Wednesday, 27 May 2026

Jagi Mangat Panda Vs SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Anr. - In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Financial Creditors having not invoked the guarantee prior to issuing demand notice in Form B, the application under Section 95 could not have been filed by Financial Creditor before invoking the guarantee.

 NCLAT (2026.03.20)  in Jagi Mangat Panda Vs SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Anr. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1530 of 2024] held that;-

  • The Notice, thus, contemplate demanding payment of the amount of default. The above Rule clearly indicate that Demand Notice has to be issued, demanding payment of the amount in default. Thus, the default by Guarantor has to exist on the date when Notice in Form-B is being issued.

  • Thus, for a default, debt has to be due and Debtor shall be only that person, to whom debt is due. A Personal Guarantor becomes a Debtor only when guarantee is invoked, making him liable to make the payment to the Lender

  • In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Financial Creditors having not invoked the guarantee prior to issuing demand notice in Form B, the application under Section 95 could not have been filed by Financial Creditor before invoking the guarantee.

  • Rule 3 (e) of the Personal Guarantor Rules defines “guarantor” as “a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part”.

  • The judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania is a judgment declaring law and it shall be treated that law as declared by this Tribunal in the above judgment was law on the all times on Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules. We, thus, do not find any substance in this submission of the Respondent.

Excerpts of the Order;

This appeal by a Personal Guarantor has been filed challenging the order dated 22.07.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal) New Delhi, Court – III admitting Section 95 application filed by the Financial Creditor – SREI Equipment Finance Ltd. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for deciding this appeal are:

(i) Various loan agreements were executed between M/ s. Ortel Communications Ltd. and M/s SREI Equipment Finance Ltd. – Respondent No.1 herein on 01.07.2018. Deed of Guarantee was executed by the Appellant on 01.07.2018 giving guarantee for repayment of money received by the Corporate Debtor from the Financial Creditor. Default was committed by the Corporate Debtor and CIRP against the Corporate Debtor commenced on 27.11.2018.

(ii) On 15.02.2022, the Financial Creditor issued a demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 demanding an amount of Rs.113,38,41,436/-.

(iii) The Personal Guarantor issued a response by letter dated 05.04.2022 to the notice.

(iv) The Financial Creditor filed an application under Section 95 in May, 2022 in which the Resolution Professional was appointed by the Adjudicating Authority. The Resolution Professional submitted a report under Section 99 recommending for admission of Section 95 application. The Personal Guarantor filed an objection pleading that guarantee has not been invoked in terms of Clause 3(a) of the guarantee. There being non-compliance of Rule 3(e) of 2019 Rules, the issuance of notice dated 15.02.2022 in Form B does not substantively amount to invocation.

(v) Before the Adjudicating Authority an application was filed by the Financial Creditor being I.A. No.816 of 2024 seeking to bring the alleged loan recall notice dated 11.06.2019 on record. The application came to be heard by the Adjudicating Authority on 03.05.2024, on which date both learned counsel for the Resolution Professional and Financial Creditor submitted that they will not rely on the notice dated 11.06.2019. After noticing the said statement, the Adjudicating Authority directed the parties to file written submissions and by order dated 22.07.2024 has admitted Section 95 application. Aggrieved by which order this appeal has been filed.

(vi) In this appeal, the Respondent No.1 has filed an I.A. No.910 of 2026 praying to take on record notice dated 11.06.2019 invoking the personal guarantee and the affidavit dated 09.04.2024 filed by the Resolution Professional, which application has been objected by the Appellant by filing a reply.


# 2. We have heard Mr. Anuj Shah, learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 and Mr. Sajjan Kumar Dokania, Resolution Professional – Respondent No.2.


# 3. Learned counsel for the Appellant challenging the order submits that the Financial Creditor having never invoked the personal guarantee given by the Appellant, the application filed under Section 95 was not maintainable. It is submitted that notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B can only be issued when guarantee has been invoked. The notice received by the Appellant under Rule 7(1) dated 15.02.2022 cannot be accepted as notice for invocation of guarantee. Law is well settled by this Tribunal in “State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania [(2025) ibclaw.in 153 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.191 of 2025” where it was held that notice under Rule 7(1) is not notice for invocation of bank guarantee and without invocation of bank guarantee Section 95 application is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the notice dated 11.06.2019, which is sought to be introduced by IA No.910 of 2026 cannot be accepted. It is submitted that attempt was made by the Respondent No.1 before the Adjudicating Authority for placing the notice dated 11.06.2019, which notice was not permitted to be taken on record and both the Financial Creditor and the Resolution Professional has made statement that they will not rely on the said document i.e. notice dated 11.06.2019. When the Respondents clearly stated that they are not relying on the notice dated 11.06.2019, they cannot be permitted to rely on said notice in this appeal.


# 4. Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned counsel for the Respondent submits that by notice dated 11.06.2019, the personal guarantee was invoked which is filed along with I.A. No.910 of 2026. It is submitted that by said notice the Bank had already invoked the personal guarantee, hence, bank was fully entitled to issue notice under Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules and the application has rightly been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 95. It is submitted that law which is laid down by this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania dated 28.05.2025 was not law on the date when order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority on 22.07.2024, hence, application was filed by the Financial Creditor relying on the existing law which did not require separate invocation of guarantee apart from issuance of notice under Rule 7.


# 5. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.


# 6. We need to first notice the copy of the application filed by the Financial Creditor under Section 95(1) under Rule 7(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019. Copy of the said application is brought on the record as Annexure 2 to the appeal. Application is based on Deed of Guarantee dated 01.07.2018 and in the application the Financial Creditor has relied on demand notice dated 15.02.2022, which was annexed as Annexure 5 to the application. In Paras 10 and 11 of the synopsis of the application following was pleaded:

  • “10. That having failed to yet recover its dues under the loan facilities availed by the Corporate Debtor, the Applicant/Financial Creditor issued a Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 to the Respondent/Personal Guarantor in Form-B as provided under Rule 7 ( 1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 for the outstanding dues of Rs, 1,13,38,41,436/- (Rupees One Hundred Thirteen Crores Thirty Eight Lakhs Forty One Thousand Four Hundred and Thirty Six Only) due to be payable to the Applicant/Financial Creditor by the Corporate Debtor, A copy of the Demand Notice dated 15,02.2022 issued in Form-B as provided under Rule 7 (1) of the by the Applicant/Financial Creditor Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 4.

  • 11. That vide letter dated 05.04.2022, the Respondent/Personal Guarantor issued her response to the Form- B Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 stating therein that in the Resolution Plan for Ortel Communications Ltd., it had been stated that the rights of the Financial Creditor to proceed against any third party shall be deemed to be assigned. The Respondent/Personal Guarantor further stated that the claim of the Applicant/Financial Creditor had not been accepted in totality in the Resolution Plan and that the Demand Notice was premature, unsustainable and illegal and thus, requested the Applicant/Personal Guarantor to withdraw the Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022.

  • A copy of the reply of the Respondent/Personal Guarantor dated 05.04.2022 in response to the Form – B Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 5.”


# 7. When we look into the Part-III of the application, according to the Financial Creditor the date on which default occurred was 27.11.2018 and on 15.02.2022 when notice under Rule 7 was issued. 27.11.2018 is the date when default was committed by the Principal Borrower. In the list of documents referred to in the Part-III apart from loan agreement, personal guarantees only notice annexed was notice under Rule 7 in Form B dated 15.02.2022. Column 15 of Part-III of the Section 95 application is as follows:


15.

