Monday, 22 September 2025

State Bank of India Vs. Vaddineni Manoj - The Hon’ble NCLAT, in Monotrone Leasing Pvt. Ltd. v. PM Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., [2020] ibclaw.in 21 NCLAT, has also stated that Section 65 pertains to applications filed under Sections 7, 9, and 10 of the Code. Hence, the attempt of the Respondent to invoke Section 65 in the present proceedings is legally untenable, as the provision cannot be stretched to apply to insolvency proceedings against personal guarantors.

 NCLT Chennai (2025.09.01) in State Bank of India Vs. Vaddineni Manoj [(2025) ibclaw.in 1722 NCLT, CP(IB)/256(CHE)/2021 Along with IA(IBC)/339/CHE/2024 in CP(IB)/256(CHE)/2021 Along with IA(IBC)/2328/CHE/2024 in CP(IB)/256(CHE)/2021] held that; 

  • As the proceedings under IBC are summary in nature, it is difficult to determine the intent of the Applicant filing an application under Section 7, 9, or 10 of the Code unless shown explicitly by way of documentary evidence. This situation may arise in specific instances where a petition is filed under IBC specifically with a fraudulent or malicious intent.

  • Simply to put, fraud consists of elements of deceit coupled with injury whereas malice is a wrongful act done without lawful justification.

  • “Person does a thing fraudulently if he does it with an intent to defraud, and so to constitute fraud two elements are necessary-deceit, and injury and loss to some person.”

  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court has defined ‘malice’ in (2003) 8 SCC 567 Chairman & MD. BPL Ltd. vs. S.P. Gururaja and Ors. in paragraph 21, in following words: “21. Malice in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in the legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse.”

  • The Hon’ble NCLAT in the case of Amour Infrastructure LLP Vs. Digital Integrated Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 884 of 2022 & I.A. No. 2458 of 2022), held that an Adjudicating Authority cannot make a finding of fraud/malice unless it is specifically pleaded and backed by documentary evidence.

  • That to attract Section 65, the burden lies on the objecting party to place on record compelling and credible evidence to prove that the Petitioner has approached the Adjudicating Authority with mala fide intent or for purposes extraneous to the resolution process.

  • The Hon’ble NCLAT, in Monotrone Leasing Pvt. Ltd. v. PM Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., [2020] ibclaw.in 21 NCLAT, has also stated that Section 65 pertains to applications filed under Sections 7, 9, and 10 of the Code. Hence, the attempt of the Respondent to invoke Section 65 in the present proceedings is legally untenable, as the provision cannot be stretched to apply to insolvency proceedings against personal guarantors.

Excerpts of the order;

# 1. This Petition u/s. 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “IBC, 2016″) r/w Rule 7(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 has been filed by State Bank of India, Stressed Assets Management Branch (“Financial Creditor”) for initiating insolvency resolution process against Vaddineni Manoj, the Personal Guarantor of Victory Electricals Limited (VEL), the Corporate Debtor in respect to Default Amount of Rs.365,36,36,599.58 (Rupees Three Hundred Sixty-Five Crore Thirty-Six Lakh Thirty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Nine and Fifty-Eight Paise Only) including interest and penalties. The Date of Default, as specified in Part-III of the Petition, is 09.03.2012 for Cash credit account and 31.05.2012 for Term Loan. The Petitioner has placed Deed of Personal Guarantee executed by the Guarantor Vaddineni Manoj in favour of the Financial Creditor dated 06.09.2005,07.11.2006,31.12.2008 & 16.11.2009, Copy of Sanction letter, Balance Sheet of the CD for FY 2014- 15 dated 02.09.2015, Copy of OTS proposal given by the Corporate Debtor dated 18.05.2016, Copy of OTS sanction letter dated 06.10.2016, Copy of cancellation of the OTS letter dated 03.05.2018 along with acknowledgement and Copy of Demand notice dated 28.06.2013.


# 2. Part – I of the Petition sets out the details of the Petitioner / Financial Creditor i.e. State Bank of India. It has its registered office at D.No.3-4- 1013/A, 1st Floor, CAC, TSRTC Bus station, Kachiguda, Hyderabad – 500027 and is represented by Assistant General Manager, Biswajit Das.

Part-II of the petition sets out the details of the Personal Guarantor namely Vaddineni Manoj. The address of the Respondent is stated as H.No.7-2-221/18, Ashok Colony, Sanathnagar, Hyderabad -500018.


# 3. It is stated that the Respondent stood as a Personal guarantor in the respect of loans availed by Victory Electricals Limited (VEL), the Corporate Debtor, from State Bank of India. The Personal Guarantor executed Deed of guarantee dated 06.09.2005,07.11.2006,31.12.2008 & 16.11.2009, in favour of State Bank of India (“Guarantee Deed”), providing an irrevocable and continuing guarantee for the repayment of the facilities availed by the Corporate Debtor.


# 4. It is stated that the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under section 7 of the IBC, 2016 against the Corporate Debtor (Victory Electricals Limited) was initiated by this Tribunal vide on order dated 13.08.2018 in CP(IB)/872(CHE)2018. Subsequently Liquidation proceedings were initiated against the Corporate Debtor on 19.11.2019.


# 5. It is stated that a Demand Notice under SARFAESI Act, 2002 was issued on 28.06.2013 to the Corporate Debtor, Corporate Guarantor and the Personal Guarantors, including Vaddineni Manoj, seeking repayment of the outstanding debt thereby invoking the personal guarantee.


# 6. It is stated that Demand Notice was issued on 09.09.2020 under Rule 7(1) of the IBBI (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 to the Personal Guarantor calling him to pay the unpaid debt amount in full within 14 days, however, the Guarantor did not make the payment.


# 7. It is stated that the Corporate Debtor sent revival letters under Form C.6 dated 06.11.2009, 01.06.2012, 03.05.2015 and 04.05.2018 to the Petitioner acknowledging the amount due for the payment of the credit facility availed from the Petitioner.


