Samunnati Finance Pvt. Ltd. vs Renukadevi Anguraj - We fully endorse with the view taken by the Principal Bench, NCLT, New Delhi in the case of Alchemist Asset Reconstruction supra, in the order dated 25.01.2022 that Personal Guarantor is an individual who has stood as Guarantee to the Corporate Debtor. Section 95 petition is for initiating insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor and it is not the case for recovery of any amount because that will go contrary to the scheme of IBC, 2016. In such a situation, on the demise of the Personal Guarantor the proceedings under Section 95 of IBC against an individual who has given his guarantee in favour of Corporate Debtor after her death, would abate and the petition under Section 95 has to be closed.

 NCLT Chennai (2026.10.07) in Samunnati Finance Pvt. Ltd. vs Renukadevi Anguraj   [(2026) ibclaw.in 3860 NCLT, CP(IB)/251(CHE)/2025 along with IA(IBC)/1587(CHE)/2025 in CP(IB)/251(CHE)/2025] held that; 

• We fully endorse with the view taken by the Principal Bench, NCLT, New Delhi in the case of Alchemist Asset Reconstruction supra, in the order dated 25.01.2022 that Personal Guarantor is an individual who has stood as Guarantee to the Corporate Debtor. Section 95 petition is for initiating insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor and it is not the case for recovery of any amount because that will go contrary to the scheme of IBC, 2016. In such a situation, on the demise of the Personal Guarantor the proceedings under Section 95 of IBC against an individual who has given his guarantee in favour of Corporate Debtor after her death, would abate and the petition under Section 95 has to be closed.

• It was rightly observed in the case of Bank of Baroda supra that the assets of the Personal Guarantor are hit by moratorium and if the legal heirs of the deceased guarantor are put into the shoes of the Personal Guarantor, their personal assets will also get automatically hit by the moratorium which will cause grave prejudice to the rights of the third party. Further, there is no provision in the Code envisaging the concept of legal heirs stepping into the shoes of the deceased Personal Guarantor.

Excerpts of the order;

# 1. This Petition has been filed u/s. 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “IBC, 2016″) r/w Rule 7(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 by Samunnati Finance Private Limited (“Financial Creditor”) for initiating insolvency resolution process against Ms. Renukadevi Anguraj (“Personal Guarantor”) in respect of default amount of Rs. 5,35,96,045 /- together with interest and penalties. The Date of Default, as specified in Part-III of the Petition, is 25.03.2024. The Petitioner has placed Deed of Guarantee dated 27.02.2019 and 05.01.2023 and Demand Notice under Form B dated 29.04.2025. This Petition has been filed on 02.08.2025.

# 2. Part -1 of the petition provides the details of the Financial Creditor i.e. Samunnati Finance Private Limited. Part – II of the petition provides the details of the Personal Guarantor i.e. Renukadevi Anguraj. She was the resident of 3/5 Nagar, Dindigul Main Road, Dindigul, Tamilnadu – 624619. She was Director in the Corporate Debtor Srinithi Enterprises Private Limited which has its registered office at Sarada Nagar, Virugambakkam, Chennai within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. Part – III of the petition sets out the particulars of the debt being Rs. 5,35,96,045/- as on 29.04.2025 and the date of default as 25.03.2024.

# 3. As per the averments made in the petition, the Corporate Debtor engaged in the trading of dairy products had availed short term loan of Rs. 3.0 Crore from the Financial Creditor Samunnati Financial Intermediation and Services Private Limited, NBFC registered with RBI which was transferred with Samunnati Finance Private Limited by the order of NCLT Chennai Bench vide dated 23.12.2022. The short term loan was renewed / modified / enhanced from time to time and the last renewal was made vide sanction letter dated 30.12.2022 enhancing the credit facility limit to Rs. 4.0 Crore. The Corporate Debtor executed various documents favouring the Financial Creditor. The Respondent / Director of the Corporate Debtor along with three others executed a deed of personal guarantee dated 05.01.2023 where they including the Respondent irrevocably, absolutely and unconditionally agreed to guarantee the repayment of loan obligations in the event of default by the Corporate Debtor. It is stated that despite multiple demand notices and reminder letters, the Corporate Debtor failed to make any payments towards the outstanding dues on the due dates. Accordingly, the Financial Creditor issued a recall notice dated 14.05.2024 to the Corporate Debtor and the Guarantors demanding repayment of a sum of Rs. 4,23,11,085/- overdue from the Corporate Debtor along with interest and penalty. However, they did not comply with the said demand and failed to discharge their liability arising out of the loan agreement and the deed of personal guarantee. The Financial Creditor then on 29.04.2025 issued a demand notice under Form B of Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 to the Personal Guarantors including the Respondent which was delivered on 02.05.2025, but the Respondent / Personal Guarantor neither responded to the notice nor filed any reply which made the Petitioner file the petition.

# 4. The Petitioner has placed the documents as detailed in the annexures to the petition at page 20 to 153.

# 5. On this petition, report from the IRP was called. He filed the report in IA(IBC)/1587(CHE)/2025 under Section 99 of IBC whereby she recommended for initiation of insolvency proceedings against the Respondent / Personal Guarantor Ms. Renukadevi Anguraj. The report is taken on record and the application IA(IBC)/1587(CHE)/2025 is disposed of.

# 6. Notice of the petition and the report was sent to the Respondent / Personal Guarantor. Shri. Prannit Stefano, Counsel appeared for the Personal Guarantor and submitted that the Personal Guarantor Ms. Renukadevi Anguraj has died in an accident. He filed the death certificate. On perusal, we find that she died on 19.04.2026 in an accident. This fact is also confirmed by the Counsel appeared on behalf of the Petitioner.

# 7. It is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the proceedings against the Personal Guarantor have to be closed as the proceedings will abate consequent to the death of the Personal Guarantor. Reference has been made to the definition of Personal Guarantor given in Section 5(22) of IBC which means an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a Corporate Debtor. It is submitted that the Personal Guarantor is an individual who stood as a Guarantee to the Corporate Debtor and therefore on her demise, the proceedings against the Personal Guarantor would abate. It is submitted that the proceedings under IBC are not in the nature of recovery.