List of documents attached to this application in order to prove the existence of debt and the amount in default

1. Loan Agreements bearing nos. 1725751 172573, 172530, 171853, 172577, 172576 and 172529 dated 01.07.2018 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 8 (Colly).


2. Personal Guarantees bearing nos. 172575! 172573, 172530, 171853, 172577, 172576 and 172529 dated 01.07.2018 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 9 (Colly).3. Notice under Form – B dated 15.02.2022 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 4.


4. A copy of the reply of the Respondent/ Personal Guarantor dated 05.04.2022 in response to the Form – B Demand Notice dated 25.02.2022 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-5.


5. Statement of Account is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 7.


6. Master Data of the Corporate Debtor is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – 10


# 8. The Adjudicating Authority while admitting the Section 95 application has held that the notice under Rule 7 issued in Form B is notice invoking guarantee and it would be unreasonable to interpret the Personal Guarantor Rules as requiring a separate invocation notice in addition to the mandatory demand notice issued per Form-B. In Para 17 of the order following was held:

  • “17. A reading of the clause of the Deed of Guarantee and the above definition makes it clear that, notwithstanding the fact that the deed of guarantee contains an invocation clause or not, the Rules have made the invocation of personal guarantee mandatory in all cases. We are of considered view that it would be unreasonable to interpret the Personal Guarantor Rules as requiring a separate invocation notice in addition to the mandatory demand notice issued per Form-B. Both notices serve the same purpose: enforcing the Personal Guarantor’s obligations under the Personal Guarantee by demanding payment of the Corporate Debtor’s unpaid debt. Therefore, issuing a Demand Notice dated 15.02.2022 as per Form-B effectively constitutes the ‘invocation’ of a personal guarantee.”


# 9. The Adjudicating Authority then proceeded on premise that notice under Rule 7 in Form B is itself invocation of guarantee. The law on the subject is laid down by this Tribunal in “State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania [(2025) ibclaw.in 153 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.191 of 2025” where this Tribunal after considering the Rule 7 of the 2019 Rules has laid down that before issuance of demand notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B there has to be invocation of guarantee. The argument raised in the above case was that notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B is itself invocation of guarantee, which was specifically dealt with and rejected. In Para 14 to 17 following was laid down:

  • “14. Sub-section (4) of Section 95 provides that an application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied with details and documents as referred to therein. Sub-section (7) provides that details and documents required to be submitted under sub-section (4) shall be such as may be specified. Rule 2 of 2019 Rules provides that these rules shall apply to insolvency resolution process for personal guarantors to Corporate Debtors. The application under Section 95 has been filed against the Respondent – Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor – LML Ltd. Hence, the application under Section 95 has to be as per 2019 Rules. Rule 3, sub-section (1) (e) defines ‘guarantor’, which is as follows:

  • “3(e) “guarantor” means a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part;”

  • 15. The ‘Guarantor’ within the meaning of 2019 Rules, means a Debtor who is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the Creditor and remains unpaid in full or part. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on definition of ‘Personal Guarantor’ as contained in Section 5, sub-section (22) of the IBC. Section 5, sub-section (22) of the IBC is in Part-II, whereas Section 95 of the IBC is in Part-III. Hence, the definition of ‘Personal Guarantor’ under Rule 5(22) may not be applicable with regard to initiation of insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor and the definition given in Rule 3, sub-rule (1) (e) of 2019 Rules has to be looked into for the purpose of initiating insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor. Rule 7, deals with ‘Application by creditor’. Rule 7 of 2019 Rules is as follows:

  • 7. Application by creditor.― (1) A demand notice under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of section 95 shall be served on the guarantor demanding payment of the amount of default, in Form B.

  • (2) The application under sub-section (1) of section 95 shall be submitted in Form C, along with a fee of two thousand rupees.

  • (3) The creditor shall serve forthwith a copy of the application referred to in sub-rule (2) to the guarantor and the corporate debtor for whom the guarantor is a personal guarantor.

  • (4) In case of a joint application, the creditors may nominate one amongst themselves to act on behalf of all the creditors.”

  • 16. Rule 7, sub-rule (1) provides that Demand Notice under Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 95 shall be served on the Guarantor demanding payment of the amount of default, in Form B. Sub-section (4) of Section 95 refers to documents relating to debts owed by the Debtor to the Creditor. Rule 7, sub-rule (1) contemplate service of Demand Notice under Clause (b) of sub-section (4) on the Guarantor, demanding payment of the amount of default in Form B.

  • 17. The Notice, thus, contemplate demanding payment of the amount of default. The above Rule clearly indicate that Demand Notice has to be issued, demanding payment of the amount in default. Thus, the default by Guarantor has to exist on the date when Notice in Form-B is being issued. When we read Section 95, sub-section (4) and Rule 7 of 2019 Rules, the above is the only intendment of the legislative scheme, i.e. default on the part of Guarantor should exist on the date when Notice in Form-B has to be issued. We have noticed the definitions of ‘debt’ and ‘default’ in Section 3 (11) and (12) of the IBC. Default shall arise on account of non-payment of debt, when whole or part of it become due. ‘Debt’ means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person. Thus, for a default, debt has to be due and Debtor shall be only that person, to whom debt is due. A Personal Guarantor becomes a Debtor only when guarantee is invoked, making him liable to make the payment to the Lender. We have noticed Clause 2 and Clause 21 of the Deed of Guarantee in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, which clearly contemplate that liability on Guarantor shall arise only when demand is made by the Lender, in event Principal Borrower fails to repay the amount. In the present case, there is no case setup by the Appellant that at any point of time guarantee was invoked, except issuance of Notice in Form-B, which is claimed by the Appellant to be treated as Notice for invocation of guarantee. Further, we have noticed the definition of ‘Guarantor’ under Rule 3(1)(e), which while defining a ‘Guarantor’ contain two conditions, i.e. (i) who is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor; and (ii) in respect of whom, guarantee has been invoked by the Creditor and remains unpaid in full or part. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that expression ‘and’ used in Rule 3 (1)(e) needs to be read as ‘or’ to make the provision workable and to avoid producing an unintelligible and absurd result. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of the above submission, i.e. AIR 1968 SC 1450 – Ishwar Singh Bindra and Ors. vs. State of U.P. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case had occasion to consider the definition of ‘drug’ contained in Section 3(b)(i) of Drugs Act 1940. Expression ‘and’ used in Section 3(b)(1) of the Drugs Act was considered in the said case and in paragraph 11 of the judgment, following was laid down:

  • “11. Now if the expression “substances” is to be taken to mean something other than “medicine” as has been held in our previous decision it becomes difficult to understand how the word “and” as used in the definition of drug in Section 3(b)(i) between “medicines” and “substances” could have been intended to have been used conjunctively. It would be much more appropriate in the context to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at p. 135 that “and” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as “or”. Similarly in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., it has been accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”.”


# 10. This Tribunal in recent judgment of this Tribunal in “Mukul Somany vs. DBS Bank Ltd. & Anr. [(2026) ibclaw.in 91 NCLAT], Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.999 of 2024 and other appeals”, decided on 04.02.2026 has again reiterated the proposition laid down by this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania. In Para 17 and 18 of the judgment following was held:

  • “17. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the Financial Creditors having not invoked the guarantee prior to issuing demand notice in Form B, the application under Section 95 could not have been filed by Financial Creditor before invoking the guarantee.

  • 18. In result, both the Appeals are allowed and order impugned dated 03.05.2024 admitting Section 95 application is set aside. Dismissal of Section 95 application shall not preclude the Financial Creditor to take such proceeding as permissible in law.”