# 8. It is stated that the One Time Settlement proposal was given by the Corporate Debtor on 18.05.2016 for an amount of Rs.68.0 crores for the amount due. The Petitioner accepted the OTS proposal and sent a sanction letter for the OTS on 06.10.2016 SAMB-II:DS:947. The terms and conditions pertaining payment schedule mentioned in the letter were:

i. Rs 0.50 Cr on handing over of sanction letter.

ii. Rs 39.50 Cr within 3 months from the date of issuing sanction letter to the company.

iii. Rs 10.00 Cr within 6 months from the date of issuing sanction letter to the company.

iv. Rs 10.00 Cr within 9 months from the date of issuing sanction letter to the company.

v. Rs 8.00 Cr within 12 months from the date of issuing sanction letter to the company.


# 9. It is stated that the Petitioner subsequently sent another sanction letter for OTS on 06.10.2016 SAMB-II:DS:948 where the total amount for OTS was changed to Rs.69.5 Crores, increasing the amount by Rs.1.50 Crores from the previous sanction letter. The terms and conditions regarding the payment schedule were slightly changed to:

(a) Rs 4l.00 Cr within three months from the date of conveying sanction instead of Rs 39:50 Cr as mentioned in the previous letter and other payment terms and conditions remained the same.


# 10. It is stated that the OTS proposal was cancelled by a letter dated 03.05.2018 vide SAMB:HYD:BSK:203 on the grounds that the Corporate Debtor did not fulfil the terms and conditions of the OTS proposal and defaulted in making payment, as per the payment schedule even after an ample time given to it.


# 11. It is stated that the Corporate Debtor referred itself to Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) u/s/15(1) under SICA, 1985 on 18.01.2013 which was registered as case No. 10/2013 on 06.03.2013. The Petitioner did not consent for the restructuring under the BIFR and resorted to recovery measures including under the SARFAESI Act.


# 12. It is stated that the Petitioner filed a case before Debt Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A.No.925/2014 for recovery of an amount of Rs.273,95,41,204.95 (Rupees Two Hundred Seventy-Three Crores Ninety-Five Lakhs Forty-One Thousand Two Hundred Four and Ninety- Five paise only) which was allowed vide an order dated on 28.10.2019.


# 13. It is stated that the Managing Director of the Corporate Debtor filed a case OS/137/2018 in the Civil Court of Medchal against the cancellation of the OTS proposal and the case is still pending.


# 14. It is stated that the Petitioner has also filed a case under section 7 against the Corporate guarantor, Hackbridge Hewittic and Easun Ltd of the Corporate Debtor. The NCLT passed an order dismissing the petition on 06.01.2021 on the ground that the petition is barred by limitation. It went in appeal vide case no. Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins.) No. 05 of 2021 & I.A. No. 614 of 2021 where the Hon’ble NCLAT set aside the order of NCLT stating that the petition was filed well within limitation and the case was remanded back to Adjudicating Authority (NCLT).


# 15. It is stated that the Respondent has filed an application I.A(IBC)/2328/2024 under Section 65(1) of IBC on 26.11.2024 to declare that the Petition CP(IB)No.256/2021 filed by the Financial Creditor as malicious and fraudulent and consequentially dismiss the Petition by imposing penalty.


PROCEEDING OF THE TRIBUNAL

# 16. This Tribunal vide an order dated 05.01.2024 in CP(IBC)/256(CHE)/2021 appointed Mr. Kasi Srinivas, as Insolvency Resolution Professional and directed the Insolvency Resolution Professional to collate all the facts relevant to the examination of the Petition for the commencement of the Insolvency Resolution Process in respect of the Personal Guarantor. He in terms of the order of this Tribunal filed his report vide SR No.0362 on 17.01.2024.


# 17. The IRP in his Report, after due examination of the Petition, documents filed along with the Petition, and the Reply filed by the Respondent, in addition to the requirements as mandated under clauses (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) of Section 99 of the IBC, 2016, recommended for the admission of the present petition against the Personal Guarantor u/s. 95 of IBC, 2016.


FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL

# 69. We have heard Ld. Counsels for the parties, perused the documents, the reply, the report of the IRP and the written synopsis filed.


# 70. In the present case, the Corporate Debtor, i.e., Victory Electrical Limited had availed credit facility from the Petitioner i.e. State bank of India. The Respondent has executed a personal guarantee dated 06.09.2005, 07.11.2006, 31.12.2008 & 16.11.2009 undertaking to make payment in case of default by the Corporate Debtor. The account of corporate Debtor was declared NPA and Demand Notice under the SARFAESI Act was issued to both the Corporate Debtor and the Personal Guarantor 28.06.2013, thereby invoking the guarantee provided by the Respondent. A case was filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A.No.925/2014 for recovery of an amount of Rs.273,95,41,204.95 which was allowed vide an order dated 28.10.2019. An OTS proposal was made on 18.05.2016 by the Corporate Debtor for an amount of Rs.68.0 Crores but was later changed to Rs. 69.5 Crores. The OTS was agreed by both the Petitioner and the Corporate Debtor. The OTS was cancelled on 03.05.2018 due to non-payment of the default amount according to the terms and conditions of the OTS agreement. Subsequently a Legal notice under Form B was sent on 09.09.2020 to the Corporate Debtor and the Respondent for the repayment of the default amount. The present Petition has been filed on 08.05.2021, which is well within the prescribed limitation period of three years considering the covid period as there was continued acknowledgment of debt due, by the Corporate Debtor.


# 71. It is a settled principle that before admitting a case under section 100 of IBC, the adjudicating authority should be satisfied with the essential conditions. At the threshold, the existence of a debt and a corresponding default are foundational. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(2019) 4 SCC 17] emphasized that the IBC requires a real default and not merely a claim. Similarly, in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank [(2018) 1 SCC 407], the Hon’ble Court underscored that the existence of a “debt” and “default” must be clearly established before any insolvency proceeding can be admitted. These principles apply with equal force in the context of personal guarantors under Part III of the Code. Further, the application must be based on a valid and enforceable personal guarantee executed in accordance with law. In State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan [(2018) 17 SCC 394], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a personal guarantor’s liability is co- extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, and the commencement of CIRP does not absolve the guarantor of liability. The Hon’ble NCLAT, in R. Srinivasan v. SBI & Ors. [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 305 of 2021], reiterated that a Section 95 application must be premised upon an enforceable guarantee deed that evidences the guarantor’s liability.