# 8. The case of Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company vs. Deepak Puri in IB/438(PB)(2021) is referred where the Principal Bench of NCLT, New Delhi in its order dated 25.01.2022, held that in the case of proceedings under Section 95 of IBC which is not a case for recovery of any amount, after the demise of the Personal Guarantor as an individual who has given a guarantee in favour of the Corporate Debtor, there is no question of continuing the proceedings against such a dead person and the proceedings have to be closed. The case of Bank of Baroda, SAMB vs. Divya Jalan, CP(IB) No.363/2021 is also referred where NCLT, Kolkata Bench took a similar view in its order dated 11.02.2022. Following provisions / regulations were cited which are reproduced as under:

# 9. In the order, it was held that in a petition under Section 95 of IBC, the assets of the Personal Guarantor are hit by moratorium and if legal heirs of the deceased Personal Guarantor are put into the shoes of the Personal Guarantor, then their personal assets will also get automatically hit by moratorium which will cause grave prejudice to the rights of the third party. There is no provision in the Code which envisages the concept of legal heirs stepping into the shoes of the deceased Personal Guarantor. It was held that the petition cannot be maintained against the legal heirs of the deceased Personal Guarantor. However, liberty was given to the creditor to pursue other recovery measures available under the law.

# 10. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner per contra argued that as per section 169 of IBC, 2016 proceedings can be continued against the legal heirs of the bankrupt and also the said provision is in pari-materia to section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and section 93 of the Presidency Town Insolvency Act, 1909.

# 11. Ld. Counsel referred the case of State Bank of India SAMB v. Vijay Pal Garg IB 112(ND)/2022 where the case of IB/438/PB of 2021 titled Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company supra, was discussed where it was observed that in the instant case, no death certificate has been produced regarding the death of the Personal Guarantor. In the absence of any document, it cannot be presumed that the person has expired. Order 22 Rule 4 and Rule 4A CPC, 1908 were referred which provide that if the sole defendant dies, right to sue survives against the legal representatives of the deceased defendant. It was observed that the Ld. Principal Bench did not consider Order 22 Rule 4 and Rue 4A while passing the order. The Tribunal thereafter directed the person appearing on behalf of the Personal Guarantor to file an affidavit whether personal guarantor is still alive or not. Ld. Counsel also referred the case of Reliance Capital AF Trustee Company Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Sailesh & Anr. CP(IB) No.132 of 2020 decided on 08.06.2022. Ld., Counsel submits that this issue is pending consideration before the Hon’ble NCLAT.

# 12. Ld. Counsel has also referred the case of Invent Assests Securitization and reconstruction Private Limited vs. Popatlal K Jain (Legal heir of late Smt Sakuben K Jain Personal Guarantor of Shree Daksh Jyot Silk Mills Private Limited) CP(IB)-203(MB)/2023 to contend that legal heirs can be substituted in place of the deceased personal guarantor.

# 13. Ld. Counsel argued that under the old insolvency laws, like the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, proceedings could continue against the estate of a deceased debtor by substituting legal heirs, and therefore a similar approach should be taken under the IBC.

# 14. We have given our thoughtful consideration to contentions of both the parties.

# 15. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner contends that, in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, proceedings could continue against the estate of a deceased debtor by substituting legal heirs, and therefore a similar approach should be taken under the IBC. This Tribunal is of the view that, this contention of the Petitioner does not hold any merit as those enactments have been repealed by Section 243 of the Code and creditors are free to proceed against the estate of the deceased guarantor under other laws, such as the Indian Contract Act and the CPC, but not under the IBC framework.

# 16. It is not in dispute that the Respondent/Personal Guarantor expired on 19.04.2026. Death Certificate in this respect has been placed on record.

# 17. We fully endorse with the view taken by the Principal Bench, NCLT, New Delhi in the case of Alchemist Asset Reconstruction supra, in the order dated 25.01.2022 that Personal Guarantor is an individual who has stood as Guarantee to the Corporate Debtor. Section 95 petition is for initiating insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor and it is not the case for recovery of any amount because that will go contrary to the scheme of IBC, 2016. In such a situation, on the demise of the Personal Guarantor the proceedings under Section 95 of IBC against an individual who has given his guarantee in favour of Corporate Debtor after her death, would abate and the petition under Section 95 has to be closed. The similar view was taken by the other NCLTs in the cases referred supra.

# 18. The case of State Bank of India SAMB v. Vijay Pal Garg IB 112(ND)/2022 is distinguishable on facts. The Order 22, Rule 4 & Rule 4A of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are applicable for substituting the legal heirs of the deceased defendant representing the estate of the deceased. The IBC proceeding is not a recovery proceeding or the proceedings where the legal heirs have inherited the estate of the deceased. It only relates to insolvency of the Personal Guarantor. It was rightly observed in the case of Bank of Baroda supra that the assets of the Personal Guarantor are hit by moratorium and if the legal heirs of the deceased guarantor are put into the shoes of the Personal Guarantor, their personal assets will also get automatically hit by the moratorium which will cause grave prejudice to the rights of the third party. Further, there is no provision in the Code envisaging the concept of legal heirs stepping into the shoes of the deceased Personal Guarantor.

# 19. In the light of what has been stated above, we decide the issue in favour of the Respondent holding that the proceedings against the Personal Guarantor will abate after the death of the Personal Guarantor. The insolvency proceedings against the Personal Guarantor are accordingly closed.

# 20 The Petition CP(IB)/251(CHE)/2025 is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

# 21. File be consigned to records.

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Ms. Manju Sirohi vs Assets Care & Reconstruction Enterprise Ltd. & Anr. - We need to appreciate that the estate, comprising all property belonging to the bankrupt at the commencement date, vests in the Trustee by operation of law, without any conveyance, assignment or transfer. Thus, it is clear that money at credit in a bank account is property and from 21.05.2025, the balance was the Trustee’s to hold, and every withdrawal by the Appellant was a dealing with property that was not hers to deal with.