# 11. In view of the law laid down by this Tribunal, as noted above, view taken by the Adjudicating Authority in Para 17 that notice under Rule 7 is the notice invoking the guarantee cannot be said to be in accordance with correct proposition of law.


# 12. A copy of the Deed of Guarantee is on record. In Para 16 of the order, Col. 3(a) of the Deed of Guarantee has been extracted, which is to the following effect:

  • “16. Clause 3 (a) of the Deed of Guarantee provides as under:

  • “In the event of any default on the part of the Customer in payment/ repayment of any of the moneys referred to in Clause 2 above, or in the event of any default on the part of the Customer to comply with or perform any of the terms, conditions and covenants contained in the Facility Documents, the Guarantor (s) shall, upon demand, forthwith pay to SEFL without demur all the amounts payable by the Customer under the Facility Documents. Any such demand made by SEFL on the Guarantor(s) shall be final, conclusive and binding notwithstanding any difference or any dispute between SEFL and the Customer/ arbitration or any other legal proceedings, pending before any court, tribunal, arbitrator or any other authority.

  • Rule 3 (e) of the Personal Guarantor Rules defines “guarantor” as “a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part”.


# 13. The Deed of Guarantee required issuance of notice of payment of default. Thus, the guarantee clearly contemplated demand from the Financial Creditor and invocation of guarantee was mandatory.


# 14. Now we look into the submission of the Respondent – Financial Creditor relying on notice dated 11.06.2019 which according to the Respondent can be treated to be notice demanding from personal guarantor. There are two reasons due to which the above submission cannot be accepted. Firstly, in the application which was filed under Section 95, the Financial Creditor has not come with any case that apart from notice under Form B dated 15.02.2022 there is any other notice invoking guarantee. As noticed above, in Part-III of the application only document referred to is notice in Form B dated 15.02.2022. Financial Creditor has not come up with any case that prior to notice under Form B dated 15.02.2022, any earlier notice was issued. Secondly, the Financial Creditor sought to bring on record notice dated 11.06.2018 by filing I.A. No.816 of 2024 before the Adjudicating Authority. The Resolution Professional has also filed an affidavit bringing on record recall notice dated 11.06.2019. When the IA No.816 of 2024 along with IB-337(ND)/2022 came for consideration, both learned counsel for the Financial Creditor and Resolution Professional submitted that they will not rely on notice dated 11.06.2019. The order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 03.05.2024 is as follows:

  • HYBRID HEARING (PHYSICAL & VC)
    ORDER

  • ΙΑ-816/2024:-

  • The Resolution Professional had filed an affidavit on 09.04.2024 seeking to bring on record a document alleged to be a loan recall notice issued on 11.06.2019 Mr. Gaurav Mitra, Learned Counsel appearing for the Personal Quarantor strongly objected to take the said document on record. Mr. Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant/Financial Creditor has submitted that he will be advancing his arguments without relying upon the said document. Mr. Vinod Chaursia, Learned Counsel appearing for the Resolution Professional has also submitted that he will not be relying upon on the said affidavit filed on 09.04.2024 and the document in question.

  • We have heard the submissions made by Mr. Anirban Bhattacharya, Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant.

  • Arguments heard. The parties are at liberty to file written submissions along with case laws, if any, within one week.

  • List the matter on 17.05.2024 for compliance.”


# 15. We, thus, are unable to accept the prayer of the Respondent No.1 by I.A. No.910 of 2026 taking notice dated 11.06.2019 on record. When the Respondent – Financial Creditor and Resolution Professional both made submission before the Adjudicating Authority that they will not rely on the notice dated 11.06.2019, they cannot be allowed to rely on said notice in this appeal.


# 16. One more submission made by the Respondent needs to be noticed. It is submitted by the Respondent that at the time when order was passed by the Adjudicating Authority, the judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania was not delivered, which was only delivered on 28.02.2025, hence, there was no requirement of bringing notice dated 11.06.2019 on record.


# 17. When the application is filed under Section 95 by a Financial Creditor, all relevant materials including the demand notice and notice for invocation of the bank guarantee are required to be pleaded. When there is no pleading of the notice dated 11.06.2019 in Section 95 application, it is not open for the Respondent to contend that the judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania was not delivered at that relevant time hence there was no requirement. The judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania is a judgment declaring law and it shall be treated that law as declared by this Tribunal in the above judgment was law on the all times on Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules. We, thus, do not find any substance in this submission of the Respondent.


# 18. Learned counsel for the Respondent has also relied on judgment of this Tribunal in “Paresh Rastogi vs. Omkara Assets Reconstruction Private Limited [(2025) ibclaw.in 194 NCLAT], (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 2053 of 2024” decided on 18.03.2025. The question which has come up for consideration in the present case was not considered and answered in the above judgment, hence, this judgment cannot help the Respondent in the present case.


# 19. In result of the foregoing discussion and our conclusions, order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 22.07.2024 cannot be sustained. Appeal is allowed. Order dated 22.07.2024 is set aside. Company Petition IB-337(ND)/2022 is dismissed. We make it clear that dismissal of Company Petition IB-337(ND)/2022 shall not preclude the Financial Creditor to take such other measures as permissible in law.

” 

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Thursday, 7 May 2026

Canara Bank vs Mr. Rajiv Prasad - It is trite that a demand upon the personal guarantor to pay the outstanding due from the Principal Borrower constitutes the invocation of the personal guarantee executed by the personal guarantor and the limitation runs from the expiry of period specified in the first demand notice.

  NCLT Mumbai-1 (2026.04.23) in Canara Bank vs Mr. Rajiv Prasad  [(IB)/1075(MB)2025] held that;-

  • In terms of aforesaid specific averment, the release of borrower consequent to its liquidation does not discharge the Personal Guarantor herein and the Personal Guarantor remains liable for the unsatisfied debt owed to the Applicant Creditor by the dissolved corporate debtor. Hence, the personal guarantor remains liable for the unsatisfied debt and does not get discharged on the ground of discharge of corporate debtor consequent to its dissolution.

  • It is trite that a demand upon the personal guarantor to pay the outstanding due from the Principal Borrower constitutes the invocation of the personal guarantee executed by the personal guarantor and the limitation runs from the expiry of period specified in the first demand notice.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. The present petition CP (IB) 1075 of 2025 has been preferred by Canara Bank (“Applicant / Creditor”) under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 seeking initiation of insolvency resolution proceedings against the Respondent, Mr. Rajiv Prasad (“Respondent / Personal Guarantor”), the personal guarantor in respect of the credit facilities extended by the Applicant to the Corporate Debtor, M/s Ultra Drytech Engineering Ltd.


# 2. It is stated that, in order to secure the repayment of the Credit facilities extended to the Principal Borrower/Corporate Debtor, the Respondent executed a Deed of Guarantee dated 29.11.2014, thereby undertaking to be jointly and severally liable for the dues of the Corporate Debtor. The Applicant/Creditor issued a statutory demand notice in Form B on 30.08.2025.


