Friday, 9 May 2025

Divyang Soni Vs. Bank of Baroda - The amount was recovered by the Respondent Bank due to auction of mortgaged property as a result of decree passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad. Thus, in terms of Explanation (b) of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, this recovery would not considered as Debt and therefore does not impact/enhance limitation period as pleaded by the Appellant.

 NCLAT (2025.05.02) in Divyang Soni Vs. Bank of Baroda [(2025) ibclaw.in 333 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1988 of 2024] held that.

  • The 1963 Act’s Section 19 specifically governs payments toward debt or interest on a legacy, resetting the limitation period if made by the debtor or their authorized agent, provided the payment is acknowledged in writing (except for pre-1928 interest payments). The Limitation Act,1963 explicitly excludes money payable under court decrees from the definition of “debt,” narrowing its application to non-adjudicated liabilities.

  • In other words, if a court has already passed a decree or order directing the payment of a certain amount, such an amount is not considered a “debt” for the purposes of Section 19 of the Limitation Act,1963. This means that if a payment is made towards satisfying a court decree or order, such payment will not result in the computation of a fresh limitation period under Section 19 of the Limitation Act,1963.

  • The amount was recovered by the Respondent Bank due to auction of mortgaged property as a result of decree passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad. Thus, in terms of Explanation (b) of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, this recovery would not considered as Debt and therefore does not impact/enhance limitation period as pleaded by the Appellant.

  • It is reiterated that the action based on to decree passed by the DRT was in respect of the mortgaged property held by the Respondent. Hence, it cannot be case of the Appellant that such recovery shall extend the limitation for personal guarantee given by the Appellant. The argument therefore submitted by the Appellant are not tenable.

Blogger’s Comments; In the present case section 94 application of the PG (Personal Guarantor) has been dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority on the grounds that the default of the concerned debt of the CD is time barred on the date of section 94 application. I am of the opinion that section 94 applications are to be governed by the “Doctrine of Debt due and Payable” not by the “Doctrine of Debt due and Recoverable”

Doctrine of "Debts due and payable"


Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant i.e. Divyang Gopalbhai Soni under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’), challenging the Impugned Order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad, Court-2 (Adjudicating Authority) in C.P.(IB)/ 268 (AHM) 2024.


# 2. Bank of Baroda who is the financial creditor is the Respondent herein.


# 3. The appellant has challenged the Impugned Order dated 04.09.2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, in C.P.(IB)/268(AHM)2024, which dismissed the Appellant’s application under Section 94(1) of the Code as not maintainable. The Appellant contended that the Adjudicating Authority passed the Impugned Order dated 04.09.2024 without considering arguments, facts, or circumstances, and asserts that the Impugned Order is a non-speaking order, legally unsustainable, and unsupported by the facts and merits of the case.


# 4. It is the case of the Appellant that the Corporate Debtor despite this recovery, the Appellant’s application under Section 94(1) of the Code was dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority as “not maintainable” without addressing whether the Respondent’s claims persisted post-auction or evaluating compliance with Code’s procedural mandates for personal guarantor insolvency. The Appellant submitted that the order fails to consider the legal effect of recoveries made during the DRT proceedings on the limitation period and does not address the applicability of the Limitation Act and 238A of the Code.


# 5. The Appellant submitted that by virtue of the payments credited by the Corporate Debtor, the limitation period has been revived under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby enabling the filing of the present application within the prescribed time. The Appellant submitted that his application was well within the limitation period as prescribed under the Code, which mandates computation of limitation from the date of default or the date of last acknowledgment or credit, whichever is later. The Appellant stated that in the present case, the last credit was made on 14.02.2024. The Appellant relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy [(2021) 10 SCC 330], wherein it was held that the decree/order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal constitutes a fresh cause of action, thereby extending the limitation period by three years from the date of the last credit. The Appellant argued that since the present petition CP(IB)/268(AHM)/2024 was filed on 06.08.2024 and registered on 03.09.2024, it was within the limitation period, and the dismissal on limitation grounds is therefore unsustainable.