 NCLAT (2026.10.07) in Ms. Manju Sirohi vs Assets Care & Reconstruction Enterprise Ltd. & Anr.  [Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1772 of 2026 & I.A. No. 6703 of 2026] held that; 

• We need to appreciate that the estate, comprising all property belonging to the bankrupt at the commencement date, vests in the Trustee by operation of law, without any conveyance, assignment or transfer. Thus, it is clear that money at credit in a bank account is property and from 21.05.2025, the balance was the Trustee’s to hold, and every withdrawal by the Appellant was a dealing with property that was not hers to deal with.

• Section 155(2)(a) excludes only “excluded assets” as defined in section 79(14) of the code. The Clause (c) protects only unencumbered personal ornaments which cannot be parted with, in accordance with religious usage, of a value not exceeding Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rule 5(a) of the 2019 Bankruptcy Rules).

• It has also been brought to our notice that on the commencement date, the Appellant held no ornaments (her Form-E shows jewellery as Nil but a bank balance, which none of clauses (a) to (e) of section 79(14) of the code mentions, and nothing in the Code carries the protected character over to sale proceeds.

Excerpts of the order;

# 1. There are two appeals before us i.e. Company Appeal (AT) (INS) No. 1772 of 2026 and Company Appeal (AT) (INS) No. 1773 of 2026 filed by the Appellant, Manju Sirohi.

# 2. The appeal is filed by the Appellant i.e., Manju Sirohi who is a Personal Guarantor of M/s Saha Infratech Private Limited under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (“Code”) arising out of Impugned Order dated 03.08.2026 passed in IA/ND/4604/2025 in CP(IB)-80/ND/2023 by the Hon'ble National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi (“Adjudicating Authority”). Assets Care & Reconstruction Enterprise Ltd., who is the Financial Creditor, acting in its capacity as trustee of ACRE-100-TRUST, is the Respondent No.1 herein.  Mr. Anup Kumar, who is the Bankruptcy Trustee of the Appellant is the Respondent No.2 herein.

# 3. The appeal is filed by the Appellant i.e., Manju Sirohi who is a Personal Guarantor of M/s Saha Infratech Private Limited under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, (“Code”) arising out of Impugned Order dated 20.08.2026 passed by the Hon'ble National Company Law Tribunal (“Adjudicating Authority”) in CP(IB)-80/ND/2023, whereby RA-73/ND/2026 seeking recall of the Order dated 03.08.2026 being being ex-parte Order was dismissed. Assets Care & Reconstruction Enterprise Ltd., who is the Financial Creditor, acting in its capacity as trustee of ACRE-100-TRUST, is the Respondent No.1 herein. Mr. Anup Kumar, who is the Bankruptcy Trustee of the Appellant is the Respondent No.2 herein.

Common Pleadings of the Appellant

# 4. The Appellant submitted that Respondent No. 1 had filed an application under Section 95(1) of the Code, to initiate the insolvency process against her on account of the failure of M/s Saha Infratech Pvt. Ltd. (Corporate Debtor) to repay the debt. The Appellant stated that vide order dated 10.04.2023, the Adjudicating Authority appointed Mr. Anup Kumar as the Resolution Professional in CP(IB)- 80/ND/2023. The Appellant contended that Respondent No. 1 thereafter filed IA- 5276/2024 under Section 123 of the Code seeking initiation of the bankruptcy process against her, and that due to her non-appearance, the Adjudicating Authority initiated ex-parte proceedings by order dated 21.02.2025. 

# 5. The Appellant submitted that on 03.03.2025 and again on 16.03.2025 she sold her personal jewellery in order to sustain herself in Delhi NCR, with the sale proceeds being credited to her personal bank account, and that on 11.03.2025 she received funds transferred from her mother-in-law’s bank account pursuant to its closure. The Appellant contended that on 14.05.2025 the Adjudicating Authority reserved orders in IA-5276/2024, and that on 21.05.2025 the Adjudicating Authority declared her bankrupt under Section 126 of the Code and appointed Respondent No. 2 as the Bankruptcy Trustee under Section 125 of the Code.

# 6. The Appellant submitted that on 11.09.2025, Respondent No. 2 filed IA- 4604/ND/2025 under Regulation 12 of the relevant IBBI Regulations read with Section 186(D) of the Code, seeking, inter alia, directions to the Appellant to submit her complete financial position, to return a sum of Rs. 19,17,500/- forming part of the bankruptcy estate, to furnish details of after-acquired property, and to extend co-operation in the bankruptcy process.

# 7. The Appellant stated that a complete transaction summary of her Union Bank of India account (No. 398502010053816) reveals deposits totalling Rs. 18,92,214.00 comprising Rs. 5,66,966.00 transferred from her mother-in-law’s account on 11.03.2025 and Rs. 13,25,248.00 realised from the sale of gold jewellery and related items on 24.03.2025, against withdrawals totalling Rs. 19,19,500.00 made between 16.06.2025 and 24.07.2025, primarily by selfwithdrawal and ATM.

# 8. The Appellant contended that her counsel, who was recently engaged,  appeared on 03.08.2026 through video conferencing when the Adjudicating Authority disposed of IA-4604/ND/2025 and passed an ex-parte order directing her to pay back Rs. 19,17,500/- to Respondent No. 2. The Appellant submitted that although her counsel was present when the matter was called, an unstable internet connection prevented necessary submissions, resulting in the ex-parte order.

# 9. The Appellant submitted that being aggrieved by the said ex-parte order, she preferred RA-73/ND/2026 under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 seeking its recall. The Appellant stated that on 20.08.2026, the recall application was heard and dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that IA- 4604/ND/2025 had been allowed and disposed of on merits and that a recall application was not the appropriate remedy, even though the order dated 03.08.2026 itself recorded that the application was allowed due to the absence of any denial.