# 3. This Tribunal observed that the Applicant has not placed on record a Notice of invocation of Guarantee along with the Petition. Accordingly, the Applicant was directed to place on record Notice of invocation of guarantee prior to the issuance of statutory demand notice, which was placed by the Applicant vide additional affidavit dt. 11.11.2025. On perusal of the said Affidavit, it is noticed that the liability of the Respondent in terms of the guarantee was invoked vide notice dt. 07.08.2025, upon failure of the Corporate Debtor to discharge its obligations, stating that “The Financial creditor through this notice brings to your attention that the Corporate Debtor has failed and neglected to repay the dues/ outstanding liabilities and hence hereby demand you under the provisions of IBC, by issuing this notice to discharge in full the liabilities of the Corporate Debtor as stated in Schedule A hereunder to the secured creditor within 07 days from the date of receipt of this notice. Further, it is brought to your notice that you are also liable to pay future interest at the rate of 12.95 % per year together with all costs, charges, expenses and incidental expenses with respect to the proceedings undertaken by the Financial Creditor in recovering its dues. The said notice was served by Speed Post dated 18.08.2025, thus the said notice is presumed to have been delivered within 48 hours i.e. on 20.08.2025. Accordingly, the period specified in the said notice expires on 26.08.2025


# 4. The Applicant issued a demand notice in Form B dt 30.08.2025 upon the Respondent requiring him to pay the outstanding debt, if not paid earlier, within 14 days from receipt of demand notice. Along with this Petition, and has also placed on record the sanction letter, loan agreement, deed of guarantee, bank statements, NeSL record of default and proof of service.


# 5. It is stated that, as on 31.07.2025, the total outstanding debt recoverable from the Respondent is Rs. 42,00,53,235.02/- (Rupees Forty-Two Crore Fifty-Three Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five and Two Paise only), which has remained in default since 30.06.2016, and despite repeated reminders and demands, the Respondent has failed to clear the said dues.


# 6. This Tribunal appointed MR. Kamal Kumar Jadwani, as the Resolution Professional vide order dated 25.11.2025 requiring him to examine the Company Petition and file the report within 10 days from the date of receipt of this order. The Resolution Professional filed his report dated 10.12.2025 vide IA (IBC) 5854 of 2025 recommending the admission of present petition. It is also stated in the said report that “In response to the letter served upon the Personal Guarantor, the Resolution Professional received an email dated 05.12.2025 from the Advocates representing the Personal Guarantor, alleging suppression of pending DRT proceedings by the Financial Creditor before this Hon’ble Tribunal, indicating that the Personal Guarantor would move an appropriate application, and asserting that the Personal Guarantor has no assets”.


# 7. The Respondent Personal Guarantor filed his reply dated 04.02.2025 stated that the present petition is barred by limitation as the Applicant, as back as on 25 January 2017, herein had demanded the alleged outstanding dues in the sum of Rs. 9,94,34,018.20(Rupees Nine Crores Ninety Four Lacs Thirty four Thousand Eighteen and Paise Twenty Only) from the Respondent in its alleged capacity as guarantor (under the alleged guarantee dated 29/11/2014 claimed to have been executed by the Respondent in favor of Applicant. It is further stated that the Respondent however, has only an incomplete copy of the said letter of demand dated 25" January 2017, (which is annexed as an exhibit “OO” to OA No.1109 of 2024 filed by the Applicant against the Respondent in DRT) whereby the Applicant had made the aforesaid demand in the sum of Rs. 9,94,34,018.20(Rupees Nine Crores Ninety Four Lacs Thirty four Thousand Eighteen and Paise Twenty Only) on the Respondent in his alleged capacity of guarantor of the said corporate debtor Ultra Dry tech Engineering Limited. It is further stated that the debts of the Corporate debtor having been extinguished with effect from the date of its dissolution on 21.8.2024, the alleged liability of the Respondent herein as guarantor of corporate debtor (as claimed by Applicant ), being co-extensive with the debt of the said corporate debtor, has also extinguished and come to an end on 21.8.2024. The Respondent has also submitted that the demand notice dated 27.08.2024 was not served upon him.


# 8. We have heard the learned Counsel and perused the material on record.


# 9. The Respondent Personal Guarantor has challenged this petition on the ground of extinguishment of liability of Corporate Debtor consequent to its dissolution thus discharging the Personal Guarantor herein as well from his obligation under the deed of guarantee executed to secure the debt owed by the Corporate Debtor to the Applicant creditor; Non service of demand notice dated 27.08.2024; and on limitation ground stating that the guarantee came to be invoked in terms of notice dated 25.01.2017 as per own admission of the Applicant in the proceedings filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT).


# 10. Indubitably, the Principal Borrower/Corporate Debtor was liquidated and after distribution of the liquidation proceeds, the claim of the Applicant Creditor against the Corporate Debtor remained unsatisfied, and consequent to the liquidation the Corporate Debtor was dissolved. It is noted that the executed deed of guarantee states that

  • “……….The guarantor also agrees that the Guarantor shall not be discharged from his liability by the Bank's releasing the Borrower or by any act or omission of the Bank legal consequence of which may be to discharge Borrower or by any act of the bank which would, but for this present provision, be inconsistent with the Guarantor's right as surely or by the Bank's omission to do any act which, but for this present provision, the Bank's duty to the Guarantor would have required the Bank to do. Though as between the Borrower and the Guarantor, the Guarantor is surety only, the guarantor agrees that as between the Bank and the Guarantor, the Guarantor is the principle debtor, jointly with the Borrower and accordingly the Guarantor shall not be entitled to any of the rights conferred as surety by Section 133, 134, 135, 139 and 141 or any other relevant provision of the Contract Act.” 


In terms of aforesaid specific averment, the release of borrower consequent to its liquidation does not discharge the Personal Guarantor herein and the Personal Guarantor remains liable for the unsatisfied debt owed to the Applicant Creditor by the dissolved corporate debtor. Hence, the personal guarantor remains liable for the unsatisfied debt and does not get discharged on the ground of discharge of corporate debtor consequent to its dissolution.


# 11. It is further noted that the Applicant has pleaded service of the demand notice dated 27.08.2024, however, as per Annexure E attached to the Petition the said notice is dated 30.08.2025. It appears to us that this typographical error in the pleading is inconsistent with the copy of the demand notice in Form B dated 30.08.2025 attached with the Petition. The relevant document i.e. demand notice in Form B dated 30.08.2025 shall prevail over the pleadings, which is sufficient compliance of the provisions of IBC. In our considered view, the substance has to prevail over the form, hence, we do not find any merit in this ground.


# 12. On perusal of the notice dated 25.01.2017 placed as Exhibit B to the reply by the personal guarantor, it is noted that the said notice was issued by the Applicant Creditor to the Principal Borrower as well as Personal Guarantors, including the personal guarantor herein requiring them to pay the debt due. The relevant part of the said notice reads as 

  • We hereby finally call upon you to pay the said sum of Rs.9,94,34,018.20(Rupees Nine Crores Ninety Four Lacs Thirty four Thousand Eighteen and paise Twenty only) with Interest at 18.35% (Inclusive of 2% penal interest) compounded monthly from 26.01.2017 till payment within 7 days from the date of receipt hereof”. 


Indubitably, the said notice is address to the personal guarantor as well in his capacity as personal guarantor which is evident from the description of the noticee i.e. “Mr.Rajeev Prasad {Managing Director / Guarantor)”. The Respondent personal guarantor has relied upon the said notice in his defence thus it is presumed that the receipt thereof is not challenged by him. It is further noted that the corporate debtor was admitted into the CIRP on 30.03.2017 in terms of C.P. No. 29/2017.


# 13. The Applicant Creditor in its rejoinder has stated that Even assuming, without admitting, that the letter dated 25th January 2017 constituted an invocation of the guarantee, it is well established in law that a creditor may at any time thereafter issue a fresh demand upon the guarantor, which constitutes a fresh invocation of the guarantee and gives rise to a fresh cause of action”. It is further stated by the Applicant that “it is the demand that specifically invokes the personal guarantee in the context of IBC proceedings, i.e., the demand notices of 2024 and 2025. The 2017 letter was issued in a different context and under a different legal framework, and any limitation period computed from the said date is irrelevant for proceedings under Section 95(1) of the IBC, for the reasons elaborated in detail hereunder”.


