the Corporate Debtor admitted an operational debt of ₹1,14,27,112/- payable to the Respondent No.1.

# 5. Apart from the above proceedings, Respondent No.1 (Praveen Kumar Garg, Proprietor of M/s GSV Products) filed CP(IB) No. 419/ND/2023 invoking Section 95 of IBC against Appellant (Personal Guarantor/Suspended Director) before NCLT New Delhi Bench II, triggering mandatory transfer jurisdiction u/s 60(2) IBC. Respondent No. 1 initiated proceedings under Section 95 of the Code against the Appellant in his alleged capacity as Personal Guarantor and Suspended Director before the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench-II, instead of filing the same before the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench. The aforesaid proceedings were initiated deliberately and with full knowledge of the fact that the Respondent No. 1 had already instituted proceedings against the Corporate Debtor before the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench vide in shape of CP (IB) No. 107/Chd/Hry/2023, Chandigarh Bench-II, titled Praveen Kumar Garg v. Laxmi Pipes Ltd., which stood admitted on 28.05.2024, and wherein Mr. Gautam Singhal was appointed as the Resolution Professional.

# 6. The pendency and admission of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor before the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench crystallised exclusive territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction in terms of Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Consequently, the initiation and continuation of the proceedings under Section 95 IBC before the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi, Bench-II are without jurisdiction, and void ab initio, thus the said proceedings are liable to be transferred to the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench in accordance with law.

# 7. Further, by order dated 28.05.2024, the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi, Bench-II, admitted CP (IB) No. 419/ND/2023 under Section 95 IBC, appointed Mr. Gautam Singhal (IBBI/IPA-001/IP-P01437/2018-2019/12240) as the Resolution Professional, and thereby triggered an interim moratorium under Section 96 IBC, resulting into an initiation of parallel insolvency proceedings arising out of the same debt and transaction. Being aggrieved the Appellant filed Transfer Application No. T.A. (IBC)-50 (PB) of 2024 on 08.07.2024, before the Hon’ble NCLT, Principal Bench, seeking transfer of CP (IB) No. 419/ND/2023 to the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, under Section 60(1) and (2) IBC read with Rule 16(d) of the NCLT Rules, 2016, to cure the inherent jurisdictional defect. The said Transfer Application specifically raised a threshold and incurable objection of jurisdiction, contending that proceedings under Section 95 IBC against a Personal Guarantor cannot be maintained before NCLT New Delhi particularly when the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor is pending before NCLT Chandigarh, which alone has exclusive territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 60(2) of the Code. Thereafter, on 05.12.2025, the Ld. Principal Bench dismissed T.A. (IBC)-50 (PB) of 2024 titled as “Kamlesh Rani Singla Vs. Praveen Kumar Garg” by way of the Impugned Order, without granting the Appellant an effective opportunity of hearing on the jurisdictional issue, and refused to order transfer of CP (IB) No. 419/ND/2023, NCLT-II, to the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II.

# 8. While dismissing the Transfer Application of the Appellant, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has erroneously placed reliance upon the judgment dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in R/Special Civil Application No. 11679 of 2024, titled Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited v. National Company Law Tribunal & Ors. [(2025) ibclaw.in 4821 HC], and has, on that premise, misconstrued the scope of Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 as being confined only to intra-territorial transfers, thereby completely disregarding and rendering otiose the overriding, mandatory and special jurisdictional command contained in Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which obligates that all insolvency proceedings in respect of a Corporate Debtor and its corporate guarantor must be heard by the same Ld. Adjudicating Authority (Bench) having jurisdiction over the Corporate Debtor. Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in clear and mandatory terms, provides that where a CIRP or liquidation proceeding of a Corporate Debtor is pending before a particular Bench of the NCLT, any application relating to the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy of the Personal Guarantor of such Corporate Debtor shall be filed before the same Bench. The legislative intent is to ensure consolidation of proceedings, judicial consistency, and avoidance of conflicting decisions. In view of the aforesaid overriding statutory mandate under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi, lacks both territorial jurisdiction as well as inherent jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with the Section 95 application against the Appellant, and any continuation of such proceedings would be void ab initio, coram non judice, without jurisdiction, and wholly unsustainable in law.

# 9. The issue raised in the present appeal is covered by the judgment of this Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 58 of 2023, Ankit Miglani v. State Bank of India [(2023) ibclaw.in 292 NCLAT], decided on 19.04.2023, wherein this Hon’ble Tribunal, after an exhaustive consideration of the scheme and scope of Section 60(1), (2) and (3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, has categorically held that Section 60(2) of the Code is mandatory in nature and admits of no discretion. It has been unequivocally laid down that where a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor is pending before a particular Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal, any application relating to the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy of the Personal Guarantor of such Corporate Debtor must necessarily be instituted before the same Ld. Adjudicating Authority (Bench), and not before any other Bench. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal has further clarified that the legislative intent behind Section 60(2) IBC is to ensure consolidation of proceedings, judicial consistency, and avoidance of parallel or conflicting decisions by different Benches of the NCLT, and that assumption of jurisdiction by any other Bench, in the absence of a pending CIRP before it, constitutes a patent lack of territorial jurisdiction. Applying the said binding ratio, once the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor is admittedly pending before the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, the initiation and continuation of proceedings under Section 95 IBC against the Appellant before the Hon’ble NCLT, Bench-II, New Delhi are wholly without jurisdiction, non-est in law, and is liable to be transferred. The Impugned Order, therefore, runs directly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal and warrants interference on this ground alone.