# 10. The Appellant submitted that the Adjudicating Authority grossly erred in dismissing the recall application and failed to appreciate that the order dated 03.08.2026 was not passed on merits and was made without affording her an  opportunity of hearing. The Appellant stated that she is a senior citizen residing in Delhi NCR with no source of income, that the sale of her personal jewellery was a last resort to sustain herself, and that she was unaware of the moratorium at the time of the withdrawals.

# 11. The Appellant contended that her personal jewellery constitutes an excluded asset under Section 155(2) of the Code, and that the amounts withdrawn from her savings account represented the sale proceeds of such jewellery together with the sum transferred from her mother-in-law’s account, both of which are excluded assets under Section 79(14) of the Code.

# 12. Concluding arguments, the Appellant requested this Appellate Tribunal to set aside the Impugned Orders and allow the both appeals. 

# 13. Per contra, the Respondent No.2 (Bankruptcy trustee), the contesting Respondent , denied all the averments made by the Appellant as misleading and baseless.

# 14. The Respondent No. 2 stated that in the captioned matter the Personal Insolvency Resolution Process was initiated on 18.01.2024 and, upon nonsubmission of a repayment plan, the Adjudicating Authority passed an order on 02.07.2024 under Section 114 of the Code, directing the financial creditor to file an application against the personal guarantor/Appellant. The Respondent No. 2 contended that the financial creditor thereafter filed an application under Section 123 of the Code, and vide order dated 21.05.2025 the Adjudicating Authority initiated the bankruptcy process against the Appellant and appointed the answering Respondent as the Bankruptcy Trustee to conduct the proceedings in accordance with law.

# 15. The Respondent No. 2 submitted that pursuant to the order dated 21.05.2025, a public announcement was made on 30.05.2025 inviting creditor claims by 06.06.2025, and simultaneous intimation of initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings.

# 16. The Respondent No. 2 stated that pursuant to the public announcement claims were received from two financial creditors and admitted as follows: M/s Assets Care & Reconstruction Enterprises Ltd. claimed Rs. 426,19,59,899/-, of which Rs. 55,06,45,056.52/- was admitted and Rs. 371,13,14,842.48/- was admitted as contingent; M/s IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. claimed Rs. 544,33,62,699/- which was admitted entirely as contingent, resulting in a total claim of Rs. 970,53,22,598/-, of which Rs. 55,06,45,056.52/- was admitted and Rs. 915,46,77,541.48/- was admitted as contingent.

# 17. The Respondent No. 2 contended that pursuant to Section 133 of the Code the first meeting of creditors was convened on 01.07.2025, in which the Appellant through her representative participated and assured the Bankruptcy Trustee that the financial statement of the Bankrupt would be submitted as called for in the intimation letter dated 30.05.2025. The Respondent No. 2 submitted that despite the assurance, the Appellant failed to provide the financial statement as called for, whereupon another intimation was sent on 18.07.2025 seeking relevant information; in response the Appellant furnished details of bank accounts and other information.

# 18. The Respondent No. 2 stated that upon receiving the information, the Bankruptcy Trustee collected the bank account statements and instructed the banks to mark debit freeze on all accounts till further instructions. Upon perusal of the statements, it was found that the Appellant had withdrawn a total of Rs. 19,17,500/- between 16.06.2025 and 24.07.2025, the details being: 16.06.2025 – Self – Rs. 9,95,000/-; 21.06.2025 – Self – Rs. 9,00,000/-; 06.07.2025 – ATM – Rs. 10,000/-; 23.07.2025 – ATM – Rs. 10,000/-; 24.07.2025 – ATM – Rs. 1,000/- , Rs. 1,500/-, Rs. 500/- and Rs. 500/-.

# 19. The Respondent No. 2 contended that an application (IA-4604/2025) was filed before the Adjudicating Authority seeking return of the unauthorised withdrawal of Rs. 19,17,500/-. The Appellant appeared on 08.12.2025 but thereafter failed to appear despite notice, compelling the Adjudicating Authority to proceed ex-parte and pass the impugned order dated 03.08.2026 directing return of the said amount. The Appellant’s subsequent recall application (RA- 73/ND/2026) was dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 20.08.2026.

# 20. The Respondent No. 2 submitted that the amount of Rs. 19,17,500/- constitutes an unauthorised withdrawal because, under Section 154 of the Code, 2016, the estate of the bankrupt vests in the Bankruptcy Trustee immediately from the date of appointment without any conveyance, assignment or transfer. The Respondent No. 2 stated that any amount lying in the account of the Bankrupt forms part of the bankruptcy estate under Section 155 of the Code and is to be distributed to the creditors under Section 178 of the Code.

# 21. The Respondent No. 2 contended that the withdrawal is illegal as it was made after due intimation given by the Bankruptcy Trustee vide letter dated 30.05.2025. The Respondent No. 2 further submitted that while the Appellant seeks exclusion of the assets under Section 79(14) of the Code, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Bankruptcy Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 prescribe that the value of unencumbered personal ornaments under clause (c) of the said subsection shall not exceed one lakh rupees.

# 22. The Respondent No. 2 stated that the Appellant failed to avail the ample opportunities granted by the Adjudicating Authority and therefore cannot raise the plea at this stage. The Respondent No. 2 contended that the present appeals are without any merit or ground and are liable to be dismissed outright. 

# 23. Concluding the arguments, the Respondent No.2 requested this AppellateTribunal to dismiss both appeals.

Findings

# 24. We have already noted the rival contentions of the parties in preceding paragraphs. The material facts are not in dispute. The Appellant was declared bankrupt on 21.05.2025 and Respondent No. 2 was appointed Bankruptcy Trustee. The Union Bank of India statement of her savings account, filed by both sides and admittedly authentic, shows Rs. 19,07,366.46 at her credit on that date. Between 16.06.2025 and 24.07.2025 the whole of it was drawn out: two Self withdrawals of Rs. 9,95,000.00 and Rs. 9,00,000.00, and six ATM withdrawals totalling Rs. 23,500.00, leaving Rs. 114.32. The Appellant does not deny any withdrawal and her own table lists them. Her defence is one of law and hardship, not of fact.