# 72. Additionally, the law mandates that there must be invocation of the personal guarantee prior to the filing of an application under Section 95. In State Bank of India v. Mahendra Kumar Jajodia [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 120 of 2021], the Hon’ble NCLAT held that a notice invoking the guarantee, coupled with a notice of demand, is a necessary pre-condition. The obligation of the personal guarantor does not arise in abstract but only upon invocation of the guarantee by the creditor. The application must be filed within the period of limitation, as prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. In B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates [(2019) 11 SCC 633], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the limitation period for initiating insolvency proceedings under the IBC is three years from the date of default. Further, Manasi Indrajit Wadkar v. Union Bank of India [NCLAT, 2023] clarified that acknowledgments of debt, whether through One Time Settlement (OTS) proposals, balance sheets, or correspondence—can extend the limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. These acknowledgments must be clear, unambiguous, and made before the expiry of the original limitation.


# 73. In the present case, the Petitioner has placed on record sufficient material to establish the existence of a financial debt and the occurrence of default. The Petitioner has relied upon the audited balance sheet of the Corporate Debtor, which discloses the outstanding liability, as well as an order passed by the DRT directing both the Corporate Debtor and the Personal Guarantor to repay the dues. The existence of a legally valid and enforceable deed of guarantee executed by the Personal Guarantor has also been substantiated. Furthermore, the Petitioner had issued a demand notice invoking the guarantee, thereby crystallizing the liability of the guarantor in accordance with law. In addition, the record contains several documents evidencing acknowledgment of debt, including One Time Settlement (OTS) proposals, signed balance sheets, and revival letters, all of which further reinforce the continuity of liability and extend the period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Taken together, these documents sufficiently demonstrate that the statutory prerequisites under Section 95 have been met.


# 74. The Personal Guarantor has raised a contention that the present Petition has been initiated with fraudulent and malicious intent, thereby attracting Section 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and warrants consequences under Section 75 of the Code. For Section 65 to be attracted, the threshold requirement is that the insolvency proceedings must have been initiated with fraudulent or malicious intent, or for a purpose other than the resolution of insolvency or liquidation.


# 75. Section 65 of IBC, 2016 reads as:

Fraudulent or malicious initiation of proceedings.

(1) If, any person initiates the insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceedings fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of insolvency, or liquidation, as the case may be, the Adjudicating Authority may impose upon such person a penalty which shall not be less than one lakh rupees, but may extend to one crore rupees.

(2) If, any person initiates voluntary liquidation proceedings with the intent to defraud any person, the Adjudicating Authority may impose upon such person a penalty which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but may extend to one crore rupees.

(3) If any person initiates the pre-packaged insolvency resolution process

(a) fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of insolvency; or

(b) with the intent to defraud any person, the Adjudicating Authority may impose upon such person a penalty which shall not be less than one lakh rupees, but may extend to one crore rupees.


# 76. Section 65(1) of the Code provides that if any person initiates the insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceedings with a fraudulent or malicious intent, the Adjudicating Authority may impose a penalty upon such person. The Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in Monotrone Leasing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. PM Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., [2020] ibclaw.in 21 NCLAT, reaffirmed this principle, holding that a petition under Sections 7, 9, or 10 of the IBC cannot be rejected solely on the ground of lack of intent for resolution, unless there is explicit documentary proof of fraudulent or malicious intent.

  • “34. Section 65 of the Code provides for penal action for initiating Insolvency Resolution Process with a fraudulent or malicious intent or for any purpose other than the resolution. However, the same cannot be construed to mean that if a petition is filed under Section 7, 9, or 10 of the Code without any malicious or fraudulent intent, then also such a petition can be rejected by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the intent of the Applicant/Petitioner was not resolution for Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. As the proceedings under IBC are summary in nature, it is difficult to determine the intent of the Applicant filing an application under Section 7, 9, or 10 of the Code unless shown explicitly by way of documentary evidence. This situation may arise in specific instances where a petition is filed under IBC specifically with a fraudulent or malicious intent.”


# 77. The Hon’ble NCLAT in the case of Getz Cables Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India and Anr. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.1953 of 2024 considered the scope of the terms fraudulent and malicious intent. Simply to put, fraud consists of elements of deceit coupled with injury whereas malice is a wrongful act done without lawful justification. The relevant paragraphs of the order are extracted hereunder,

  • “16. Necessary ingredients, which required to be proved under Section 65, sub-section (1) are that proceedings are initiated fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of insolvency. Both expression – fraudulent and malicious has definite connotation. The expression ‘fraudulently’ has been explained in Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar 6th Edition in following words:

  • “Person does a thing fraudulently if he does it with an intent to defraud, and so to constitute fraud two elements are necessary-deceit, and injury and loss to some person.”

  • 17. Another expression which occurs in Section 65 is ‘malicious intent’. Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar define the world ‘malice’ in the legal sense in following words:

  • “1. The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. 2. Reckless disregard of the law or of a person’s legal rights.”

  • There is also a second definition, which is as follows:

  • “Malice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence of all elements of justifications, excuse or recognized mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an actual intent to cause to particular harm which is produced or harm of the same general nature, or (b) the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result….

  • 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has defined ‘malice’ in (2003) 8 SCC 567 Chairman & MD. BPL Ltd. vs. S.P. Gururaja and Ors. in paragraph 21, in following words: “21. Malice in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in the legal sense it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse.”