# 10. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order dated 05.12.2025 is illegal, perverse, and unsustainable in law. Consequently, C.P. (IB) No. 419/ND/2023 pending before the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II is liable to be transferred to the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, being the sole jurisdictional Adjudicating Authority, under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The present Appeal is, therefore, being preferred. The present Appeal, therefore, deserves to be allowed, the Impugned Order set aside, and CP (IB) No. 419/ND/2023 be transferred to the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench, being the sole competent Ld. Adjudicating Authority (Bench), in the interest of justice.

Reliefs Sought

# 11. In view of the facts and grounds stated above, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal may be pleased to:

(a) Set aside the Impugned Order dated 05.12.2025 passed by the NCLT, New Delhi Single Principal Bench in TA(IBC) – 50(PB) / 2024.

(b) Allow TA(IBC) – 50(PB) / 2024 titled as “Kamlesh Rani Singla Vs. Praveen Kumar Garg” and transfer CP(IB) No. 419/ND/2023, titled as Praveen Kumar Garg Proprietor of M/S GSV Products Vs. Kamlesh Rani Singla from NCLT New Delhi Bench II to NCLT Chandigarh Bench-II under Section 60(2) IBC read with Rule 16(d) NCLT Rules.

(c) Quash and set aside all proceedings undertaken before the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi in CP (IB) No. 419/ND/2023 pursuant to and subsequent to the admission order dated 28.05.2024, and direct that the said proceedings shall remain in abeyance and stand transferred to the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench-II, being the competent and jurisdictional Adjudicating Authority under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

(d) Pass such other order(s) as this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

Issues for consideration:

• Whether the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench-II, could exercise jurisdiction over proceedings initiated under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against a Personal Guarantor, when the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor is admittedly pending prior in time before the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II?

• Whether the dismissal of T.A. (IBC) No. 50 (PB) of 2024 by the Ld. Principal Bench, New Delhi, without affording the Appellant an effective and meaningful opportunity of hearing on the foundational objection of lack of jurisdiction under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice which is basic essence of adjudication, thereby vitiating the impugned order and rendering it legally unsustainable?

• Whether the judgment of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court dated 16.10.2025 passed in R/SCA No.11679 of 2024, rendered in the context of administrative transfers, is applicable to, or can govern, judicial transfer applications seeking correction of an inherent and incurable statutory jurisdictional defect under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016?

Appraisal

# 12. The Ld. Adjudicating Authority has dismissed the transfer application, solely relying on the order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in R/Special Civil Application No. 11679 of 2024. The relevant portion of that order is extracted below:

• “[16] On a perusal of Rule 16(d) of the NCLT Rules, 2016, it becomes clear that the Rule defines the powers and functions of the President, Registrar, and Secretary. Under this provision, the President has the authority to transfer cases from one Bench to another within the same Tribunal when circumstances so require. However, the Rule does not confer any power to transfer a case beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a particular Bench. In other words, the President’s authority to transfer matters is confined to Benches falling within the same territorial limits.

In the present case, the NCLT, New Delhi, while acting on the administrative side, has committed a serious error by transferring the cases from the NCLT, Ahmedabad, to the NCLT, Mumbai. The President of the NCLT has no administrative power to alter or extend the territorial jurisdiction of any Bench. Such an administrative decision directly affecting pending judicial proceedings is, therefore, subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the orders dated 6th June 2024 and 10th February 2025 passed by the NCLT, New Delhi, on the administrative side, are without any legal authority and are liable to be quashed and set aside.

Moreover, since the issue of transfer of these petitions was already pending before the NCLT, New Delhi, on the judicial side, the exercise of administrative powers in this manner has rendered those proceedings ineffective, which further fortifies the impropriety of the orders.

I answer the question No.(ii) accordingly.”

# 13. The primary issue for our consideration before us is as to whether NCLT, New Delhi, Bench-II, could exercise jurisdiction over proceedings initiated under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, against a Personal Guarantor, when the CIR Proceedings of the Corporate Debtor is already pending before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, and whether it is against the provisions under Section 60(2) of the Code? Further whether Rule 16(d) of the NCLT Rules, 2016, restricts the power and functions of the President to allow such transfer applications in such situations as is in this case.

# 14. Before proceeding further, it will be useful to extract the provisions of Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code noted as follows:

“Section 60: Adjudicating Authority for corporate persons

(1) The Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors thereof shall be the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the corporate persons located.

(2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1) and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor shall be filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.

(3) An insolvency resolution process or liquidation or bankruptcy proceeding of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of the corporate debtor pending in any court or tribunal shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of such corporate debtor”

# 15. We note that Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, clearly provides that where a CIRP or liquidation proceeding of a Corporate Debtor is pending before a particular Bench of the NCLT, any application relating to the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy of the Personal Guarantor of such Corporate Debtor shall be filed before the same Bench. Apparently, the intent is to ensure consolidation of proceedings, judicial consistency, and avoidance of conflicting decisions. The provisions of Section 60(2), because of use of non-obstinate clause, will have an overriding effect under the circumstances to Section 60(1), as far as it relates to defining of territorial jurisdiction for cognizance of proceeding under the Code. Thus, this is an overriding statutory mandate under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Therefore, NCLT, New Delhi, lacks both territorial jurisdiction as well as inherent jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with the Section 95 application against the Appellant, and any continuation of such proceedings would be void ab initio and without jurisdiction.