# 14. It is trite that a demand upon the personal guarantor to pay the outstanding due from the Principal Borrower constitutes the invocation of the personal guarantee executed by the personal guarantor and the limitation runs from the expiry of period specified in the first demand notice. Further, any subsequent demands after first notice of demand are not relevant for the purpose of determination of limitation. It is noted that the notice dated 25.01.2017 forms part of the application filed by the Applicant Creditor herein before DRT, which constitutes admission on part of the Applicant Creditor before a Court of Law as to the genuineness, including its contents, of the said document as well as its due service upon the notice(s) and such admission binds the applicant creditor. Accordingly, in our considered view, the limitation starts running from the expiry of 7 days from the date of receipt of said notice. Accordingly, after taken into consideration some period for the delivery of the said notice, the limitation shall start to run from from first week of February, 2017 and the period of three years shall expire in first week of February, 2020. The present petition having filed on 30.09.2025, is beyond the limitation period.


# 15. Accordingly, CP (IB) 1075 of 2025 is dismissed and disposed of.

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Tuesday, 28 April 2026

Dineshbhai Premjibhai Lathidadia Vs. Sarvodaya Sahakari Bank Ltd. and Anr. - “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.

 NCLAT (2026.04.24) in Dineshbhai Premjibhai Lathidadia Vs. Sarvodaya Sahakari Bank Ltd. and Anr. [(2026) ibclaw.in 558 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 2147 of 2024 with Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 621 of 2025] held that;-

  • There is therefore, little difficulty in holding that the date of admission of a Claim by the IRP grants a fresh date for commencement of limitation and when the Claims are subsequently updated it pushes the date of terminus a quo to that date.

  • An Acknowledgment for liability itself is sufficient and it need not necessarily be accompanied by a promise to pay as per decision in Hetal Enterprises v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. 2012 (1CCC 458 Bom). Further, an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be with respect to not only the property or Right, but it can be even in regard to the Liability.

  • There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and a promise within the meaning of Section 25 of the Contract Act. Both promise and acknowledgment in writing, signed by a party or its agent authorised in that behalf, have the effect of creating a fresh starting of limitation.

  • In view of the foregoing discussion, we are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7 (1) issued in Form-B to the Guarantor, demanding repayment of the default amount, has to be treated as Notice for invoking guarantee. Default before issuance of Notice under Rule 7(1), must exist on the part of the Guarantor.

  • Secondly, we notice that there is no dispute between the parties pertaining to the invocation of guarantee on 11.08.2016, filing of summary suit before the JR on 24.10.2016 and passing of decree by the JR on 15.09.2017 and this period was admittedly expiring on 14.09.2020 and in our considered opinion the decree passed by the JR would provide a fresh cause of action of three years which would conclude in ordinary way on 14.09.2020.

  • “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.


Excerpts of the Order;

Both above placed appeals are connected with each other and the issue involved in both the appeals is identical, therefore for the sake of convenience and for the purpose of appreciation of evidence, both these appeals are being disposed of by passing this common judgment.


Analysis and Findings

# 31. Having heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and having perused the record a short question which arise for adjudicating is as to whether the application filed by the Respondent no. 1 under Section 95 of the Code was within the limitation period and secondly, as to whether if the civil court has passed a decree during the commencement of the original period of limitation of three years whether the same would provide a fresh cause of action starting the three years’ limitation a fresh.


# 32. We also notice that almost all the facts pertaining to the happening of events appears to be admitted to the parties and in this regard a timeline prepared by the RP and has also been filed through its written submissions appears to be the true depiction of the facts and is reproduced as under for our convenience:


# 33. We notice that the factual matrix barring some minor facts is admitted to the parties. It appears to be an admitted fact as is also reflected from the petition filed by the Respondent No. 1 under Section 95 of the Code before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority that the guarantee advanced by the appellants was invoked on 11.08.2016 and thereafter on 24.10.2016 a summary suit no. 144 of 2016 was filed under Section 99 (4) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act (Act) before Ld. Joint Registrar and Member, Board of nominees, Surat, Gujarat, JR.


# 34. It is also an admitted fact that the above mentioned suit was decreed on 15.09.2017 directing repayment of Rs. 28,865,468.35/- along with 13% compound interest thereon payable by the CD and all personal guarantors, including appellants to the Respondent No.1.


# 35. It also appears to be an admitted fact that no amount after the passing of this decree has been paid by the Appellants to the Respondent Bank.


# 36. It also appears to be an admitted fact that on 01.07.2022, a demand notice under Section 95 (4) (b) of the Code was issued by the Respondent Bank to the appellants which is stated to have been returned by the appellants and it is claimed by the Respondent Bank that this notice was again delivered to the appellants through email on 14.07.2022 and 16.07.2022.


# 37. It also appears to be an admitted fact that the Respondent Bank has filed petition under Section 95 of the IBC before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority on 14.11.2022 which was registered on 11.01.2023, however was dismissed on 22.12.2023 as defective with the liberty to file fresh petition and it was thereafter on 18.06.2024, petition under Section 95 of the Code was filed by the Respondent Bank whereon, after appointment of the Resolution Professional and having perused its reports the impugned orders have been passed by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority admitting the petitions filed by the Respondent Bank under Section 95 of the Code.


# 38. It is to be recalled that part I of the Code is placed under the heading preliminary which contains definition clause and under Section 3, subsection (11) of it the “debt” has been defined as under: –

(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt;


# 39. It is also fruitful to mention here the manner in which the “default” has been defined under the Code under Section 3(12) of the Code which is also reproduced as under: –

(12) “default” means non-payment of debt when whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is not 1[Paid] by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be;


# 40. In part II of the Code which is dedicated to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons in Section 5(22) “personal guarantor” has been defined as under: –

(22) “personal guarantor” means an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor;


# 41. Since, the application has been filed by the Respondent No. 1/ Financial Creditor under Section 95 of the code, therefore, the same is also reproduced as under: – . . . 


# 42. This Appellate Tribunal in IDBI Bank vs. Hemangi Patel [(2025) ibclaw.in 599 NCLAT] : 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1263 Opined as under:

  • 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, held that claim of acknowledgment under Section 18 on basis of letter dated 29.01.2020 cannot be accepted since the said acknowledgement was subsequent to expiry of 3 years. Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on earlier judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ‘B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd.’ v. ‘Parag Gupta & Associates’, [(2019) 11 SCC 633], where Article 137 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable and limitation as 3 years. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that recovery certificate will give a fresh cause of action and application brought within 3 years of issue of recovery certificate is well within time. With regard to two recovery certificates, with respect to which Section 7 was initiated within 3 years, Hon’ble Supreme Court held the same to be within limitation relying on Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In the above context, following was laid down in paragraph 24:

  • “24. What has been filed before NCLT is a composite application based on three recovery certificates, two of which have been instituted within the three-year period as postulated in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The third recovery certificate was issued in the year 2015. Thus, there is more than three years’ gap between the date of issue thereof and the date of filing of the application before NCLT. But a recovery certificate under the 1993 Act is also clothed with the character of a deemed decree. The provisions of Section 19 (22-A) of the 1993 Act specifies:

  • “19. Application to the Tribunal.—(1)-(22) * * * (22-A) Any recovery certificate issued by the Presiding Officer under sub-section (22) shall be deemed to be decree or order of the Court for the purposes of initiation of winding-up proceedings against a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) or limited liability partnership registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009) or insolvency proceedings against any individual or partnership firm under any law for the time being in force, as the case may be.”