# 25. It may be stated that the correct test is vesting, not moratorium. The Trustee’s intimation of 30.05.2025 and his application, and the Appellant’s plea of being unaware of the moratorium, all proceed on a wrong label. We observe that Section 128(1)(c) of the code restrains creditors from acting against the bankrupt’s property; it does not regulate the bankrupt. We need to appreciate that the estate, comprising all property belonging to the bankrupt at the commencement date, vests in the Trustee by operation of law, without any conveyance, assignment or transfer. Thus, it is clear that money at credit in a bank account is property and from 21.05.2025, the balance was the Trustee’s to hold, and every withdrawal by the Appellant was a dealing with property that was not hers to deal with.

# 26. We are of clear opinion that the plea of unawareness is no defence to vesting, which does not depend on the bankrupt’s knowledge, and is in any case unproved. It has been brought to our notice that the Trustee’s intimation was delivered to the Appellant on 05.06.2025 , eleven days before the first withdrawal and she was represented at the creditors meeting on 01.07.2025 and further she wrote to the Trustee about her accounts on 22.07.2025, after which the ATM withdrawals of 23–24.07.2025 followed.

# 27. We would like to state that the jewellery sale proceeds of Rs. 13,25,248.00 (69.5 % of the balance) are not excluded assets as Section 155(2)(a) excludes only “excluded assets” as defined in section 79(14) of the code. The Clause (c) protects only unencumbered personal ornaments which cannot be parted with, in accordance with religious usage, of a value not exceeding Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rule 5(a) of the 2019 Bankruptcy Rules). We are not in position to accept the pleadings of the appellant because the proceeds are more than thirteen times the cap prescribed in the regulations. Further the exclusion attaches to described assets, not to money. It has also been brought to our notice that on the commencement date, the Appellant held no ornaments (her Form-E shows jewellery as Nil but a bank balance, which none of clauses (a) to (e) of section 79(14) of the code mentions, and nothing in the Code carries the protected character over to sale proceeds.

# 28. We are of considered opinion that claimed hardship by the Appellant cannot enlarge section 79(14) of the code, which is a closed list. We also do not find any rationale for withdrawal of Rs. 18,95,000/- by the Appellant in five days without explanation.

# 29. We note that the recall application (RA-73/ND/2026) was dismissed. It needs to be appreciated that recall is not a matter of right. The Appellant’s case that her counsel could not be heard on 03.08.2026 for want of connectivity is not supported by any record. We have noted that notice had been served to the Appellant on 22.09.2025 and no reply had been filed for over ten months. Even on the Appellant’s version, no prejudice is shown. Thus, we do not find any meritin the contents of the appellant regarding denial of recall application by the Adjudicating authority.

# 30. Based on the above analysis, we do not find any merit in either of the appeals. The appeals fail and stand rejected. No order as to cost. IA, if any, stands closed.

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Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel vs State Bank of India and Ors. - Since the guarantee deed specifically mentioned that the guarantee was in the nature of an on-demand guarantee, the default was to arise on the part of the Guarantor only when the Demand Notice was issued as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. Thus, the period of limitation of the Personal Guarantor was to commence once the demand was made on the Guarantor by the Respondent No.1 Bank. Hence, the Notice dated 04.06.2021 issued by the Respondent No.1 Bank to the Personal Guarantor has to be treated to be Notice on Demand as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee.

 NCLAT (2024.12.18) in Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel vs State Bank of India and Ors. [(2024) ibclaw.in 841 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1702 of 2024 & Others] held that; 

• There can be default by the Principal Borrower and the Guarantor on the same date or date of default for both may be different depending on the terms of contract of guarantee. It is well settled that the loan agreement with the Principal Borrower and the Bank as well as Deed of Guarantee between the Bank and the Guarantor are two different transactions and the Guarantor’s liability has to be read from the Deed of Guarantee.

• Since the guarantee deed specifically mentioned that the guarantee was in the nature of an on-demand guarantee, the default was to arise on the part of the Guarantor only when the Demand Notice was issued as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. Thus, the period of limitation of the Personal Guarantor was to commence once the demand was made on the Guarantor by the Respondent No.1 Bank. Hence, the Notice dated 04.06.2021 issued by the Respondent No.1 Bank to the Personal Guarantor has to be treated to be Notice on Demand as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee.

 

Excerpts of the Order; 

The present appeal filed under Section 61(1) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (‘IBC’ in short) by the Appellant arises out of the Order dated 27.06.2024 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Impugned Order’) passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench-I) in C.P/IB/205/AHM/2022, C.P/IB/206/AHM/2022 and C.P/IB/215/AHM/2022 respectively. By the impugned order, the Adjudicating Authority has admitted the application filed by the Respondent No.1- State Bank of India under Section 95(1) of IBC initiating insolvency resolution process of the Appellant- Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel being the Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant.

 

# 2. The significant dates and sequence of events which require to be noticed for deciding the matter at hand are as placed below:

• The Corporate Debtor-Vrundavan Ceramic Pvt. Ltd. had been sanctioned loan facilities by the Respondent No.1- Bank. The Personal Guarantor-Appellant had executed a Deed of Guarantee dated 09.04.2005 followed by Supplemental Deeds of Guarantees until 2010 in respect of credit facilities extended by the Respondent No. 1-Bank to the Corporate Debtor.

• The Loan Account of the Corporate Debtor was declared as Non- Performing Asset (“NPA” in short) on 31.07.2013 and recalled by the Respondent No. 1-Bank due to failure to repay as per schedule of payment. The Financial Creditor-Respondent No.1-Bank had filed a Section 7 application under the IBC against the Corporate Debtor.