# 16. It was also brought to our notice that this Appellate Tribunal in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 58 of 2023, Ankit Miglani v. State Bank of India [(2023) ibclaw.in 292 NCLAT], after an exhaustive consideration of the scheme and scope of Section 60(1), (2) and (3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, decided on 19.04.2023, that Section 60(2) of the Code is mandatory in nature and admits of no discretion. It was held that:

• The Scheme of the Code as per Section 60 is that Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors in the NCLT having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of a corporate person is located. The Corporate Person in the present case is Uttam Galva Metallics Limited, whose registered office admittedly is in the State of Haryana. Sub-section (2) of Section 60 contains an addition to Section 60(1), which provides that where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution process of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor shall be filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.

# 17. We further note that, this Appellate Tribunal had also considered the Scheme of Section 60, sub-section (2) in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.60 of 2022 – State Bank of India, Stressed Asset Management Branch vs. Mahendra Kumar Jajodia, Personal Guarantor to Corporate Debtor [(2022) ibclaw.in 89 NCLAT], wherein, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority had held that no CIRP or liquidation proceedings of the Corporate Debtor being pending, the Application filed under Section 95 was rejected. In the above context, this Appellate Tribunal examined the statutory Scheme of Section 60 and in paragraphs 7 to 10, following was held:

• “7. Sub-Section 1 of Section 60 provides that Adjudicating Authority for the corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors shall be the NCLT. The Sub-Section 2 of Section 60 requires that where a CIRP or Liquidation Process of the Corporate Debtor is pending before ‘a’ National Company Law Tribunal the application relating to CIRP of the Corporate Guarantor or Personal Guarantor as the case may be of such Corporate Debtor shall be filed before ‘such’ National Company Law Tribunal. The purpose and object of the sub-section 2 of Section 60 of the Code is that when proceedings are pending in ‘a’ National Company Law Tribunal, any proceeding against Corporate Guarantor should also be filed before ‘such’ National Company Law Tribunal. The idea is that both proceedings be entertained by one and the same NCLT. The sub-section 2 of Section 60 does not in any way prohibit filing of proceedings under Section 95 of the Code even if no proceeding are pending before NCLT.

• 8. The use of words ‘a’ and ‘such’ before National Company Law Tribunal clearly indicates that Section 60(2) was applicable only when a CIRP or Liquidation Proceeding of a Corporate Debtor is pending before NCLT. The object is that when a CIRP or Liquidation Proceeding of a Corporate Debtor is pending before ‘a’ NCLT the application relating to Insolvency Process of a Corporate Guarantor or Personal Guarantor should be filed before the same NCLT. This was to avoid two different NCLT to take up CIRP of Corporate Guarantor. Section 60(2) is applicable only when CIRP or Liquidation Proceeding of a Corporate Debtor is pending, when CIRP or Liquidation Proceeding are not pending with regard to the Corporate Debtor there is no applicability of Section 60(2).

• 9. Section 60(2) begins with expression ‘Without prejudice to sub-section (1)’ thus provision of Section 60(2) are without prejudice to Section 60(1) and are supplemental to sub-section (1) of Section 60.

• 10. Sub-Section 1 of Section 60 provides that Adjudicating Authority in relation to Insolvency or Liquidation for Corporate Debtor including Corporate Guarantor or Personal Guarantor shall be the NCLT having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the Registered Office of the Corporate Person is located. The substantive provision for an Adjudicating Authority is Section 60, sub-Section (1), when a particular case is not covered under Section 60(2) the Application as referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 60 can be very well filed in the NCLT having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the Registered Office of corporate Person is located.”

# 18. As noted by this Appellate Tribunal in above noted judgments, we find that it has been unequivocally laid down that where a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the Corporate Debtor is pending before a particular Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal, any application relating to the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy of the Personal Guarantor of such Corporate Debtor must necessarily be instituted before the very same Ld. Adjudicating Authority (Bench), and not before any other Bench. It ensures consolidation of proceedings, judicial consistency, and avoidance of parallel or conflicting decisions by different Benches of the NCLT. Furthermore, we agree with the arguments that assumption of jurisdiction by any other Bench, in the absence of a pending CIRP before it, constitutes a lack of territorial jurisdiction. We thus find that by applying the said ratio, once the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor is admittedly pending before the Hon’ble NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, the initiation and continuation of proceedings under Section 95 IBC against the Appellant before the Hon’ble NCLT, Bench-II, New Delhi are wholly without jurisdiction, non-est in law, and liable to be set aside.

# 19. The Impugned Order, therefore, runs directly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Appellate Tribunal and warrants our interference on this ground alone. Thus, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the statutory mandate contained in Section 60(2) read with Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, it is manifest that the assumption and continuation of jurisdiction by the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi in CP (IB) No. 419/ND/2023 is wholly without authority of law and vitiated by a jurisdictional error.

# 20. The position of law as per Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 and the related NCLT Rules 2016 is recapitulated as below for ready reference:

• Section 60 (2): Without prejudice to sub-section (1) and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor shall be filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.

• Rule 16 (d) in addition to the general powers provided in the Act and in these Rules, the President shall exercise the following powers, namely: – transfer any case from one Bench to other Bench when the circumstances so warrant”

• “Bench” per Rule 2(7) of NCLT Rules 2016: “bench means a bench of the tribunal constituted under Section 419 of the Act and includes circuit benches constituted by the President with prior approval of the Central Government to sit at such other geographical locations as may be necessary, having regard to requirements.”