# 78. The Hon’ble NCLAT in the case of Amour Infrastructure LLP Vs. Digital Integrated Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 884 of 2022 & I.A. No. 2458 of 2022), held that an Adjudicating Authority cannot make a finding of fraud/malice unless it is specifically pleaded and backed by documentary evidence. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder

  • “5. Learned Counsel for the respondent has referred to the findings in paragraph 26 of the order which is to the following effect:

  • “From these facts, we have got reasonable basis to reach to a conclusion that application filed under Section 7 is a mechanism whereby financial creditor is trying to settle personal scores and put undue pressure on the corporate debtor. hence, we have no hesitation in holding that this application has been filed with malicious intent and for purposes other than the Resolution of Insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. We further find that corporate debtor is a solvent company” 8. Observations made in paragraph 26 is that Financial Creditor is trying to settle personal scores and put undue pressure on the Corporate Debtor. We are of the view that for proving the ingredient of Section 65 there has to be adequate pleadings and findings. Observations made in paragraph 26 does not fulfil the requirement of Section 65 so as to reject the Section 7 application.”


# 79. This principle has also been reinforced in the case of M/s. Flycreative Online Private Limited v. GO Airlines (India) Limited (Int. Petition No. 68/2023), the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), New Delhi, wherein the Tribunal examined the allegations of fraudulent and malicious intent in insolvency proceedings. The Tribunal emphasized that for an application to be considered malicious under Section 65, there must be substantial and corroborative evidence proving fraudulent intent. It was observed that merely failing to inform creditors about the intention to file for insolvency, does not, by itself, establish malice unless supported by concrete evidence.

  • “10. In terms of Section 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, there must be substantial and corroborative evidence to explicitly prove ‘fraudulent intent’, ‘malice’ and ‘mens rea’ on part of the CD by way of specific documentary evidence and also that the Applicant approached with malicious intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of insolvency.”


# 80. In light of the above legal position, it is evident that to attract Section 65, the burden lies on the objecting party to place on record compelling and credible evidence to prove that the Petitioner has approached the Adjudicating Authority with mala fide intent or for purposes extraneous to the resolution process. In the present case, the Personal Guarantor has failed to produce any such substantial or corroborative material that would support the allegation of fraud or malice.


# 81. The Respondent has alleged that the Liquidator/Resolution Professional failed to pursue the actionable claims of the Corporate Debtor. However, the said Liquidator/Resolution Professional, Mr. Chinnam Poorna Chandra Rao, has not been made a party to the application. It is further noted that while the ex-promoters have challenged the forensic audit report, they have not sought any relief either in respect of the alleged dereliction of duty or for recovery of the sum of Rs. 649,47,03,194/-.


# 82. On a consideration of the reply filed by the Financial Creditor and the documents, we do not find substance in the application filed by the Respondent/Personal Guarantor. In the instant case, the account of the Corporate Debtor was declared NPA in the year 2012. This CIRP petition was filed in 2019. The Corporate Debtor was not in operation even prior to its accounts was declared NPA. The OTS proposal was given in 2016. It was approved on certain terms and conditions. The Corporate Debtor failed to honour the OTS as per the terms and the Financial Creditor cancelled the OTS in 2018. It was only thereafter the petition was filed. The order for initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor was passed in 2019. It may be true that the maximum supply of the Corporate Debtor was to the Electricity Boards and there could be trade receivables / book debts but there is no document showing the effort put in by the Corporate Debtor to recover the debts from the Electricity Boards before the initiation of CIRP. As per the tally data, referred in para-65 & 66 supra, Vaddineni Mahindra Kumar vide his mail dated 17.07.2019, had informed the Liquidator that it is better to write off the debts of the other debtors as not recoverable. Although the Liquidator sought the details from the erstwhile management of the Corporate Debtor of above accounts so that he could independently examine the recoverability of the amounts but the management informed that all the records were lying in the factory. The Liquidator did not find any record pertaining to the debtors and thereafter, the management affirmed that no further records pertaining to the matter are available with them and these debts should be written off as non-recoverables. Further, in the Balance Sheet as on 09.04.2019 i.e. insolvency commencement date, the trade receivables were shown as Rs.5,62,19.563/-.


# 83. As regards OTS, the bank had approved the OTS for Rs.69.50 Crores vide dated 06.10.2016. Since the Principal Borrower did not comply with the terms of OTS, the bank cancelled the OTS on 03.05.2018. It is not the case that the bank did not sympathetically consider the proposal given by the Corporate Debtor including the Respondent. As seen from the record, the Liquidator got conducted the valuation of the assets of the Corporate Debtor and after getting the fair value and the liquidation value, he conducted the auction of the assets of the Corporate Debtors VEL and VTSL and realized the amounts. The RP/Liquidator has also been pursuing the cases instituted by the Corporate Debtor as referred in para- 67 supra. As regards the land mortgaged with the Financial Creditor, the Liquidator also initiated the action.


# 84. There is no material to indicate that RP/Liquidator was not vigilant or diligent in recovering the actionable claims of the Corporate Debtor. He informed the CoC/SCC from time to time about the action taken. Since most of the actionable claims had become time-barred even prior to initiation of CIRP, no blame can be put on the RP/Liquidator that he did not make any effort to recover the actionable claim of the Corporate Debtor to maximise the assets of the Corporate Debtor.


# 85. As regards the arbitral proceedings, it has been explained by the Liquidator that he discussed cost-benefit analysis and the chances of recovery of actionable claims with the bank. The bank voted for the abandonment in view of the reasons supra. There is no quarrel on the legal proposition that fraud vitiates the judicial acts whether in rem or in personal but in the instant case, we do not find any material showing that any fraud was played by the RP/Liquidator or the Financial Creditor. Further, there is no material to indicate that the RP/Liquidator conveniently abandoned the claims against the debtors.


# 86. It is pertinent to mention that the bank also got conducted the forensic audit of the accounts of the Corporate Debtor and reported the matter to CBI. Against conducting of the forensic audit, the Financial Creditor filed the writ petitions before the Hon’ble Telangana High Court which are pending.


# 87. In the instant case, the objections are mere assertions unsupported by material evidence. No supporting forensic or statutory material has been produced as envisaged in Amour Infrastructure (supra), and thereby, the allegations of the Personal Guarantor remain unsubstantiated. There is no material to show that the financial creditor has initiated the insolvency resolution process fraudulently or with malicious intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of insolvency of the Corporate Debtor which are the sine qua non for taking action under Section 65 of IBC. We find that the objections raised in the present petition when measured against the precedents, fall short of the standard required.