# 6. The Appellant contends that the Adjudicating Authority exhibited a prejudiced mindset when passing the Impugned Order dated 04.09.2024, failing to adequately consider the Appellant’s submissions and rushing to a decision. The Appellant alleged that Adjudicating Authority, overlooked vital aspects and ignored compelling evidence, disposing of the petition in the Impugned Order dated 04.09.2024 despite the Appellant demonstrating the existence of ongoing proceedings. The Appellant requested this Appellate Tribunal to set aside the Impugned Order.


# 7. It is noted that M/s Shree Mukt Jewellers Baroda Pvt Ltd (hereinafter referred to as the Corporate Debtor) had approached Bank of Baroda (the Financial Creditor/ Respondent) to avail credit facilities. The Financial Creditor sanctioned certain credit facilities to the Corporate Debtor, and the Appellant, as a personal guarantor, executed a Guarantee Agreement dated 28.09.2013 in favor of the Respondent, guaranteeing the total sanctioned amount of Rs. 201 Crores in respect of the cash credit facilities availed by the Corporate Debtor.


# 8. It is also taken into account that the Corporate Debtor was classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) by the Respondent on 27.02.2016. Subsequently, the Respondent issued a Demand Notice dated 06.08.2016 and invoked the personal guarantee furnished by the Appellant. The invocation of the personal guarantee was effected through the said notice dated 06.08.2016, read in conjunction with the terms and conditions of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Appellant. This invocation was consequent to the default by the Corporate Debtor in repayment of the sanctioned cash credit facilities guaranteed by the Appellant.


# 9. We note that in order to recover the outstanding dues from the Corporate Debtor, the Respondent filed Original Application No. 551/2016 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad, which was allowed by way of a decree/order dated 09.01.2017. Subsequently, Recovery Certificate No. 14/2017 was issued, now recorded as TRP No. 02/2023. In the said Recovery Proceedings, the DRT scheduled the auction of the mortgaged property on 30.01.2024, which was successfully conducted with the Respondent Bank receiving a highest bid of Rs. 22.42 Cr. for the property in question. Further, as per the Statement of Account filed by the Respondent Bank in TRP No. 02/2023, the highest bidder has deposited the entire sale consideration, thereby completing the auction process in accordance with the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.


# 10. We note that the Adjudicating Authority by its order dated 04.09.2024, dismissed the petition filed by the Appellant as not maintainable, holding that recoveries made from the auction of mortgaged properties pursuant to a recovery certificate do not constitute repayment by the principal borrower or guarantor and, therefore, cannot extend the limitation period for the personal guarantor in terms of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Adjudicating Authority further observed that the petition, filed on 06.08.2024, was beyond the prescribed period of limitation and did not comply with Section 238A of the Code, and accordingly disposed of the matter as not maintainable.


# 11. The facts regarding the loan given by the Financial Creditor to M/s Shree Mukt Jewellers Baroda Pvt. Ltd. as Corporate Debtor has not been disputed by the Appellant. Similarly, the Appellant did not dispute that he has signed the guarantee agreement dated 28.09.2013 in favour of the Respondent for Rs. 201 Crores in respect of cash credit facilities available by the Corporate Debtor. Hence, these facts are being taken as undisputed facts.


# 12. At this stage, we take into consideration the guarantee agreement dated 28.09.2013, which reads as under :-  . . . . . . . . .


# 13. Thus, we take into account the fact that the guarantee agreement dated 23.09.2013 is stated to be continuing and binding personal guarantee on the part of the Appellant in favour of the Respondent. The guarantee agreement, clause 2, further stated that the guarantee is an additional and without prejudice for any security for application which bank may have from the personal guarantor on the principal borrower and for which of rights and remedies in respect of are reserved. The Clause 3 of the guarantee deed categorically mentioned that the guarantee shall be continuing guarantee and shall not be considered as wholly or partially satisfied or exhausted by any payment from time to time made to the bank or any statement of any account or reason of account being created or any other at any time or from time to time. This clause 3 further states that guarantee shall continue in force notwithstanding the discharge of the principals by operation of law. We note that similar rights have been accrued in favour of the Respondent bank in clause 4, 5, 6 etc.


# 14. From this, it becomes very clear that the Respondent has absolute right to invoke the guarantee agreement signed by the Appellant despite any operation of law and other factors as discussed above.