  • 10. From the above it is clear that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case which is relied by the appellant relying on the earlier judgment in the matter of ‘Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.’ (Supra) held that limitation for filing Section 7 application is only 3 years as per Article 137. We, thus are of the view that submission of the appellant relying on the above judgment that Hon’ble Supreme Court held that limitation will be 12 years with respect to a decree is wholly incorrect and is not borne out from the judgment.

  • 13. We thus do not find any substance in the submission of the counsel for the appellant that for filing an application under IBC 12 years limitation will apply. The judgment relied by the counsel for the appellant in ‘Tottempudi Salalith’ (Supra) also does not lay down any such proposition as contended by the counsel for the appellant. The adjudicating authority in the impugned order come to the conclusion that Section 95 application filed by the IDBI Bank was filed after expiry of three years period of limitation even after giving the benefit of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu WP (Civil) No. 3 of 2022 in ‘Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’.

  • 14. We do not find any error in the order of the adjudicating authority rejecting Section 95 application filed by the appellant as barred by time. There is no merit in the appeals. Both the appeals are dismissed.


# 43. In Shankar Khandelwal v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., (2025) ibclaw.in 845 NCLAT, it is Observed as under:

  • 19. There is therefore, little difficulty in holding that the date of admission of a Claim by the IRP grants a fresh date for commencement of limitation and when the Claims are subsequently updated it pushes the date of terminus a quo to that date.


# 44. In State Bank of India vs. Gourishankar Poddar & Anr. (2025) ibclaw.in 17 NCLAT this Appellate Tribunal held as under:

  • 48. The last issue relates to the limitation in filing the CIRP petition. In this regard it is a settled law that the liability of the Corporate Debtor and the guarantor being Respondent No. 1 are co-terminus. Thus, liability for Respondent No. 1 would arise only when amounts became and went due by the Corporate Debtor. Consequently, any acknowledgement of debt by the principal borrower is also considered an acknowledgement by the guarantor under the Act of 1963. This position has been upheld by this Appellate Tribunal in E.M. Najeeb Ellias Mohammed, Promoter of Air Travel Enterprises India Ltd. v. Union Bank of India [2024 SCC OnLine NCLAT 254]. Relevant paras 65 to 67 are extracted below:

  • “65. An Acknowledgment for liability itself is sufficient and it need not necessarily be accompanied by a promise to pay as per decision in Hetal Enterprises v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. 2012 (1CCC 458 Bom). Further, an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be with respect to not only the property or Right, but it can be even in regard to the Liability.

  • 66. An Acknowledgment of a liability made by the Principal Borrower should be considered as an acknowledgment of liability, on behalf of Guarantor.

  • 67. A Revival Letter/ an acknowledgment, executed by the Principal Borrower on the authorization binds the Guarantor.”


# 45. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. vs. Key Precision Parts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [(2022) ibclaw.in 99 SC] : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 978 observed as under:

  • 31. Under Section 25(3), a debtor can enter into an agreement in writing, to pay the whole or part of a debt, which the creditor might have enforced, but for the limitation of a suit in law. A written promise to pay the barred debt is a valid contract. Such a promise constitutes novation and can form the basis of a suit independent of the original debt, for it is well settled that the debt is not extinguished, the remedy gets barred by passage of time as held by this Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay.

  • 33. There is a distinction between acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and a promise within the meaning of Section 25 of the Contract Act. Both promise and acknowledgment in writing, signed by a party or its agent authorised in that behalf, have the effect of creating a fresh starting of limitation. The difference is that an acknowledgment under Section 18 of the Limitation Act has to be made within the period of limitation and need not be accompanied by any promise to pay. If an acknowledgment shows existence of jural relationship, it may extend limitation even though there may be a denial to pay. On the other hand, Section 25(3) is only attracted when there is an express promise to pay a debt that is time-barred or any part thereof. Promise to pay can be inferred on scrutinising the document. Only the promise should be clear and unconditional.


# 46. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Pat Surana vs Union Bank of India & Anr. [(2021) ibclaw.in 53 SC] : (2021) SCC OnLine SC 267 Opined as under:

  • 43. Ordinarily, upon declaration of the loan account/debt as NPA that date can be reckoned as the date of default to enable the financial creditor to initiate action under Section 7 IBC. However, Section 7 comes into play when the corporate debtor commits “default”. Section 7, consciously uses the expression “default” – not the date of notifying the loan account of the corporate person as NPA. Further, the expression “default” has been defined in Section 3(12) to mean non-payment of “debt” when whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. In cases where the corporate person had offered guarantee in respect of loan transaction, the right of the financial creditor to initiate action against such entity being a corporate debtor (corporate guarantor), would get triggered the moment the principal borrower commits default due to non-payment of debt. Thus, when the principal borrower and/or the (corporate) guarantor admit and acknowledge their liability after declaration of NPA but before the expiration of three years therefrom including the fresh period of limitation due to (successive) acknowledgments, it is not possible to extricate them from the renewed limitation accruing due to the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Section 18 of the Limitation Act gets attracted the moment acknowledgment in writing signed by the party against whom such right to initiate resolution process under Section 7 IBC enures. Section 18 of the Limitation Act would come into play every time when the principal borrower and/or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, acknowledge their liability to pay the debt. Such acknowledgment, however, must be before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation including the fresh period of limitation due to acknowledgment of the debt, from time to time, for institution of the proceedings under Section 7 IBC. Further, the acknowledgment must be of a liability in respect of which the financial creditor can initiate action under Section 7 IBC.


# 47. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in Order dated 10.01.2022 passed in Suo Motu W.P. (C) No. 03/2020 exempting limitation during Covid-19. Held as under:

  • 5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions:

  • I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.

  • II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022.

  • III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

  • IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings. As prayed for by learned Senior Counsel, M.A. No. 29 of 2022 is dismissed as withdrawn.


# 48. The only issue which has been raised by the appellant in this appeal is pertaining to the fact that both the petitions are barred by limitation. According to the appellants the personal guarantee given by the appellants was invoked on 11.08.2016 and summary suit was filed on 24.10.2016 whereon a decree was passed on 15.09.2017 and the demand notices to the personal guarantors under Form B was issued on 11.07.2022 and 14.07.2022 and the earlier petitions CP (IB) No. 13 of 2023 and CP (IB) No. 11 of 2023 were filed on 14.11.2022 dismissed on 22.12.2023 being defective, with the liberty to file a fresh petitions and thereafter the fresh petitions have been filed whereon the impugned orders have been passed.


# 49. At this juncture, it is also important to see as to how the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has disposed of the petitions filed by the Respondent Bank and in both the impugned orders the relevant paragraph no. 18 to 22 are identical and therefore reproduced below for the purpose of convenience.

  • “18. As regards limitation aspect is concerned, in the present case admittedly Corporate Debtor after availing Credit facilities committed default. Consequently, the loan accounts of the Corporate Debtor were classified as NPA on 30.07.2016. Thereafter, on 24.10.2016 the Applicant Bank filed Summary Suit No.144/2016 U/s 99(4) of the Gujarat Co-Operative Societies Act against the Corporate Debtor, Respondent/PG & others for recovery which was allowed vide order dated 15.09.2017. On non-payment/fresh default, gave fresh cause of auction. Thus, the period of Limitation was stand extended for three years w.e.f. order dated 15.09.2017 to 14.09.2020 in terms of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

  • 19. However, in view of the COVID pandemic period, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu WP (Civil) No. 3 of 2022 in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation as well as in the matter of M/s Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. M/s Aptech Ltd. (2024 INSC 155) dated 01.03.2024 held that the period i.e. 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 is liable to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation. It is also held that in the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

  • 20. In the present case the said excluded period comes to total number of 531 days. In ordinary circumstances the limitation period would have come to an end on 14.09.2020. However, after exclusion of 531 days, the three years’ limitation period would come to an end on 16.08.2024. Thereby meaning that the limitation period available to the Applicant Bank for invoking the personal guarantee would come to an end on 16.08.2024.