# 88. Further, Section 65 of the Code falls under Chapter VI titled “Adjudicating Authority for Corporate Persons” in Part II of the IBC, whereas Section 95 is located in Part III, Chapter III, which specifically deals with the Insolvency Resolution Process for Individuals and Partnership Firms. The scheme of the Code, therefore, makes it evident that Section 65 is not intended to apply to proceedings initiated under Section 95. The Hon’ble NCLAT, in Monotrone Leasing Pvt. Ltd. v. PM Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., [2020] ibclaw.in 21 NCLAT, has also stated that Section 65 pertains to applications filed under Sections 7, 9, and 10 of the Code. Hence, the attempt of the Respondent to invoke Section 65 in the present proceedings is legally untenable, as the provision cannot be stretched to apply to insolvency proceedings against personal guarantors. The application filed by the Respondent vide IA/2328/2024 is accordingly dismissed.


# 89. In light of the aforesaid discussions, the present Petition i.e. CP(IB)/256(CHE)/2021 is admitted and the Insolvency Resolution Process stands initiated against the Personal Guarantor, Vaddeneni Manoj viz. the Respondent herein. We hereby;

I. Initiate Insolvency Resolution Process against the Personal Guarantor/Respondent, Vaddineni Manoj. The moratorium in relation to all the debts is declared, from today i.e. date of admission of the petition, and shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of 180 days, or this Tribunal passes order on the repayment plan under Section 114 whichever is earlier as provided under Sec 101 of 1BC, 2016. During the moratorium period,

a. Any pending legal action or proceeding in respect of any debt shall be deemed to have been stayed, and

b. The creditors of the debtor shall not initiate any legal action or proceedings in respect of any debt; and

c. The debtor shall not transfer, alienate, encumber, or dispose of any of his assets or his legal rights or beneficial interest therein:

d. The provisions of this section shall not apply to such transactions as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator.

II. The Resolution Professional viz. Mr. Kasi Srinivas, IBBI/IPA- 003/IPA-ICAI-N-00237/2019-2020/12840, (AFA Valid upto – 31.12.2025), Insolvency Resolution Professional is appointed as the RP. He is directed to cause a public notice published on behalf of the Adjudicating Authority within 7 days of passing this Order on the website of the NCLT Chennai Bench, inviting claims from all Creditors, within 21 days of such issue The notice under Sub Section (1) of Section 102(2) shall include: –

a. details of the order admitting the petition;

b. particulars of the resolution professional with whom the claims are to be registered; and

c. the last date for submission of claims.

III. The publication of notice shall be made in two newspapers, one in English and other in Vernacular, which have wide circulation in the State where the Corporate Debtor and Personal Guarantor resides. The Resolution Professional shall furnish two spare copies of the notice to the Registry for the record.

IV. The Resolution Professional, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 104, shall prepare a list of creditors on the basis of:

a. the information disclosed in the petition filed by the debtor under Sections 94 or 95 as the case may be, and

b. claims received by the Resolution Professional under Section 102 within 30 days from the date of the notice. The debtor shall prepare a repayment plan under Section 105, in consultation with the Resolution Professional, containing a proposal to the Creditors for restructuring of his debts or affairs.

The repayment plan may authorize or require the Resolution Professional to:

a. carry on the debtor, business or trade on his behalf or in his name: or

b. realise the assets of the debtor; or c. administers or dispose of any funds of the debtor.

The repayment plan shall include the following, namely;

a. justification for preparation of such repayment plan and reasons based on which the creditors may agree upon the plan;

b. provision for payment of fee to the Resolution Professional;

c. such other matters as may be specified.

V. The Resolution Professional shall submit the repayment plan along with his report on the plan to this Authority within a period of 21 days from the last date of submission of claims, as provided under Section 106.

VI. In case the Resolution Professional recommends that a meeting of the creditors is not required to be called, he shall record the reasons thereof. If the Resolution Professional is of the opinion that a meeting of the creditors should be summoned, he shall specify the details as provided under Section 106(3) of IBC, 2016. The date of meeting should not be less than 14 days or more than 28 days from the date of submission of the Report under subsection (1) of Section 106 of IBC, 2016, for which at least 14 days’ notice to the creditors (as per the list prepared) shall be issued by all modes. Such notice must contain the details as provided under the provisions of Section 107 of IBC, 2016.

VII. The meeting of the creditors shall be conducted in accordance with Sections 108, 109, 110 & 111 of IBC, 2016. The Resolution Professional shall prepare a report of the meeting of the creditors on repayment plan with all details as provided under Section 112 of IBC, 2016 and submit the same to this Tribunal, copies of which shall be provided to the Debtor and the Creditors. It is made clear that the Resolution Professional shall perform his functions and duties in compliance with the Code of Conduct provided under Section 208 of IBC, 2016.

VIII. The Resolution Professional shall submit his periodic reports before this Tribunal, every 30 days.

IX. The Petitioner is directed to deposit INR 3,00,000/- (Indian Rupees Two lakhs) to the bank account of the Resolution Professional within one week, towards his expenses. This shall be subjected to the rules and regulations under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

X. The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of order, report and petition to the concerned parties within seven working days and upload the same on the website immediately after the pronouncement of order.


# 90. Accordingly, the report of the RP filed in IA/IBC/339/CHE/2024 is taken on record, IA/IBC/2328/CHE/2024 is dismissed and CP/IB/256/CHE/2021 stands admitted.

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Tuesday, 16 September 2025

IDBI Bank Ltd. Vs. Hemangi Patel, - We have also held that a person would be entitled to initiate CIRP within a period of three years from the date on which the recovery certificate is issued. We are of the considered view that the view taken by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Dena Bank [Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy, (2021) 10 SCC 330] is correct in law and we affirm the same.