• The Corporate Debtor was admitted into Corporate Insolvency Regulation Process (“CIRP” in short) on 21.01.2020.

• Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021 under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act was issued by the Respondent No. 1 Bank calling upon the Borrowers and the Guarantors to make the outstanding payment amounting to Rs 32.60 Cr. This Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021 notified repayment of debt by 04.08.2021 by the Appellant-Personal Guarantor also.

• The Respondent No. 1 Bank issued a Rule 7(1) Demand Notice of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for initiation of Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019, (hereinafter refer to as “the said Rules”) under Section 95 of the IBC on the Appellant-Personal Guarantor on 28.09.2021.

• The Respondent No.1 Bank, not having received repayment of debt proceeded to file Section 95 application against the Appellant-Personal Guarantor on 18.06.2022.

• The Adjudicating Authority appointed the Resolution Professional (“RP” in short) to carry out the insolvency resolution process of the Personal Guarantor and with direction to send report under section 99 of the IBC.

• The RP recommended the admission of the application filed under Section 95 of the IBC.

• The Adjudicating Authority thereafter vide impugned order ordered the initiation of insolvency resolution process of the Personal Guarantor.

• Aggrieved by the impugned order, the present appeal has been preferred by the Personal Guarantor.

 

# 3. Two similar appeals have been filed by Narayanbhai N. Patel vide Company Appeal No. 1712 of 2024 and by Jayantibhai Nagarbhai Patel vide Company Appeal No. 1711 of 2024. The appeal filed by Narayanbhai N. Patel is against impugned order dated 27.06.2024 in CP(IB) No. 215/AHM of 2022 while the appeal filed by Jayantibhai Nagarbhai Patel is against impugned order dated 27.06.2024 in CP(IB) No. 206/AHM of 2022. In both these appeals, the above two Appellants have assailed the impugned order admitting the Section 95(1) applications filed by the Respondent No.1- State Bank of India allowing initiation of their insolvency resolution process. Since, the grounds on which the Section 95 application has been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority in these two cases are predicated on the same facts and grounds as in the case of Mavjibhai Nagarbhai Patel, we have chosen to confine ourselves to the pleadings made in Company Appeal No. 1702 of 2024 to decide these three Appeals at hand.

 

# 4. Making his submissions, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant- Personal Guarantor stated that the Adjudicating Authority had erroneously passed the impugned order allowing the Section 95 application even though it was badly time-barred. Since the date of default mentioned by the Respondent No.1 Bank in Form-C of the Section 95 application is 31.07.2013, the three- year period of limitation expired in 2016. Hence, the application under Section 95 of IBC filed in June 2022 by the Respondent No.1 Bank seeking insolvency resolution of the Appellant was grossly time-barred. Submission was pressed by the Appellant that the Respondent No. 1 had relied on a letter dated 11.01.2022 to claim that the Section 95 application was filed within the limitation period. It was pointed out that when the three-year period of limitation stood expired in 2016, the letter of 11.01.2022 could not have revived or extended the limitation period since any acknowledgment of debt made after expiry of the limitation period does not have the effect of extending the limitation period.

 

# 5. It was strenuously contended that even the claim made by the Respondent No.1 Bank that the debt qua the personal guarantor was due on 04.06.2021 being the date of Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is frivolous as the Section 95 application filed by the Respondent No.1 Bank states the date of default qua the Appellant to be 31.07.2013. Thus, the date of default in the Section 95 application is sacrosanct and cannot be changed by the Respondent No.1 Bank at its own will and fancy to suit its convenience.

 

# 6. It is also asserted that the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order has wrongly relied on two revival letters dated 30.12.2015 and 31.03.2017 to hold that the Corporate Debtor and the Personal Guarantor had signed and confirmed the balance confirmation in these letters and in treating these letters as letters of acknowledgement of liability by the Appellant. Denying that these letters were never signed by the Appellant it cannot be viewed as admission of their liability. It was further submitted that though these two letters figure in the impugned order, these letters are actually non-existent. To substantiate their argument, it is stated that these letters have neither been placed on record with the application under Section 95 filed by Respondent No. 1 nor do the letters figure in the report of Respondent No.2-RP. It has been vehemently contended by the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the impugned order therefore wrongly relied on the non-existent letters dated 30.12.2015 and 31.03.2017 to claim that the Section 95 application is filed within the limitation period.

 

# 7. The second limb of argument of the Appellant is that the application under Section 95 was defective as it has been signed and filed by an Assistant General Manager (“AGM” in short) of the Respondent No. 1 Bank and therefore not instituted by any authorised person. It was stated that as per Form-C of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019, (hereinafter refer to as “the said Rules”) any person authorized to act on behalf of the Creditor is required to enclose the authorization document in that regard. It was submitted that the Adjudicating Authority failed to consider that the Section 95 application did not disclose the authority under which the AGM had signed the application on behalf of the Respondent No.1 Bank. The stand-alone purported Authority Letter signed by a Deputy General Manager in favour of an AGM without the backing of a resolution by the Central Board of Directors of the Respondent No.1 Bank in favour of the said signatory was not sufficient to meet the criteria of disclosure of authorisation as required under Form-C of the said rules. Since this was not a valid authorization, the application under Section 95 was defective and liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

 

# 8. Refuting the contentions made by the Appellant, the Ld Counsels for the Respondents submitted that the Personal Guarantor-Appellant had executed a Deed of Guarantee dated 09.04.2005 followed by Supplemental Deeds of Guarantees in respect of credit facilities extended by the Respondent No. 1- Bank to the Corporate Debtor. The clauses of the Deed of Guarantee clearly stated that the guarantee was in the nature of a continuing guarantee and the date of default would be as stipulated in the Deed of Guarantee. In the present case, the Personal Guarantee was invoked by the Respondent No.1 Bank through Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act which called upon both the Borrowers and the Guarantors to make payment of the amount of Rs 32.60 Cr. within 60 days. As the Personal Guarantor did not make the payment as demanded in the Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021, the Respondent No. 1 Bank issued Demand Notice dated 28.09.2021 under Rule 7(1) of the said rules. Since the Appellant-Personal Guarantor did not repay the debt within 14 days from Rule 7(1) Notice, the Respondent No.1 proceeded to file the Section 95 application on 18.06.2022 which was within the limitation period as Personal Guarantee had been invoked by demand notice dated 04.06.2021.