# 15. The only point raised by the Appellant is regarding limitation based on which application was filed by the Appellant under Section 94 of the Code which had been dismissed by the Adjudicating Authority. In this connection, we note that the Respondent has invoked the guarantee of the Appellant vide notice dated 06.08.2016, therefore, the filing of appeal against the same should have been done by 05.08.2019 whereas the application was indeed filed under Section 94 of the Code by the Appellant before the Adjudicating Authority vide C.P.(IB)/268 (AHM) 2024 on 04.09.2024, which is apparently much beyond the limitation period.


# 16. The Appellant has made out the case that the Respondent has filed Original Application No. 551/2016 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad, which was allowed by way of a decree/ order dated 09.01.2017 and decree passed Recovery Certificate No. 14/2017 was issued, which is now recorded das TRP No. 02/2023. The Appellant submitted as per auction of the mortgaged property the Respondent Bank has received Rs. 22.42 Crores qua the property in question. It is the case of the Appellant that since the bank has received the amount on 30.01.2024, hence, the law of limitation in respect of his application filed under Section 94 of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority should have been counted from 30.01.2024 rather than from 06.08.2016.


# 17. The Appellant also cited the judgement of Dena Bank (Supra), where in the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the judgment and order/ decree of the DRT gave a fresh cause of action and therefore there is an extension of three years from the last credit, i.e., 14.02.2024, as the C.P.(IB)/268 (AHM) 2024 was filed on 06.08.2024 and the same was registered on 03.09.2024, hence the said petition was well within the limitation period. 


# 18. In this regard, we take into account the relevant para of Dena Bank (Supra) which reads as under :-

“It is well settled that entries in books of accounts and/or balance sheets of a Corporate Debtor would amount to an acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.”

From above, it is noted that the judgment of Dena Bank (Supra) was w.r.t., entries in the books of accounts of the Corporate Debtor w.r.t., acknowledgement under Section 18 of Limitation Act.


# 19. In this regard, we have also taken into account Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as under :-

  • “Section 19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.

  • Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made:

  • Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment.

  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

  • (a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment; 

  • (b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.   (Emphasis Supplied)


# 20. We would also like to see old provision for same as contained in the Section 20 of the Limitation Act,1908 which reads as under:

  • “Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.— [(1) Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his duly authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made:]

  • [Provided that * * * an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment.]

  • (2) Effect to receipt of procedure of mortgaged land. Where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment for the purpose of sub-section (1).

  • Explanation.–Debt includes money payable under a decree or order of Court.” (Emphasis Supplied)


# 21. Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, differ in scope, structure, and applicability. The 1963 Act’s Section 19 specifically governs payments toward debt or interest on a legacy, resetting the limitation period if made by the debtor or their authorized agent, provided the payment is acknowledged in writing (except for pre-1928 interest payments). The Limitation Act,1963 explicitly excludes money payable under court decrees from the definition of “debt,” narrowing its application to non-adjudicated liabilities. In contrast, Section 20 of the 1908 Act broadly covered interest and part-payments of principal, requiring acknowledgment for all payments and including court-decreed debts. Structurally, the 1963 Act introduced a streamlined format with a proviso and explanatory clauses. Additionally, the 1963 Act’s exemption for pre-1928 interest payments reflects legislative intent to address historical liabilities pragmatically, whereas the 1908 Act imposed uniform acknowledgment rules. These distinctions highlight the 1963 Act’s focus on clarity and procedural precision, particularly in segregating court-decreed obligations from ordinary debts.


# 22. We would like to go in detail on the Explanation (b) of Section 19 of the Limitation Act,1963 states “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court. Thus, we note that the term “debt” in the context of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 specifically excludes any money that is payable under a decree or order of a court. In other words, if a court has already passed a decree or order directing the payment of a certain amount, such an amount is not considered a “debt” for the purposes of Section 19 of the Limitation Act,1963. This means that if a payment is made towards satisfying a court decree or order, such payment will not result in the computation of a fresh limitation period under Section 19 of the Limitation Act,1963. The benefit of extending the limitation period through part payment is only available for debts that are not yet decreed by a court. We may see implication by a hypothetical situation. For instance in case, A owes B Rs.1 Cr. and makes a part payment before B files a suit and obtains a decree, the limitation period for B to file a suit can be extended as per Section 19 of the Limitation Act,1963.However, if B has already obtained a court decree for Rs.1 Cr. against A, any payment made by A towards this decreed amount will not extend the limitation period for execution of the decree under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.1963.