# 21. The perusal of the above legal position makes things very clear. Rule 16(d) of the NCLT Rules 2016, administratively equips the President NCLT with sufficient power to transfer any case from one bench to the other bench. Further, the power of President NCLT is not restricted nor clouded to any territorial location. Rather the President NCLT is empowered to transfer a case as per the criteria laid down in section 60(2) of the Code, which empowers to transfer proceedings against personal guarantor from some other bench to where the proceedings against the Corporate Debtor were going on. We note that it will create anomalous situations by a narrow interpretation that Rule 16(d) restricts it to the same territorial jurisdiction as has happened in this particular case.

# 22. We thus observe that a combined reading of Section 60 of the Code, Rule 16 (d) and Rule 2(7) of NCLT Rules 2016 indicates that the President NCLT is empowered to transfer any case from one bench to the other bench having regard to requirements. It is all the more important per Section 60 when the CIR proceeding against the Corporate Debtor is going on in one bench, the President is very well empowered under Section 60(2) of the Code to transfer proceedings against personal guarantor from some other bench to where the proceedings against the corporate debtor were going on.

# 23. We note that the insolvency proceedings against the Corporate Debtor are going on in the NCLT bench in Chandigarh and the insolvency proceedings against the personal guarantor have been initiated in another bench in another territorial location at New Delhi. Even the transfer application has been dismissed by the President NCLT, ignoring the provisions in Section 60(2) of the Code but on a very narrow interpretation of Rule 16(d) that the proceedings cannot be transferred from one territorial jurisdiction to another territorial jurisdiction.

# 24. Thus we find that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has misconstrued the scope of Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 as being confined only to intra-territorial transfers, thereby completely disregarding and rendering otiose the jurisdictional command contained in Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, though being overriding provision which obligates that all insolvency proceedings in respect of a Corporate Debtor and its corporate guarantor must be heard by the same Ld. Adjudicating Authority (Bench) having jurisdiction over the Corporate Debtor. Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in clear and mandatory terms, provides that where a CIRP or liquidation proceeding of a Corporate Debtor is pending before a particular Bench of the NCLT, any application relating to the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy of the Personal Guarantor of such Corporate Debtor shall be filed before the same Bench. In view of the aforesaid overriding statutory mandate under Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Hon’ble NCLT, New Delhi, lacks both territorial jurisdiction as well as inherent jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with the Section 95 application against the Appellant, and any continuation of such proceedings would be void ab initio, coram non judice, without jurisdiction, and wholly unsustainable in law.

# 25. We also note that the Transfer Application specifically raised a threshold and objection of jurisdiction, contending that proceedings under Section 95 IBC against a Personal Guarantor cannot be maintained before NCLT New Delhi when the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor is pending before NCLT Chandigarh, which alone has exclusive territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction under Section 60(2) of the Code. In this case we find that the proceedings against the Corporate Debtor were going on in NCLT Chandigarh in one of the benches and simultaneously proceedings against the personal guarantor have been initiated in NCLT Delhi in another bench. It would have been appropriate that this application should have been dismissed as non-maintainable at the stage of the admission itself and the applicant should have been advised to file it before the appropriate bench, that is in Chandigarh. In any case when the transfer application was filed before the President, the President while relying on the judgement of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court has not been allowed the transfer, which is against the provisions of the Code and a very narrow interpretation of Rule 16 (d) of the NCLT Rules.

Orders

# 26. Therefore, we set aside the order of the President NCLT in TA(IBC)-50(PB)/2024 and quash the proceedings in CP(IB) No. 419/ND/2023. Respondents are provided liberty to file proceedings as per law as an Operational Creditor under Section 95 before NCLT with appropriate jurisdiction in the matter.

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Kanta Gupta vs Bank of India & Ors. - The principle which is enshrined under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is pertaining to getting the benefit of the acknowledgement made in writing by the opposite party against whom some right is being claimed, however, the same could not be claimed by the person on the basis of his own act.

 NCLAT (2026.08.21) in  Kanta Gupta  vs  Bank of India & Ors. [Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1058 of 2026 & I.A. No. 4167, 4168, 4169, 4477 of 2026] held that;

• The principle which is enshrined under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is pertaining to getting the benefit of the acknowledgement made in writing by the opposite party against whom some right is being claimed, however, the same could not be claimed by the person on the basis of his own act.

• In simple words, if the acknowledgement has been made by the opposite party in writing against whom any right is being asserted, the same acknowledgement may enhance the period of limitation. However, a party, by making any document, himself, cannot extend the period of limitation by invoking section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act.

Blogger’s Comments; NCLAT laid down guidelines for looking into limitation aspect in section 94 applications. but the following question was not examined-          

• “Whether limitation is required to be looked into, in an application filed under section 94 of the IBC.”

Hon’ble Supreme Court (1992.04.20) in Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.) held that;

• "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy  the rights of the parties.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to  the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. .

Further Hon’ble Supreme Court (2018.10.11) in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017] has in length noted the difference between debt “due and payable” from debts “due and recoverable”. 

• # 20. Shri Dholakia went on to cite Bhimsen Gupta v. Bishwanath Prasad Gupta, (2004) 4 SCC 95, and In re Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia, AIR 1950 Bom 74, for the proposition that debts “due and payable” must be differentiated from debts “due and recoverable”. . . .