 

# 9. On the plea raised by the Appellant that the Section 95 application was not filed by a person competent to do so, this argument was strongly rebutted by the Ld. Counsel for Respondent No.1 Bank by contending that the Authority Letter authorising the AGM to file the Section 95 application was signed by the Deputy General Manager in terms of Gazette Notification dated 02.05.1987 issued in pursuance of Regulations 76(1) of the State Bank of India General Regulations, 1955 framed under Section 50 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955. Hence the contention of the Appellant that the Section 95 application was filed by an unauthorized person is not a valid submission and lacks merit.

 

# 10. We have duly considered the arguments advanced by the Learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the records carefully.

 

# 11. The two short issues for consideration are whether the Section 95 application filed by the Respondent No. 1 Bank was time-barred or not and whether the Section 95 application was filed by a duly authorized person.

 

# 12. It is the case of the Appellant that the stand taken by the Respondent No.1 that the date of default was 04.06.2021 as shown in the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the Respondent No.1 Bank has held the date of default qua the Corporate Debtor-Guarantors to be 31.06.2013. Hence, the Respondent No.1 Bank cannot read the date of default on the part of the Personal Guarantor to be 04.06.2021 at a time when the date of default on the part of the Corporate Debtor was 31.07.2013.

 

# 13. Before we dwell upon the issues delineated by us at para 11 above, at the very outset, we would like to advert attention to the judgement of this Tribunal in Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs. State Bank of India in CA(AT) (Insolvency) No.329 of 2023 wherein it has been held that the liability of a borrower and guarantor is co-extensive but the liability of a Guarantor stems from the contract of guarantee and therefore the date of default in the case of the guarantor depends on the terms of contract of guarantee. The date of default for the principal borrower and the guarantor can be different depending on the terms of the Contract of Guarantee in terms of this judgment. The relevant excerpts of the judgment are extracted as below:

• 24. The scheme of I&B Code clearly indicate that both the Principal Borrower and the Guarantor become liable to pay the amount when the default is committed. When default is committed by the Principal Borrower the amount becomes due not only against the Principal Borrower but also against the Corporate Guarantor, which is the scheme of the I&B Code. When we read with as is delineated by Section 3(11) of the Code, debt becomes due both on Principal Borrower and the Guarantor, as noted above. The definition of default under Section 3(12) in addition to expression ‘due’ occurring in Section 3(11) uses two additional expressions i.e. “payable” and “is not paid by the debtor or corporate debtor”. The expression ‘is not paid by the debtor’ has to be given some meaning. As laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors.” (supra), a guarantor’s liability depends on terms of his contract. There can be default by the Principal Borrower and the Guarantor on the same date or date of default for both may be different depending on the terms of contract of guarantee. It is well settled that the loan agreement with the Principal Borrower and the Bank as well as Deed of Guarantee between the Bank and the Guarantor are two different transactions and the Guarantor’s liability has to be read from the Deed of Guarantee. (Emphasis supplied) 

 

# 14. In the present factual matrix, it is an undisputed fact that the Personal Guarantor-Appellant had executed a Deed of Guarantee dated 09.04.2005 followed by Supplemental Deeds of Guarantees until 2010 in respect of credit facilities extended by the Respondent No. 1- Bank to the Corporate Debtor. It may therefore be relevant to peruse the guarantee deed to find out the treatment of date of default in respect of the Guarantors.

 

# 15. When we look at the relevant clauses of the guarantee deed, we notice that the clauses spell out the co-extensive liability of the principal borrower and the guarantor qua the credit facility extended by the Respondent No.1 Bank as well as the event of default which are as reproduced below:

• “6. The Guarantee herein contained shall be enforceable against the Guarantors notwithstanding the securities aforesaid or any other collateral securities that the Bank may have obtained or may obtain from the Borrower or any other person shall at the time when proceedings are taken against the Guarantors hereunder be outstanding and/or not enforce and or remain unrealised.

• 7. In order to give effect to the Guarantee herein contained the Bank shall be entitled to act as if the Guarantors were principal debtors to the Bank for all payments guaranteed by them as aforesaid to the Bank.

• 8. The guarantee herein contained is a continuing one for all amounts advanced by the Bank to the Borrower in respect of or under the aforesaid credit facilities as also for all costs and other monies which may from time to time become due and remain unpaid to the Bank thereunder.…

• 12. The Guarantors affirm confirm and declare that any balance confirmation and/or acknowledgment of debt and/or admission of liability given or promise or part payment made by the Borrower or the authorised agent of the Borrower to the Bank shall be deemed to have been made and/or given by or on behalf of the Guarantors themselves and shall be binding upon each of them.

• 13. The Guarantors shall forthwith on demand made by the Bank deposit with the Bank such sum or security or further sum or security as the Bank may from time to time specify as security for the due fulfillment of their obligations under this Guarantee….

• 20. The Guarantors agree that amount due under or in respect of the aforesaid credit facilities and hereby guaranteed shall be payable to the Bank on the Bank serving the Guarantors with a notice requiring payment of the amount …” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

# 16. The liability of the guarantor has to be read from the Deed of Guarantee. Further, the terms of the Deed of Guarantee are extremely material as the invocation of the guarantee was to be purely in accordance with the terms of guarantee. Having looked at the relevant clauses of the Deed of Guarantee in the preceding paragraph, we are of the considered view that the Deed of Guarantee entered between the Respondent No.1 Bank and Personal Guarantor is an independent, distinct and a special contract which has to be construed on its own terms. It is clear from the reading of the clauses in the Deed of Guarantee that guarantee was given by the Personal Guarantor in unequivocal terms and the guarantee amount was to be paid by the guarantor once the guarantee was invoked.