# 23. In this backdrop, we note that in appeal before us, the amount was recovered by the Respondent Bank due to auction of mortgaged property as a result of decree passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad. Thus, in terms of Explanation (b) of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, this recovery would not considered as Debt and therefore does not impact/enhance limitation period as pleaded by the Appellant. In fact, this goes against the cause of the Appellant.


# 24. From above, it is noted that payment on account of debt is required to be made by the person liable to pay for getting fresh period of limitation which be computed from the time of the payment was made. In this connection, we observe that no payment was made by the Corporate Debtor or the personal guarantor for the outstanding loan of Rs. 201 Crores. It is only on the sale of the mortgaged property by the Respondent Bank based on the decree of the DRT in his favour which was done in January, 2024 which has nothing to do with the payment which should have been made by the Corporate Debtor or the personal guarantor to take the benefit of the Section 19 of the Code.


# 25. In this connection, we also note Section 238 A of the Code which reads as under :-

  • “Section 238A: The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.”

(Emphasis Supplied)


# 26. The aforesaid Section 238A of the Code stipulates that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to the proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority. The same has also been taken into consideration by the Adjudicating Authority in the Impugned Order.


# 27. At this stage, it will be worthwhile to take into consideration the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 04.09.2024 where the issue of limitation raised by the Appellant has been dealt and the application of the Appellant was rejected. The order reads as under :-

  • “Heard the Ld Counsel for the applicant. This application has been filed under sec 94 of IBC 2016 with a further affidavit on 06.08.2024. The applicant had executed a guarantee on 28.09.2013 for Rs 201.00 crores to the financial creditor (Bank of Baroda) to enable the Corporate Debtor Shree Mukt Jewellers Baroda P Ltd to obtain certain facilities and also mortgaged his property in favour of the financial creditor. The account was classified as NPA and a demand notice was issued on 06.08.2016 recalling the loan and invoking the guarantee and an application was filed before the DRT Ahmedabad. The DRT passed an order decreeing the debt due and payable on the Corporate Debtor and the guarantors vide its order dated 09.01.2017 and recovery certificate was issued. It is further observed that the financial creditor has been executing the order and auctioning the properties of the mortgaged properties and other assets. Such receipts of recoveries do not pertain to the repayment of the principal borrower or guarantor/s and is out of the mortgaged properties on which a recovery certificate has been issued, cannot extend the limitation period for the personal guarantor who is not complying with the provisions of Sec 36 of Limitation Act 1963.

Further, this petition has been filed on 06.08.2024 which is beyond the period of limitation and does not comply with Sec 238 A of the IBC 2016. In view of the same, CP(IB) 268 of 2024 stands disposed of as not maintainable.”

(Emphasis Supplied)


# 28. To recapitulate, we observe that the default by the Corporate Debtor and subsequently notice to Appellant invoking the bank guarantee are undisputed. We also note that the bank has issued guarantee which is in nature of continuing and unconditional guarantee which has been legally invoked by the Respondent Bank. We further observe that the DRT proceedings are under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. It is reiterated that the action based on to decree passed by the DRT was in respect of the mortgaged property held by the Respondent. Hence, it cannot be case of the Appellant that such recovery shall extend the limitation for personal guarantee given by the Appellant. The argument therefore submitted by the Appellant are not tenable.


# 29. In conclusion, we do not find any error in the Impugned Order. The Appeal devoid of any merit stand rejected. No cost. I.A., if any, are closed.

-------------------------------------------------


Saturday, 3 May 2025

Mudraksh Investfin Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Gursev Singh - We, thus, reject the submission of the Appellant that for insolvency resolution against the Personal Guarantor, threshold of only Rs.1000/- needs to be fulfilled.

 NCLAT (2025.05.02) in Mudraksh Investfin Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Gursev Singh [(2025) ibclaw.in 323 NCLAT,  Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 9 of 2025] held that.