•  . . . . .In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 328] it has been held that when the debt becomes time-barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt.” 

In the teeth of Hon’ble Supreme Court observations that Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt., how come section 94 application can be time barred.

Excerpts of the Order; 

The instant appeal has been filed by the Appellant, who is the personal guarantor of the principal borrower, against the impugned order dated 26-05-2026 passed by the Ld. National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (Adjudicating Authority) in CP No. 295 of 2025, whereby the petition filed by the Appellant under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) was dismissed on the grounds that the same is barred by limitation.

# 2. During the pendency of the instant appeal the Liquidator has issued an auction notice for the purpose of inviting bids for the auction of the leasehold rights in the subject property, along with the building constructed thereon, at a reserve price of Rs. 49 Crores 50 Lakhs. The Appellant has also moved IA No. 4477 of 2026 challenging the said auction notice.

# 3. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal appears to be that the appellant is the personal guarantor of the loan made available to the corporate debtor, namely M/s OSIL Exports Limited, which had availed credit facilities from five banks under a consortium arrangement, namely:

• Bank of India, being the lead bank

• State Bank of India

• State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur

• State Bank of Patiala

• Oriental Bank of Commerce

Appellant had extended personal guarantees, which is evident from the deeds of guarantee dated 21-05-2014 and 21-02-2015. On the happening of the default, Bank of India had filed a petition under Section 7 of the Code against the corporate debtor, being CP No. 128/2017, titled Bank of India vs. OSIL Exports Limited, which was admitted by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority by order dated 31/01/2018.

# 4. It is also reflected that as no viable Resolution Plan was accepted by the CoC, and the Resolution Professional filed IA No. 526 of 2018 under Section 33 of the Code seeking liquidation of the CD and by order dated 17-10-2019, the liquidation process was commenced against the principal borrower/CD.

# 5. It is further reflected that on 10-9-2019, Bank of India issued notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, to the Appellant and thereby invoked her personal guarantee. The Bank of India, being the lead bank, also issued notice under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, which included the outstanding amount of all the 5 banks and took symbolic possession of the assets of the personal guarantor.

# 6. It is also reflected that on 16/04/21, a one-time settlement proposal was submitted by all guarantors, including the appellant, requesting the financial creditor to consider the OTS on behalf of the corporate debtor. The guarantors offered Rs. 22 Crore to settle the dispute. The revised OTS proposal was also submitted by the Appellant on 03/04/2023.

# 7. It is further reflected that the appellant filed CP No. 295/2025 under Section 94 of the IBC before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority on 18-12-25 and vide order dated 20-01-2026, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority appointed Resolution Professional, who submitted his report recommending admission of the petition and observing that the debt was within limitation. The Bank of India, however, filed objections with regard to the report of the Resolution Professional, and Appellant also filed objections to the response. The petition filed by Appellant under Section 94 of the Code was dismissed by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority by passing impugned order dated 26/05/2026.

# 8. We have heard the Ld. Counsels for the parties and have perused the record.

# 9. Ld. Sr. Counsel appearing for the Appellant submits that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has committed an illegality in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Section 94 of the Code, as the last milestone for expiry of limitation period has not yet happened, as the recovery certificate was not issued. Elaborating further, it is submitted that the limitation for taking proceedings under Section 94 would commence from the cause of action. However, the cause of action in this case has arisen on 27/6/2016, when Section 13(2) notice was issued and ultimately a recovery certificate was issued on 18/2/2019. Thereafter, the OTS proposals was submitted to the creditors, and having regard to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the acknowledgement made by way of these OTS proposals had extended the limitation period for another three years.

# 10. It is further submitted that the DRT proceedings are still pending against the Appellant, which has not culminated till date, and therefore the underlying borrower’s guaranteed debt is still subsisting and enforceable. Therefore, the rejection of the Section 94 petition by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority is erroneous on the score that:

• the underlying debt recovery is still underway and pending

• the recovery certificate has still not been issued

• the corporate debtor is still continuing in liquidation, of which the residual debt is liable to be paid by the personal guarantor, i.e. the Appellant

Elaborating further, it is submitted that the CD is under liquidation, and the liquidation process has still not culminated, therefore, the debt is still enforceable, and therefore the petition filed by the Appellant under Section 94 of the Code may not be said to be barred by limitation.

# 11. It is further submitted that Section 18 of the Limitation Act does not distinguish between a creditor and debtor, and it will apply with equal force to the debtor as well as to the creditor. Therefore, the approach of the Ld. Tribunal is erroneous.

# 12. It is further submitted that in the present case, Section 13 (2) notice was issued on 10-09-2019, and the expiry of 60 days mentioned therein constituted the date of default, i.e., 10-11-2019. However, the date of default only indicates the first trigger for limitation. Therefore, it was imperative that further acts or causes of action would renew the period of limitation, and this aspect of the matter has been ignored by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority.

# 13. It is vehemently submitted that when a creditor can use the acknowledgements made by the debtor under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, why the same acknowledgements could not be used by the debtor? It is submitted that, at the cost of repetition, it is to be highlighted that Section 94 does not trigger on the first cause of action and allows the debtor to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority thereafter at any date where the settlement of the dues may be in sight.