  • 21. In the present case the Applicant Bank has invoked the personal guarantee by serving Form-B being Demand Notice dated 01.07.2022 Section 95(4) (b) of the IBC, 2016 r.w. Rule 7(1) of the I&B (AAA for IRP for PGCD) Rules, 2019 after fresh default in terms of order dated 15.09.2017 passed in the Summary Suit No.144/2016 U/s 99(4) of the Gujarat Co-Operative Societies Act with in period of limitation in terms of section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

  • 22. Hence, in our view, even taking the date of invocation of Guarantee dated 01.07.2022 applying the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu WP (Civil) No. 3 of 2022 (should be 2020) In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation as well as in the matter of M/s Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. M/s Aptech Ltd. (2024 INSC 155) dated 01.03.2024, the present Petition filed on 19.06.2024 is very much within limitation as period of limitation for the same is available to the Applicant Bank till 16.08.2024”.


# 50. Perusal of the impugned orders passed by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority would reveal that Ld. Adjudicating Authority has taken the date i.e. 30.07.2016 as the date on which the loan account of the CD was classified as NPA and thereafter considered the decree passed by the Ld. JR under the Section 99 (4) of the Act on 15.09.2017 and goes on to hold that non-payment/ fresh default provided fresh cause of action and thus found the period of limitation extended for three years with effect from order of the JR dated 15.09.2017 which is to end on 14.09.2020 and thereafter by the implication of the happening of the Covid Pandemic and in view of the Suo Motu- WP (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation dated 10.01.2022 as well as the law laid down in M/s Arif Azim Company Ltd. vs. M/s Aptech Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 80 SC] : (2024 INSC 155) dated 01.03.2024 held that the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 is liable to be excluded from calculating the period of limitation and that when the actual balance period of limitation is remaining w.e.f. 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days than longer period shall apply and has calculated that period as of 531 days and found that this period (after exclusion of 531 days) was ending on 16.08.2024 and thus hold that the limitation period available to the applicant bank for invoking the personal guarantee would come to an end on 16.08.2024.


# 51. It was further held by Ld. Adjudicating Authority that the bank has invoked personal guarantee by serving Form-B (demand notice on 01.07.2022) under Section 95 (4) (b) of the Code read with Rule 7 (1) of the PG to CD Rules, 2019 and found that in terms of decree dated 15.09.2017 passed by the JR the petitions are within limitation.


# 52. We notice that the Ld. Adjudicating Authority has committed a manifest illegality in taking the guarantee invocation date as 01.07.2022 by issuance of demand notice on 01.07.2022 under Section 95 (4) (b) of the Code read with Rule 7 (1) of the PG to CD Rules, 2019 while the guarantee had already been invoked by the Respondent Bank admittedly on 11.08.2016. It appears to be a settled law that by issuance of notice under Form-B the guarantee may not be invoked and in this regard the law laid down by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Appellate tribunal in SBI vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania, (2025) ibclaw.in 153 NCLAT may be recalled and relevant part of the same is reproduced as under:

  • “17. The Notice, thus, contemplate demanding payment of the amount of default. The above Rule clearly indicate that Demand Notice has to be issued, demanding payment of the amount in default. Thus, the default by Guarantor has to exist on the date when Notice in Form-B is being issued. When we read Section 95, sub-section (4) and Rule 7 of 2019 Rules, the above is the only intendment of the legislative scheme, i.e. default on the part of Guarantor should exist on the date when Notice in Form-B has to be issued. We have noticed the definitions of ‘debt’ and ‘default’ in Section 3 (11) and (12) of the IBC. Default shall arise on account of non-payment of debt, when whole or part of it become due. ‘Debt’ means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person. Thus, for a default, debt has to be due and Debtor shall be only that person, to whom debt is due. A Personal Guarantor becomes a Debtor only when guarantee is invoked, making him liable to make the payment to the Lender. We have noticed Clause 2 and Clause 21 of the Deed of Guarantee in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, which clearly contemplate that liability on Guarantor shall arise only when demand is made by the Lender, in event Principal Borrower fails to repay the amount. In the present case, there is no case setup by the Appellant that at any point of time guarantee was invoked, except issuance of Notice in Form-B, which is claimed by the Appellant to be treated as Notice for invocation of guarantee. Further, we have noticed the definition of ‘Guarantor’ under Rule 3(1)(e), which while defining a ‘Guarantor’ contain two conditions, i.e. (i) who is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor; and (ii) in respect of whom, guarantee has been invoked by the Creditor and remains unpaid in full or part. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that expression ‘and’ used in Rule 3 (1)(e) needs to be read as ‘or’ to make the provision workable and to avoid producing an unintelligible and absurd result. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of the above submission, i.e. AIR 1968 SC 1450 – Ishwar Singh Bindra and Ors. vs. State of U.P. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case had occasion to consider the definition of ‘drug’ contained in Section 3(b)(i) of Drugs Act 1940. Expression ‘and’ used in Section 3(b)(1) of the Drugs Act was considered in the said case and in paragraph 11 of the judgment, following was laid down:

  • “11. Now if the expression “substances” is to be taken to mean something other than “medicine” as has been held in our previous decision it becomes difficult to understand how the word “and” as used in the definition of drug in Section 3(b)(i) between “medicines” and “substances” could have been intended to have been used conjunctively. It would be much more appropriate in the context to read it disconjunctively. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn. it is stated at p. 135 that “and” has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a contexts, read as “or”. Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., it has been accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”.

  • The coordinate bench of this Appellate Tribunal in the above noted case further opined as under: –

  • “20. The above judgment reiterates that one of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. When we look into definition of ‘Guarantor’ in Rule 3(1)(e), fulfilment of both the condition that Debtor is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked, has been cumulatively used. The submission of the Appellant that use of the expression ‘and’ has to be read as ‘or’, shall not further the statutory object and purpose. Guarantor with regard to whom guarantee has not been invoked, shall not be a Debtor and no default can be committed by Guarantor, unless guarantee is invoked as per the terms of Deed of Guarantee. Thus, the insolvency resolution process against a Guarantor, against whom debt has not become due, is not understandable. We, thus, reject the submission of the Appellant that word ‘and’ used in Rule 3(1)(e) has to be read as ‘or’. Reading of word ‘or’ in place of ‘and’ shall be not in accordance with the statutory scheme and shall be against the statutory intendment.

  • 22. The requirement of date, when the default occurred, itself contemplate the default by Guarantor, when Application is filed against Guarantor. Obviously, the default has to be of the Guarantor and mentioning of date when the default occurred, itself contemplate default on the part of Guarantor, i.e. invocation of guarantee as per Deed of Guarantee. Thus, non-mention of requirement of whether guarantee has been invoked and proof thereof, is inconsequential, since the date when default occurred is specifically asked for.