 NCLAT (2025.08.087) in  IDBI Bank Ltd. Vs. Hemangi Patel, [(2025) ibclaw.in 599 NCLAT,  Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 991 of 2025 with Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 992 of 2025 ] held that

  • We have also held that a person would be entitled to initiate CIRP within a period of three years from the date on which the recovery certificate is issued. We are of the considered view that the view taken by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Dena Bank [Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy, (2021) 10 SCC 330] is correct in law and we affirm the same.

  • Consequently, the holder of the recovery certificate would be a financial creditor within the meaning of clause (7) of Section 5 IBC. As such, the holder of such certificate would be entitled to initiate CIRP, if initiated within a period of three years from the date of issuance of the recovery certificate.

Excerpts of the order;

These two appeals have been filed by the IDBI Bank, challenging the two identical orders passed on 05.05.2025 by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Indore Special Bench, Court – I in C.P. (IB) No.55/MP/2024 and C.P. (IB) No.54/MP/2024, rejecting Section 95 application filed by the IDBI Bank against the respondent, the personal guarantor herein.


# 2. Both the respondents in these appeals being personal guarantor of the same corporate debtor – Great Logistic and Parking Services Pvt. Ltd., it shall be sufficient to refer to the pleadings in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) No. 991/2025 for deciding both the appeals.


# 3. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noticed for deciding the appeals are:

i. The IDBI Bank extended credit facilities to corporate debtor – Great Logistic and Parking Services Pvt. Ltd., the respondent herein stood personal guarantor and executed a personal guarantee in favour of the creditor on 28.10.2010.

ii. The corporate debtor had defaulted in repayment of the cash credit facilities on 31.03.2016 leading the classification of the account as NPA.

iii. The creditor issued a guarantee invocation notice to the personal guarantor on 24.10.2016 and an OA was also filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) on 31.03.2017 and recovery certificate was issued in favour of the creditor on 25.01.2019, after issuing demand notice under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019, (herein after referred to as ‘2019 Rules’) on 19.03.2024. The application under Section 95 was filed by the IDBI Bank on 02.09.2024.

iv. The adjudicating authority by the impugned order rejected the application as barred by time. It was held that from recovery certificate dated 25.01.2019, 3 years will expire on 25.01.2022 and even giving benefit of order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto WP (Civil) No. 3 of 2022 in ‘Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’, the limitation period would extend only till 11.01.2024 and the application having been filed on 02.09.2024 is beyond limitation period. Adjudicating authority by the impugned order rejected C.P. (IB) No.55/MP/2024 ad C.P. (IB) No.54/MP/2024, aggrieved by which orders, IDBI Bank has filed this appeal.


# 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.


# 5. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the order raised only one submission. Learned counsel for the appellant based his submissions relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ‘Tottempudi Salalith’ Vs. ‘State Bank of India & Ors.’ reported in [(2024 1 SCC 24] decided on 18.10.2023. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case has held that decree passed by Court shall remain valid for a period of 12 years and during which claim can be filed in the IBC. It is submitted that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case, limitation for filing Section 95 application has to be treated as 12 years hence the application filed was not barred by time.


# 6. We have considered the submission raised by the counsel for the appellant and perused the record.


# 7. We need to first notice the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Tottempudi Salalith’ (Supra) to find out the ratio of the judgment and as to whether counsel for the appellant is correct in his submission that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment has held that limitation for filing an application under IBC is 12 years. The above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court arose from proceeding under Section 7 initiated by State Bank of India as lead bank. Consortium of Banks including the State Bank of India has extended various facilities to the corporate debtor – Totem Infrastructure Ltd. Notice under Section 13(2) was issued. An application was also filed before the DRT Hyderabad. OA No.154/2014, OA No.221/2014 & OA No.1653/2017 and one OA was filed before the DRT Bengaluru being OA No.1930/2014. Two recovery certificates was issued by the DRT Hyderabad on 08.09.2015, 17.10.2017 and another recovery certificate was issued on 04.08.2017. Application under Section 7 was filed on 06.09.2019 before NCLT based on three recovery certificates. On 12.01.2021, adjudicating authority admitted Section 7 application and declared moratorium and appointed the RP. The Managing Director of the corporate debtor filed an appeal before the NCLAT and point urged was point of limitation. The appellate tribunal did not accept the submission of the appellant that debt is barred by limitation. Appeal was dismissed. The appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the order of the NCLT & NCLAT raised two submissions including that the application was barred by limitation. Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on the earlier judgment in ‘Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.’ Vs. ‘A. Balakrishnan’ reported in [(2022) 9 SCC 186] in respect of recovery certificate issued by DRT has been examined and it was held that limitation shall be 3 years. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, following was laid down:

  • “9. In [Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. A. Balakrishnan, (2022) 9 SCC 186 : (2022) 4 SCC (Civ) 548] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court had examined the question of limitation from the perspective of issue of recovery certificates in terms of provision of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (the 1993 Act). We shall refer to this judgment henceforth as Kotak Mahindra-1 [Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. A. Balakrishnan, (2022) 9 SCC 186 : (2022) 4 SCC (Civ) 548] . It was opined by this Court in this judgment : (SCC pp. 203, 210, 214 & 218, paras 28, 56, 71 & 86)

  • “28. It could thus be seen that this Court in Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy [Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy, (2021) 10 SCC 330] in SCC paras 136 and 141, has in unequivocal terms held that once a claim fructifies into a final judgment and order/decree, upon adjudication, and a certificate of recovery is also issued authorising the creditor to realise its decretal dues, a fresh right accrues to the creditor to recover the amount of the final judgment and/or order/decree and/or the amount specified in the recovery certificate. It has further been held that issuance of a certificate of recovery in favour of the financial creditor would give rise to a fresh cause of action to the financial creditor, to initiate proceedings under Section 7 IBC for initiation of the CIRP, within three years from the date of the judgment and/or decree or within three years from the date of issuance of the certificate of recovery, if the dues of the corporate debtor to the financial debtor, under the judgment and/or decree and/or in terms of the certificate of recovery, or any part thereof remained unpaid.