# 14. It is further submitted that the petition filed by the Appellant was within time, as the liquidation process was pending against the CD and the debt was enforceable. Moreover, Section 18 provides a new cause of action has arisen due to the proposals made by the Appellant in the form of OTS.

# 15. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1, however, submits that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has correctly dismissed the application moved by the appellant under Section 94 of the code as the appellant, in its own application, admits that the cause of action is the invocation of the guarantee by notice dated 10/09/2019 and thereafter, the limitation would be available only till 10/09/2022, as specified under Article 137 of the Limitation. It is highlighted that this Appellate Tribunal in Suyog Jain v. Aravind Kumar [(2025) ibclaw.in 635 NCLAT] : 2025 SCC Online NCLAT 1354 has held that the limitation for the sake of filing an application under Section 94 of the Code has to be filed within a period of 3 years of the commencement of default (i.e., from the invocation of guarantee).

# 16. It is further submitted that this contention of the Appellant is patently wrong that, by virtue of the OTS proposals proposed by Appellant and rejected by the Bank, the same would result in extension of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The law is well settled that once limitation starts, it runs continuously and cannot be stopped. Further, the appellant cannot seek any benefit under Section 18 of the Limitation Act by way of its own acknowledgment, which has been disputed by the respondent, against whom such right is being claimed. It is also highlighted that Section 18 categorically states that the acknowledgement of liability has to be signed by the party against whom such right is being claimed. While there is no such signed document available with the Appellant, which may extend the limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

# 17. It is further submitted that Section 94 application was moved to abuse the process of law. This Appellate Tribunal in Ashwani Kumar Oberoi versus SBI [(2026) ibclaw.in 635 NCLAT] : 2026 SCC Online Nclat 595 and in Rojina firoz Hajiani versus Union of India [(2026) ibclaw.in 1653 HC] : 2026 267 COMP CAS 82 has held that the provision of 94 IBC is being broadly misused by the guarantors to delay the proceedings of SARAFAESI Act, 2002.

# 18. It is further submitted that by moving IA No. 4477 of 2026, the Appellant has sought the stay of auction notice dated 30 June 2026 issued by the Respondent Bank, however the relief sought is beyond the jurisdiction of this appellate tribunal, as the auction notice has been issued under SARAFAESI Act, 2002 and the jurisdiction with regard to the said notice lies with the DRT.

# 19. It is further submitted that the judgment passed by the Learned Adjudicating Authority is a well-reasoned judgment, and no interference is required therein. The Appellant has sat quietly for a period of over six years since the issuance of Demand Notice, which has been issued under Section 13(2) of the SARAFAESI Act, 2002 by the Respondent Bank. The Appellant has only instituted the present proceedings with the objective of claiming the benefit of moratorium under Section 96 of the Code, which has subsequently been amended to not apply to applications for personal insolvency (owing to its flagrant misuse to stall the execution of remedies available to banks and financial institutions under the SARAFAESI Act, 2002). Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

# 20. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has relied on the law laid down by this appellate tribunal in 

• Suyog Jain v. Arvind Kumar, [(2025) ibclaw.in 635 NCLAT] : 2025 SCC online NCLAT 1354, 

• Ashwani Kumar Oberoi v. SBI, [(2026) ibclaw.in 635 NCLAT] : 2026 SCC online NCLAT 595, and 

• Rozina Feroz Hajiani Vs Union of India, [(2026) ibclaw.in 1653 HC] : (2026) 267 Comp Cas 82.

# 21. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 – liquidator submits that OSIL Exports Limited (CD) availed various financial facilities in 2014, and the appellant and her husband, being the suspended directors of the CD, executed personal guarantees in favour of the lenders. Upon default by the CD, the loan account was classified as December 2015.

# 22. It is further submitted that Respondent No. 1, Bank of India, initiated CIRP against the CD under Section 7 of the IBC, which was admitted by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority on 31stJanuary 2018. As no resolution plan was received, the CD was ordered into liquidation vide order dated 17th October 2019, and the answering respondent was appointed as the liquidator for the purpose of conducting the liquidation process.

# 23. It is further submitted that during the liquidation process, the Respondent initiated proceedings under the SARAFAESI Act, 2002 by issuing the demand notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act on 10/09/2019, and a possession notice under Section 13(4) in respect of the subject property was also given. It was during the pendency of this liquidation proceedings Appellant filed an application under Section 94 of the Code on 3rd December 2025, consequently RP was appointed by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority under Section 97 of the Code, who submitted report under Section 99 recommending admission of the application on the ground that the Appellant’s OTS proposal dated 16 April 2021 and 3rd April 2023 extended limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Respondent bank has taken objection that the application is barred by limitation and also that there is no valid acknowledgement. Accordingly, the application filed by the appellant under Section 94 of the Code was dismissed by passing the impugned order on the ground of being barred by limitation. The liquidator in terms of liquidation regulations, published an auction notice on June 30, 2026, inviting bidders for the auction of the leasehold rights of the subject property along with the building constructed thereon at a reserve price of Rs. 49,50,00,000/- and the appellant has also challenged auction notice by moving an application being IA No. 4477 of 2026.

# 24. Ld. Counsel for the Liquidator submits that the above sequence of events clearly demonstrates that the application under Section 94 of the Code was not a bona fide invocation of the insolvency process but a calculated attempt to obstruct realization of assets by the Banks. Elaborating further, it is submitted that the Respondent-Liquidator convened the 20th Meeting of the SCC on 3rd December 2025, wherein a proposal for joint auction of the assets of the CD and of the Personal Guarantor was under consideration. It is on the same day that the Appellant hurriedly filed the application under Section 94 of the Code to trigger the interim moratorium under Section 96 and thus the proceedings have been filed only for the purpose of stalling the proposed auction.