  • It was further held that default shall arise on the part of Guarantor only when Demand Notice is issued, as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee in following words: –

  • “27. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7 (1) issued in Form-B to the Guarantor, demanding repayment of the default amount, has to be treated as Notice for invoking guarantee. Default before issuance of Notice under Rule 7(1), must exist on the part of the Guarantor. Hence, we reject the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7, sub-rule (1) is a Notice, invoking the guarantee. We, thus, do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority, rejecting Section 95 Application filed by the SBI. There is no merit in the Appeal. The Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

  • The aforesaid law propounded by a Bench of this Appellate Tribunal comprising three Hon’ble Members has clearly laid down the law that it would be mandatory on the part of the Financial creditor to invoke the guarantee before issuing a notice under Rule 7(1) in Form B of 2019 Rules and also that default before issuance of such notice must exist on the part of the guarantor and has therefore rejected the submissions as canvassed by Ld. Counsel for the Appellant by holding that the notice given under Rule 7(1) of 2019 Rules is not a notice for the purpose of invoking the guarantee.


# 53. Secondly, we notice that there is no dispute between the parties pertaining to the invocation of guarantee on 11.08.2016, filing of summary suit before the JR on 24.10.2016 and passing of decree by the JR on 15.09.2017 and this period was admittedly expiring on 14.09.2020 and in our considered opinion the decree passed by the JR would provide a fresh cause of action of three years which would conclude in ordinary way on 14.09.2020. In this regard the law laid down by this Appellate tribunal in IDBI Bank vs. Hemangi Patel (supra) and by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [(2018) ibclaw.in 32 SC] may be recalled and relevant part of these judgments is reproduced as under:

  • 41. Shri Dholakia argued that the Code being complete in itself, an intruder such as the Limitation Act must be shut out also by application of Section 238 of the Code which provides that, “notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force”, the provisions of the Code would override such laws. In fact, Section 60(6) of the Code specifically states as follows: “60. Adjudicating authority for corporate persons. – (1)- (5) * * * (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which such moratorium is in place shall be excluded.” This provision would have been wholly unnecessary if the Limitation Act was otherwise excluded either by reason of the Code being complete in itself or by virtue of Section 238 of the Code. Both, Section 433 of the Companies Act as well as Section 238-A of the Code, apply the provisions of the Limitation Act “as far as may be”. Obviously, therefore, where periods of limitation have been laid down in the Code, these periods will apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Limitation Act. From this, it does not follow that the baby must be thrown out with the bathwater. This argument, therefore, must also be rejected.

  • 42. It is thus clear that since the Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Code from the inception of the Code, Article 137 of the Limitation Act gets attracted. “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.


# 54. In Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy [(2021) ibclaw.in 69 SC] : (2021) 10 SCC 330 Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

  • “141. Moreover, a judgment and/or decree for money in favour of the financial creditor, passed by the DRT, or any other tribunal or court, or the issuance of a certificate of recovery in favour of the financial creditor, would give rise to a fresh cause of action for the financial creditor, to initiate proceedings under Section 7 IBC for initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process, within three years from the date of the judgment and/or decree or within three years from the date of issuance of the certificate of recovery, if the dues of the corporate debtor to the financial debtor, under the judgment and/or decree and/or in terms of the certificate of recovery, or any part thereof remained unpaid”.


# 55. Ld. Adjudicating Authority after holding that the period of limitation to file a petition was available till 14.09.2020 calculated that 531 days in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation dated 10.01.2022, would be excluded from counting the limitation period and in this way the limitation period would come to end on 16.08.2024.


# 56. We are of the considered view that Ld. Adjudicating authority has also committed patent illegality in computing the period which may be excluded from counting the limitation period as according to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation dated 10.01.2022 and M/s Arif Azim Company Ltd. vs. M/s Aptech Ltd. [(2024) ibclaw.in 80 SC] : (2024 INSC 155), the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 could only be excluded however where the limitation period has expired before 28.02.2022 is greater than 90 days that longer period would be available to the petitioner from 01.03.2022.


# 57. The appellant in their written submissions filed before us has calculated this period from 15.03.2020 to 14.09.2020 as 182 days while the Respondent No. 1 in his written submissions has counted this period from 15.03.2020 to 14.09.2020 (184 days) and by such computation the period was to expire on 31.08.2022 and according to the appellants this period was to expire on 30.08.2022. We are unable to understand as to on what basis Ld. Adjudicating Authority has calculated the period which may be excluded in view of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation as 531 days, therefore in his regard also Ld. Adjudicating Authority has committed an illegality.


# 58. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent no. 1 has submitted that even if the period of limitation was to expire on 31.08.2022 but the same has extended first on the score that a letter has been written by the appellants to the Respondent Bank on 17.03.2022 unconditionally promising and undertaking to pay 77% of the principal debt owed to the appellants and by this acknowledgment in writing the period of limitation has further extended for another three years.


# 59. Secondly, it is also argued by the Respondent Bank that another letter of date 12.07.2022 was send by the appellant to pay entire principal debt amount owed to him which would further extend the limitation period from another three years in view of Section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act and the petitions filed by the Respondent No. 1 on 14.11.2022 and thus the same were within limitation.


# 60. Another argument which has been taken by the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 is in terms that the claim of the Bank was admitted in the CIRP of the CD on 02.03.2020 and keeping in view the law laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Appellate tribunal in Shankar Khandelwal (supra) and SBI vs. Gauri Shankar Poddar it will amount to an acknowledgment by which the limitation has further extended for another three years and since by writing letters dated 17.03.2022, 12.07.2022 unconditional promise to pay the debt has been acknowledged by the appellants the same would amount to acknowledgment in writing under Section 18 of the limitation act and thus the limitation has extended till 12.07.2025. Reliance in this regard has been placed on Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. vs. Key Precision(supra).


# 61. It appears to be prima facie true that since the decree was passed by the JR on 15.09.2017 the limitation period according to this decree which has provided a fresh cause of action would have extended the limitation period till 14.09.2020 and keeping in view the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Re: Cognizance for extension of limitation dated 10.01.2022 the period of 184 days would have been excluded from counting the limitation period and by such exclusion the limitation would have expired on 31.08.2022. Keeping in view the communication of the appellants dated 17.03.2022 and 12.07.2022 a copy of which has been placed at (page no. 256 to 265) (268 to 269) of the appeal paper book of CA (AT) (Ins) No. 2147 of 2024 the same may amount to an acknowledgment in writing and this acknowledgment would have extended the limitation for a further period of three years from such date and the petition appears to have been filed within this period.


# 62. However, we notice that in none of the impugned order Ld. Adjudicating Authority has discussed anything about the filing of claim by the Respondent Bank before the IRP or the RP in the CIRP of the CD nor any discussion has been made pertaining to the letters dated 17.03.2022 and 12.07.2022 written by the appellants to Respondent No. 1 acknowledging the debt and therefore in absence of the same we are not in a position to dispose of the issue of limitation emerging between the parties and therefore there appears no option before us except to remand the matter again to the Ld. Adjudicating Authority for deciding it afresh.


# 63. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons given herein before the impugned order may not with stand the test of law and therefore are set aside.


# 64. Resultantly, the appeals filed by the appellants are allowed. The matter is remanded back to Ld. Adjudicating Authority for deciding it afresh after providing an opportunity by passing a reasoned order. For this purpose, the CP (IB) No. 249/NCLT/AHM/2024 with I.A. No. 1563/NCLT/AHM/2024 and CP (IB) No. 231/NCLT/AHM/2024 with I.A. No. 1270/NCLT/AHM/2024 is revived on the board of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority.


# 65. The parties shall appear before Ld. Adjudicating Authority on 12.05.2026. There is no order as to costs.


# 66. Pending I.A.’s if any is also disposed of.


# 67. We request the Ld. Adjudicating authority to make all endeavor to dispose of the aforesaid matter afresh within two months from appearance of the party before it.

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