  • When NCLT is the Forum for initiating the CIRP against the Personal Guarantor and the process against the Personal Guarantor are to be taken by the same Forum before whom the insolvency resolution process of the CD is to be held, we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that threshold for the Application to be filed by against the Personal Guarantor before the NCLT shall be Rs.1 crore.

  • The threshold of Rs.1000/- has been provided for an Application under Section 78 with respect to matter relating to fresh start, insolvency and bankruptcy of individuals or partnership firms, with regard to whom the Adjudicating Authority is the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

  • When clear exception has been carved out in Section 78 by providing adjudicating authority as NCLT for Personal Guarantors of the CD, the threshold of Rs.1000/- as provided for filing an Application by individuals and partnership firms are not applicable, when Application is filed under Section 95(1) before the NCLT.

  • We have noticed above that personal insolvency of Personal Guarantor has been synchronized with insolvency of the CD. We, thus, are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that threshold for filing Section 95 Application against the Personal Guarantor is Rs.1000/- as provided in Section 78, only needs to be fulfilled.

  • The law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Lalit Kumar Jain’ (Supra) is clear and categorically lays down that insolvency resolution process of personal guarantor have been integrated in with the insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor and the forum being Section 60 i.e., NCLT, appeal against an order of NCLT shall lay to NCLAT.”

  • Accepting the submission that on default of a debt of Rs.1000/-, personal insolvency against the Personal Guarantor should be permitted to be initiated, shall lead to innumerable cases of insolvency against Personal Guarantors, which shall frustrate the purpose, for which exception was carved for Personal Guarantors of Corporate Debtors.

  • We, thus, reject the submission of the Appellant that for insolvency resolution against the Personal Guarantor, threshold of only Rs.1000/- needs to be fulfilled.

Excerpts of the Order;

This Appeal by a Financial Creditor has been filed challenging order dated 14.02.2024 passed by National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench (Court – II) by which order Application filed under Section 95, sub-section (1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the “IBC”) filed by the Financial Creditor to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) against the Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor (“CD”) has been rejected. The Appellant aggrieved by the order rejecting the Application has come up in this Appeal.


# 2. Brief facts necessary to be noticed for deciding the Appeal are:

i. The Principal Borrower – Mica Industries Limited has obtained loan of Rs.10 lakhs from the Appellant on 01.02.2023. The Respondent – Gursev Singh, provided a personal guarantee for repayment of the loan as taken by the Principal Borrower on 08.02.202.

ii. The Financial Creditor invoked the personal guarantee on 15.10.2023 and filed an Application CP IB No.422/2024 under Section 95, sub-section (1) of the IBC, which Application has been rejected by the Adjudicating Authority holding that it did not meet the threshold of Rs.1 crore. Aggrieved by which order, this Appeal has been filed.


# 3. We have heard Shri Mrinal Harshwardhan and Shri Iswar Mohapatra, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Shri Rahul Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent.


# 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant in support of the Appeal submits that threshold limit for individuals prescribed under Section 78 of the IBC is Rs.1000/-. Section 95 Application is under Part-III of the IBC for which threshold is of Rs.1000/- only. Thus, for initiating personal insolvency against a Personal Guarantor, the debt requirement is of only Rs.1000/-. Hence, the Adjudicating Authority committed error in applying the threshold of Rs.1 crore for filing an Application, which is against the clear intendment of Sections 78 and 79 of the IBC. It is submitted that Even if the NCLT is the Fora for filing Section 95 Application against the Personal Guarantor, Section 4, which provides for threshold under Part-II, is not applicable with respect to an Application under Part-III. Had the legislature intended to specify the threshold of Rs.1 crore for Personal Guarantor, the same would have been incorporated in Section 60. No separate threshold having been provided for an Application against the Personal Guarantor, threshold of Rs.1000/- alone shall be applicable. The fact that single Fora for insolvency resolution against both the CD and Personal Guarantor is provided as NCLT, cannot mean that for Personal Guarantor, debt threshold of Rs.1 crore is required to be fulfilled. The Adjudicating Authority committed error in relying on Notification dated 15.11.2019 issued by Central Government. Notification did not make any provision of threshold regarding insolvency resolution of Personal Guarantor. The Adjudicating Authority misinterpreted provision of Section 78 of IBC and has come to wrong conclusion that threshold is not fulfilled in the Application filed by the Appellant, which was for a debt of Rs.10 lakhs.