# 25. It is further submitted that joint auction of assets is permissible for the purpose of value maximization. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Appellant has relied on the law laid down by this Appellate Tribunal in 

• Ayaan Malik v. Pratim Bayal [(2022) ibclaw.in 362 NCLAT] Company (A-T) (I-N-S) No. 456 of 2022 and 

• Mr. Pratik Gupta and others v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited and another [(2022) ibclaw.in 368 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 147 of 2022.

# 26. It is also submitted that the application being IA No. 4477 of 2026, filed under Rules 31 and 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, seeking stay of the Option Notice dated 30 June 2026, is not maintainable. Rule 31 is merely procedural and cannot enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of this appellate tribunal to stay an independent statutory action of the liquidator.

# 27. It is further submitted that by notice dated 30th June 2026, only the leasehold rights are being proposed to be auctioned in view of the lease deed dated 15th October 2010, and it has been specified in the auction notice clearly. Highlighting Section 36(3)(d) and Section 3(27) of the IBC, it is submitted that these sections expressly include contractual rights and every description of proprietary interest within the liquidation estate which may be sold by the liquidator in order to maximize the value. In this regard, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Victory Iron Works Limited v. Jitender Lohia and others, [(2023) ibclaw.in 29 SC] : (2023) 7 SCC 227, has been relied.

# 28. Before proceeding further, it is clarified that on 31st July 2026, we have noted that the Respondent No. 1 has filed the reply. It was also informed that the Respondent No. 1 is the lead bank, while Respondent No. 2 and 3 are members of the consortium. Therefore, the reply filed by the Respondent No. 1 may also be deemed to be the reply filed by the respondent No. 2 and 3. In this regard, the statement made by the counsel for respondent No. 1 was recorded. We have to place on record that, vide order dated 22nd July 2026, we permitted the appellant to file amended memo of parties, which has been filed. Now, having regard to the amended memo of parties, the Bank of India, Punjab National Bank, Rare Assets Reconstruction Limited, Mr. Diwan Asparan Nabi, and OSIL Exports Limited have been arrayed as Respondent No. 1 to 5, respectively.

# 29. We also place on record that on 31st July 2026, we have heard the submissions made by Ld. Counsel for the Appellant as well as Ld. Counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1, 4 and 5.

# 30. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, we notice that there are certain facts in the instant appeal which are admitted to the Appellant. In view of the facts stated by the appellant in the memo of appeal and in the list of dates and events, it appears to be admitted to the appellant that he had executed deeds of personal guarantee in favour of the consortium lenders in respect of credit facilities availed by OSIL exports Limited vide guarantee deeds dated 21st May 2014 and 21st February 2015. The loan account of the CD was classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 31st Dec 2015.

# 31. It is also admitted to the Appellant that the Respondent No. 1, Bank of India, filed a petition under Section 7 of the Code against the CD on 29/11/2017, and the Learned Adjudicating Authority vide Order dated 31/01/2018 initiated the CIRP against the CD.

# 32. It is also admitted to the Appellant that vide notice issued under Section 13 of the SARAFAESI Act, 2002 on 10/09/2019, the personal guarantee was invoked against the Appellant and also that in absence of any viable Resolution Plan, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has directed the initiation of liquidation proceedings against the CD on 17th October 2019.

# 33. It is also admitted to the Appellant that the Respondent No. 1, Bank of India, issued possession notice under Section 13(4) of the SARAFAESI Act, 2002, and took symbolic possession of assets of the Appellant on 25-11-2019.

# 34. It is further stated by the appellant that the appellant submitted one-time settlement proposal on 16-04-2021 and a revised OTS proposal on 03-04-2023. Petition under Section 94 of the IBC was filed by the Appellant on 18th December 2025, whereon, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority appointed a Resolution Professional on 20th January 2026, who submitted his report on 05/02/2026 in favour of the Appellant. However, Bank of India filed objections to this report, contending that the application is beyond limitation and also that the recovery proceedings had already been initiated. The Appellant also filed a reply to the objections of the Bank of India, however, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority dismissed the Section 94 petition by passing the impugned order.

# 35. The main thrust of the submissions advanced by Ld. Counsel for the appellant is on the fact that by submitting OTS proposals dated 16-04-2021 and revised proposal on 03-04-2023 within the period of limitation of three years since invocation of guarantee on 10.09.2019, the same would constitute valid acknowledgement of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and a fresh period of three years would commence from such acknowledgement in writing and thus period till 03.04.2026 was available to the guarantor to file petition.

# 36. Ld. Counsels for the Respondents have contended that Section 94 application was moved with mala fide intent and was not a bona fide invocation of the insolvency process and it is a calculated attempt to obstruct realization of assets by the banks. It is highlighted that 20th meeting of the SCC was held on 03/12/2025, wherein a proposal for joint auction of the assets of the CD and of the personal guarantor was under consideration. On the very same day, the appellant hurriedly filed the application under Section 94 of the code only for the purpose of triggering the interim moratorium under Section 96 and it was not a sincere effort for submitting any repayment plan.