 

# 17. When we look at the specific Clauses of the Deed of Guarantee, it clearly states that the guarantee was in the nature of a continuing guarantee. The Guarantor had agreed that any admission on acknowledgement in writing signed by the Borrower shall also be binding on the Guarantor. Further, the Guarantor had agreed that the amount due under or in respect of the credit facilities to be payable to the creditor bank will be payable by the guarantor on a notice requiring payment of the amount.

 

# 18. In the present case, after the Corporate Debtor was admitted into CIRP on 21.01.2020 and the Personal Guarantee was invoked by the Respondent No.1 Bank through Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act which called upon both the Borrowers and the Guarantors to make payment of the amount of Rs 32.60 Cr. as on 30.04.2021 within 60 days. The Section 13(2) Notice which was sent to the Corporate Debtor was also forwarded to the Guarantor with the specific demand to make payment of the amount mentioned in the notice in terms of the guarantee. This Section 13(2) Notice was indisputably also sent to the Personal Guarantors separately and independently. When we see the Section 13(2) notice under SARFAESI Act as placed at pages 549 to 551 of Appeal Paper Book (“APB” in short) we find that there is clear indication of the names of all the Personal Guarantors therein which includes the present Appellant (and also the other two Appellants whose appeals are also under consideration before us). Para 11 of the Section 13(2) SARFAESI addressed to the Corporate Debtor notice which was also forwarded to the personal guarantors including the Appellant is relevant to be noticed which is as extracted below:

• “11. Further we are also forwarding the copy of this notice to personal guarantor who are liable to pay the aforesaid outstanding amount. This notice is without prejudice to the Bank’s right to initiate such other actions or legal proceedings as it deems necessary under any other applicable provisions of Law. This notice is in supersession of our earlier notices sent to you vide our letter no. SAMB/GRJ/2018-19/2002 dated 16.02.2019 which stands withdrawn.

• XXXX

• You are requested to make the payment of the amount mentioned in the notice in terms of the guarantees executed by you.” (Emphasis supplied) 

 

# 19. The Appellant-Personal Guarantor did not make the payment as demanded by the Section 13(2) Notice dated 04.06.2021. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 1 Bank issued Demand Notice dated 28.09.2021 under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for initiation of Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 as below: . . . . .

The above Demand Notice under Rule 7(1) clearly stipulated that the debt was due on 04.06.2021 being the date of Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The date of default in the Rule 7(1) notice was clearly shown as 04.08.2021 being 60 days from 04.06.2021. The Section 13(2) Notice was also attached with the Rule 7(1) Notice.

 

# 20. Since the guarantee deed specifically mentioned that the guarantee was in the nature of an on-demand guarantee, the default was to arise on the part of the Guarantor only when the Demand Notice was issued as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. Thus, the period of limitation of the Personal Guarantor was to commence once the demand was made on the Guarantor by the Respondent No.1 Bank. Hence, the Notice dated 04.06.2021 issued by the Respondent No.1 Bank to the Personal Guarantor has to be treated to be Notice on Demand as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. The Rule 7(1) Notice dated 28.06.2021 had therefore rightly recorded that the debt was due on 04.06.2021 being the date of Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and that the date of default occurred on 04.08.2021 on the expiry of 60 days from 04.06.2021.

 

# 21. Further, when we look at the Form-C of Section 95 application filed by Respondent No. 1 Bank, we find that the date of default in respect of the Personal Guarantor has been explained in Part-II at column No. 4 as follows:

• “On 28.9.2021, Demand Notice was issued under section 95(4)(b) of the IB Code 2016, read with rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process of Personnel Guarantors to Corporate Persons) Rules, 2019 on the Respondent- personal guarantors demanding the Payment of the unpaid debt in default amounting to Rs. 33,51,62,406.00/- which was successfully severed to respondent- personal guarantor.”

We also find that the Section 95 application shows that the Respondent No.1 Bank besides relying on the Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021 also relied on other documents and guarantees including the Rule 7(1) Demand Notice; Deed of Guarantee dated 09.04.2005; Demand Notice dated 04.06.2021; Settlement Proposal dated 11.01.2022 etc.

 

# 22. Given this backdrop, to answer the first question before us, the Section 95 petition which was filed on 18.06.2022 was very much within the limitation period since the Personal Guarantee had been invoked on 04.06.2021 and demand qua the Personal Guarantor arose on the expiry of the period specified in the Demand Notice. When the Respondent No.1 Bank has given time to the Guarantor to make payment by 04.08.2021 in terms of the Notice dated 04.06.2021, there can be no default on the part of the Guarantor on any earlier date.

 

# 23. This brings us to the second question on whether the Section 95 application has been validly filed. It is an admitted fact that the Authority Letter authorising the AGM to file the Section 95 application was signed by the Deputy General Manager. It was clarified by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No.1 Bank during the oral submissions that the AGM of the Respondent No1 Bank being SMGS-V was statutorily competent to sign any petition by virtue of The Gazette of India Notification dated 02.05.1987 which notified that in pursuance of Regulations 76(1) of the State Bank of India General Regulations, 1955 framed under Section 50 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955 the Executive Committee of the Central Board of the State Bank of India authorized all Officers in the Grade of SMGS-IV and above to exercise Signing Power in respect of documents connected with the current or authorized business of the Bank. Since the Gazette of India Notification lies in the public domain and is subsisting, we are not impressed by the plea raised by the Appellant that the Section 95 application signed by an AGM level Officer of the Respondent No.1 Bank to be unauthorized. Thus, to reply to the second question, we are of the considered view that the Section 95 application filed by the Respondent No.1 Bank is valid and therefore reject this technical plea raised by the Appellant.

 

# 24. For the forgoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that all the three impugned orders therefore do not warrant any interference. The Appeals filed by all the three Appellants are devoid of merit and therefore dismissed. No costs.

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