  • ***

  • 56. Insofar as the contention of the respondents with regard to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 IBC is concerned, we do not find that the words used in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 IBC could be read to mean that the decree-holder is not entitled to invoke the provisions of IBC for initiation of CIRP. A plain reading of the said section would clearly provide that once CIRP is initiated, there shall be prohibition for institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority. The prohibition to institution of suit or continuation of pending suits or proceedings including execution of decree would not mean that a decree-holder is also prohibited from initiating CIRP, if he is otherwise entitled to in law. The effect would be that the applicant, who is a decree-holder, would himself be prohibited from executing the decree in his favour.

  • ***

  • 71. We have already hereinabove, done the exercise of considering the relevant provisions of IBC afresh and come to a conclusion that a liability in respect of a claim arising out of a recovery certificate would be a “financial debt” within the meaning of clause (8) of Section 5 IBC and a holder of the recovery certificate would be a “financial creditor” within the meaning of clause (7) of Section 5 IBC. We have also held that a person would be entitled to initiate CIRP within a period of three years from the date on which the recovery certificate is issued. We are of the considered view that the view taken by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Dena Bank [Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy, (2021) 10 SCC 330] is correct in law and we affirm the same.

  • ***

  • 86. To conclude, we hold that a liability in respect of a claim arising out of a recovery certificate would be a “financial debt” within the meaning of clause (8) of Section 5 IBC. Consequently, the holder of the recovery certificate would be a financial creditor within the meaning of clause (7) of Section 5 IBC. As such, the holder of such certificate would be entitled to initiate CIRP, if initiated within a period of three years from the date of issuance of the recovery certificate.”


# 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, held that claim of acknowledgment under Section 18 on basis of letter dated 29.01.2020 cannot be accepted since the said acknowledgement was subsequent to expiry of 3 years. Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on earlier judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ‘B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd.’ Vs. ‘Parag Gupta & Associates’, reported in [(2019) 11 SCC 633], where Article 137 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable and limitation as 3 years. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that recovery certificate will give a fresh cause of action and application brought within 3 years of issue of recovery certificate is well within time. With regard to two recovery certificates, with respect to which Section 7 was initiated within 3 years, Hon’ble Supreme Court held the same to be within limitation relying on Article 137 of the Limitation Act. In the above context, following was laid down in paragraph 24:

  • “24. What has been filed before NCLT is a composite application based on three recovery certificates, two of which have been instituted within the three-year period as postulated in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The third recovery certificate was issued in the year 2015. Thus, there is more than three years’ gap between the date of issue thereof and the date of filing of the application before NCLT. But a recovery certificate under the 1993 Act is also clothed with the character of a deemed decree. The provisions of Section 19(22-A) of the 1993 Act specifies:

  • “19. Application to the Tribunal.—(1)-

  • (22)                                                     *                                                      *                                                      *

  • (22-A) Any recovery certificate issued by the Presiding Officer under sub-section (22) shall be deemed to be decree or order of the Court for the purposes of initiation of winding-up proceedings against a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) or limited liability partnership registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009) or insolvency proceedings against any individual or partnership firm under any law for the time being in force, as the case may be.”


# 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed Article 136 of the Limitation Act for execution of any decree where limitation is 12 years which was noticed in paragraph 25. Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, categorically held that limitation for filing an application under Section 7 is 3 years under Article 137 which has been clearly held in paragraph 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 27 & 28 by noticing provisions of 19(22-A) of the 1993 Act has held that for lodging a claim in IBC shall retain the character of decree. The argument of appellant that application under Section 7 was barred by time was rejected which was clearly held in paragraph 30, which is to the following effect:

  • “30. We are otherwise not satisfied with the argument of the appellant about maintainability of the application out of which this appeal arises on the ground of the application being barred under limitation. The application with respect to the two recovery certificates issued in the year 2017 is maintainable. In the event the Appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the CIRP could not lie so far as the recovery certificate of 2015 is concerned, as the decree would be still alive, the claim based on the said recovery certificate could be segregated from the composite claim and the Committee of Creditors shall, in that event, treat the sum reflected in the said recovery certificate as part of the claims made in pursuance of the public announcement. This direction we are issuing in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”


# 10. From the above it is clear that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case which is relied by the appellant relying on the earlier judgment in the matter of ‘Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.’ (Supra) held that limitation for filing Section 7 application is only 3 years as per Article 137. We, thus are of the view that submission of the appellant relying on the above judgment that Hon’ble Supreme Court held that limitation will be 12 years with respect to a decree is wholly incorrect and is not borne out from the judgment.


# 11. We need to also refer to a 3 Judge bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ‘Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave’ Vs. ‘Asset Reconstruction Ltd. & Anr.’, reported in [(2019) 10 SCC 572], where Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider limitation on basis of decree passed by the DRT with respect to Section 7 application under the IBC. Article 62 was relied by NCLT holding that limitation will be 12 years against which order, the appeal was dismissed. Appeal was filed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court where the question was considered and it was held that limitation for filing Section 7 application under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is only 3 years and for the application under Section 7, Article 62 which provide for limitation 12 years is not applicable. It is useful to extract paragraphs 3, 6 & 7 of the judgment, which is as follows:

  • “3. An independent proceeding was then begun by Respondent 1 on 3-10-2017 being in the form of a Section 7 application filed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in order to recover the original debt together with interest which now amounted to about 124 crores of rupees. In Form-I that has statutorily to be annexed to the Section 7 application in Column II which was the date on which default occurred, the date of the NPA i.e. 21-7-2011 was filled up. The NCLT applied Article 62 of the Limitation Act which reads as follows:

“Description of suit

Period of limitation

Time from which period begins to run

62. To enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property

Twelve years

When the money sued for becomes due.”


  • Applying the aforesaid Article, the NCLT reached the conclusion that since the limitation period was 12 years from the date on which the money suit has become due, the aforesaid claim was filed within limitation and hence admitted the Section 7 application. The Nclat vide the impugned judgment [Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave v. Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 329] held, following its earlier judgments [Pushpa Shah v. IL&FS Financial Services Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 572], that the time of limitation would begin running for the purposes of limitation only on and from 1-12-2016 which is the date on which the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was brought into force. Consequently, it dismissed the appeal.