# 37. It was also highlighted that the guarantee was invoked in the year 2019, and the petition under Section 94 was filed after six years, which itself shows that the same has not been filed with any bona fide intention. It is also the case of the respondents that by moving any OTS, the appellant cannot invoke Section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act for the purpose of extension of limitation.

# 38. We also notice that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order has given following reasons for dismissing the application filed by the Appellant under Section 94 of the Code: –

• “5. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the Creditor and the RP. As can be seen from the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, where before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation for a suit or application in respect of any property or right an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act reads thus:

• “Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (India) deals with the effect of acknowledgment in writing. It provides:

• Where, before the expiration of the prescribed limitation period for a suit or application relating to any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability regarding that property or right is made in writing and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed (or by a person through whom he derives title or liability), a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the acknowledgment was signed”.

• 6. From the aforementioned provisions, it is clear that the acknowledgment should be made by the parties against whom the right is claimed. In the present case, when the debtor has initiated the process to offer repayment plan to creditors, the Bank of India as one of the creditor has opposed the report of RP. To take the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the RP need to show the acknowledgment from the Bank of India, which has actively opposed the admission of the present petition. The RP/debtor cannot seek the benefit of the act of debtor. If an acknowledgment by the party pursuing the cause is relied upon to give benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the provision could be widely abused. It could be different issue if the creditor i.e. Bank of India, had accepted the proposal and then the debtor/PG subsequently committed default in repaying the amount of debt (settled amount). However, such is not the position in the present case. Indubitably, Account of the principal debtor was declared as NPA on 31.12.2015 and the notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 was issued on 10.09.2019, thus the debtor had period of limitation available to him to file petition under Section 94 of IBC, 2016 till 09.09.2022. The petition preferred under Section 94 of the Code in the year 2025, is barred by limitation and deserves to be rejected. In the wake, the recommendation/report given by the RP as annexed and the petition preferred under Section 94 of IBC are rejected. IA(IBC)/195(CH) 2026 and CP(IB) No.295/Chd/Hry/2025 are accordingly disposed of”.

# 39. We at the outset record that the view adopted by Ld. Adjudicating Authority is in accordance with law and in our considered opinion also, the appellant by any unilateral act cannot enhance or extend the limitation.

• Section 18 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides as under:

• “Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed”.

The principle which is enshrined under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is pertaining to getting the benefit of the acknowledgement made in writing by the opposite party against whom some right is being claimed, however, the same could not be claimed by the person on the basis of his own act. In simple words, if the acknowledgement has been made by the opposite party in writing against whom any right is being asserted, the same acknowledgement may enhance the period of limitation. However, a party, by making any document, himself, cannot extend the period of limitation by invoking section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act. In this regard the law laid down by this appellate tribunal in Zameer Pawan Kumar Agarwal v. Pankaj Prabhudayal Goenka (RP) and Ors., (2025) ibclaw.in 1044 NCLAT may be recalled.

# 40. In fact, Zamir Pawan Kumar Agarwal (supra) was cited by Ld. Senior Counsel, appearing for the Appellant, in order to project that the limitation period would start from the date when the recovery certificate has been issued. However, we are of the considered view that the limitation period, so far as the guarantor is concerned, would commence from the date of invocation of the guarantee. In the aforesaid case of Zamir Pawan Kumar Agarwal, a coordinate branch of this Appellate Tribunal has categorically held that the mere fact that the Appellant gave an OTS proposal to the bank shall not give any benefit under Section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act to the Appellant for completing the limitation period.

# 41. This Appellate Tribunal, in Yogesh Kumar Thakkar vs Indian Overseas Banks and Others (2026) ibclaw.in 655 NCLAT, categorically held that for Section 94 application, the limitation would start running against the personal guarantor for initiating proceeding under Section 94 of the Code from the cause of action which according to the Tribunal occurred in that case on 27/06/2016 when the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARAFAESI Act, 2002, was issued, and thereafter, when recovery certificate was issued on 18/02/2019. Thus the cause of action would accrue from invocation of guarantee.

# 42. This may be viewed from another angle. An OTS, which has been moved by the guarantor, is nothing but an admission of liability. Having regard to the general principles of admissions, a party making an admission cannot use the same for his own benefit. Rather, the admission made by a party can be proved against him by the other party. The OTS, which has been moved by the Appellant as a personal guarantor, could be used by the bank for invoking Section 18 of the Limitation Act, but the same could not be used by the Appellant/Guarantor himself in order to extend the limitation.

# 43. Thus, if we exclude the period which has been included by the appellant in view of Section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act, it would emerge that the three-year period provided under Section 137 of the Indian Limitation Act has expired much before the institution of the proceeding by the appellant, under Section 94 of the Code, on 18-12-2025. Thus, the petition filed by the appellant under Section 94 of the Code was clearly barred by limitation.

# 44. Since we have found that the petition filed by the Appellant under Section 94 of the Code is barred by limitation, we are not commenting on the timing of filing the Section 94 petition by the Appellant as highlighted by the Respondent and suffice it is to say that by passing the impugned order, no illegality appears to have been committed by Ld. Adjudicating Authority.

# 45. Thus, for the reasons given here in before, we do not find any merit in the appeal filed by the appellant, therefore the appeal as well as the IA No. 4477 of 2026 filed by the appellant is hereby dismissed.

# 46. There is no order as to costs.

# 47. Pending I.A.’s, if any, is also disposed of.

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