  • 6. Having heard the learned counsel for both sides, what is apparent is that Article 62 is out of the way on the ground that it would only apply to suits. The present case being “an application” which is filed under Section 7, would fall only within the residuary Article 137. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, time, therefore, begins to run on 21-7-2011, as a result of which the application filed under Section 7 would clearly be time-barred. So far as Mr Banerjee’s reliance on para 11 of B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. [B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633] , suffice it to say that the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee [Ed. : Report of the Insolvency Law Committee (March, 2018), Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India] itself stated that the intent of the Code could not have been to give a new lease of life to debts which are already time-barred.

  • 7. This being the case, we fail to see how this para could possibly help the case of the respondents. Further, it is not for us to interpret, commercially or otherwise, articles of the Limitation Act when it is clear that a particular article gets attracted. It is well settled that there is no equity about limitation – judgments have stated that often time periods provided by the Limitation Act can be arbitrary in nature.”


# 12. The above 3 Judge bench judgment clearly laid down that limitation for Section 7 application is only three years as per Article 137.


# 13. We thus do not find any substance in the submission of the counsel for the appellant that for filing an application under IBC 12 years limitation will apply. The judgment relied by the counsel for the appellant in ‘Tottempudi Salalith’ (Supra) also does not lay down any such proposition as contended by the counsel for the appellant. The adjudicating authority in the impugned order come to the conclusion that Section 95 application filed by the IDBI Bank was filed after expiry of three years period of limitation even after giving the benefit of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto WP (Civil) No. 3 of 2022 in ‘Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation’.


# 14. We do not find any error in the order of the adjudicating authority rejecting Section 95 application filed by the appellant as barred by time.


There is no merit in the appeals. Both the appeals are dismissed.

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Monday, 1 September 2025

Syndicate Bank vs Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors. - Continuing Guarantee & Co-extensive Liability

 The question here is whether the guarantor is liable for the actions of the principal borrower after the invocation of the continuing guarantee. On invocation of guarantee, the contract of guarantee attains the finality and the liabilities and obligations of the guarantor stands defined & fixed, as on the date of invocation of the continuing guarantee & the aspect of limitation to sue the principal borrower and / or the guarantor gets delinked & thus have to be viewed separately.

Supreme Court of India (10.04.2006) in Syndicate Bank vs Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors. [Appeal (civil) 6894 of 1997] held that;

# 9. A guarantor's liability depends upon the terms of his contract. A 'continuing guarantee' is different from an ordinary guarantee. There is also a difference between a guarantee which stipulates that the guarantor is liable to pay only on a demand by the creditor, and a guarantee which does not contain such a condition. Further, depending on the terms of guarantee, the liability of a guarantor may be limited to a particular sum, instead of the liability being to the same extent as that of the principal debtor. The liability to pay may arise, on the principal debtor and guarantor, at the same time or at different points of time. A claim may be even time-barred against the principal debtor, but still enforceable against the guarantor. The parties may agree that the liability of a guarantor shall arise at a later point of time than that of the principal debtor. We have referred to these aspects only to underline the fact that the extent of liability under a guarantee as also the question as to when the liability of a guarantor will arise, would depend purely on the terms of the contract.

 

# 11. But in the case on hand, the guarantee deeds specifically state that the guarantors agree to pay and satisfy the bank on demand and interest will be payable by the guarantors only from the date of demand. In a case where the guarantee is payable on demand, as held in the case of Bradford (supra) and Hartland (supra), the limitation begins to run when the demand is made and the guarantor commits breach by not complying with the demand.

 

# 13. What then is the meaning of the said words used in the guarantee bonds in question? The guarantee bond states that the guarantors agree to pay and satisfy the Bank 'on demand'. It specifically provides that the liability to pay interest would arise upon the guarantor only from the date of demand by the Bank for payment. It also provides that the guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee for payment of the ultimate balance to become due to the Bank by the borrower. The terms of guarantee, thus, make it clear that the liability to pay would arise on the guarantors only when a demand is made. Article 55 provides that the time will begin to run when the contract is 'broken'. Even if Article 113 is to be applied, the time begins to run only when the right to sue accrues. In this case, the contract was broken and the right to sue accrued only when a demand for payment was made by the Bank and it was refused by the guarantors. When a demand is made requiring payment within a stipulated period, say 15 days, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, if payment is not made or is refused within 15 days. If while making the demand for payment, no period is stipulated within which the payment should be made, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, when the demand is served on the guarantor.

 

# 14. We have to, however, enter a caveat here. When the demand is made by the creditor on the guarantor, under a guarantee which requires a demand, as a condition precedent for the liability of the guarantor, such demand should be for payment of a sum which is legally due and recoverable from the principal debtor. If the debt had already become time-barred against the principal debtor, the question of creditor demanding payment thereafter, for the first time, against the guarantor would not arise. When the demand is made against the guarantor, if the claim is a live claim (that is, a claim which is not barred) against the principal debtor, limitation in respect of the guarantor will run from the date of such demand and refusal/non compliance. Where guarantor becomes liable in pursuance of a demand validly made in time, the creditor can sue the guarantor within three years, even if the claim against the principal debtor gets subsequently time-barred. To clarify the above, the following illustration may be useful :

  • Let us say that a creditor makes some advances to a borrower between 10.4.1991 and 1.6.1991 and the repayment thereof is guaranteed by the guarantor undertaking to pay on demand by the creditor, under a continuing guarantee dated 1.4.1991. Let us further say a demand is made by the creditor against the guarantor for payment on 1.3.1993. Though the limitation against the principal debtor may expire on 1.6.1994, as the demand was made on 1.3.1993 when the claim was 'live' against the principal debtor, the limitation as against the guarantor would be 3 years from 1.3.1993. On the other hand, if the creditor does not make a demand at all against the guarantor till 1.6.1994 when the claims against the principal debtor get time-barred, any demand against the guarantor made thereafter say on 15.9.1994 would not be valid or enforceable.

  • Be that as it may.

 

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