# 5. Learned Counsel for the Respondent refuting the submissions of learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that Section 60, sub-section (1) stipulates that the Adjudicating Authority for a CD and its Personal Guarantor shall be the NCLT in whose jurisdiction the CD has its registered office. The provisions of Section 60 provides that if a CIRP is initiated against the CD before a particular Adjudicating Authority, then the personal insolvency of a Personal Guarantor to that CD also be initiated before the same Adjudicating Authority. If the creditor cannot knock the doors of the NCLT seeking initiation of CIRP against the CD then the same creditor cannot approach the NCLT seeking initiation of personal insolvency against the very same Personal Guarantor. The Appellant cannot maintain an Application under Section 7 against the CD – Mica Industries Ltd., hence, he is also precluded to file an Application under Section 95 against the Personal Guarantor of the CD.


# 6. We have heard the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the records.


# 7. A short but very interesting question has arisen for consideration in this Appeal, i.e., what is the threshold for filing an Application under Section 95, sub-section (1) by the Financial Creditor against the Personal Guarantor. Whether the threshold is Rs.1 crore as provided in Section 4 or it is Rs.1000/- as provided in Section 78 of the IBC, is the question to be answered. Section 4, which provides for threshold for filing an Application for insolvency against the CD is Rs.1 crore with effect from 24.03.2020. Section 60 of the IBC provides for ‘Adjudicating Authority for corporate person’. Section 60, sub-section (1), (2), (3) and (4) are as follows:

  • “60. Adjudicating Authority for corporate persons. –

  • (1) The Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors thereof shall be the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of a corporate person is located.

  • (2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1) and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor shall be filed before the National Company Law Tribunal.

  • (3) An insolvency resolution process or liquidation or bankruptcy proceeding of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of the corporate debtor pending in any court or tribunal shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of such corporate debtor.

  • (4) The National Company Law Tribunal shall be vested with all the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal as contemplated under Part III of this Code for the purpose of subsection (2).”


# 8. A notification was issued by Central Government under Section 1, sub-section (3) of the IBC, by which various provisions of the Code were enforced. Notification dated 15th March, 2019 has been extracted by Adjudicating Authority in paragraph-10 of the order, which is as follows:

  • “NOTIFICATION
    New Delhi, the 15th November, 2019

  • S.0. 4126(E).–In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), the Central Government hereby appoints the 1st day of December, 2019 as the date on which the following provisions of the said Code only in so far as they relate to personal guarantors to corporate debtors, shall come into force:

(1) clause (e) of section 2;

(2) section 78 (except with regard to fresh start process) and section 79;

(3) sections 94 to 187 [both inclusive];

(4) clause (g) to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 239;

(5) clause (m) to clause (zc) of sub-section (2) of section 239;

(6) clause (zn) to clause (zs) of sub-section (2) of section 240; and;

(7) section 249.”


# 9. On the date when Notification dated 15.11.2019 was issued, Central Government also notified the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019. Section 3, sub-section (e) was also inserted defining personal guarantor to a CD by the said Notification. Now we need to look into Sections 78 and 79 of the IBC, which find place in Part-III of the IBC. Section 78 provides as follows:

  • “78. Application. –

  • This Part shall apply to matters relating to fresh start, insolvency and bankruptcy of individuals and partnership firms where the amount of the default is not less than one thousand rupees:

  • Provided that the Central Government may, by notification, specify the minimum amount of default of higher value which shall not be more than one lakh rupees.”


# 10. Section 79 defines the Adjudicating Authority, i.e., Debt Recovery Tribunal in Part-III. Section 79 is as follows:

  • “79. Definitions. –

  • In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, –

  • (1) “Adjudicating Authority” means the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (51 of 1993);”


# 11. Section 179, which deals with territorial jurisdiction, sub-section (1) of which is as follows:

  • “179. Adjudicating Authority for individuals and partnership firms. –

  • (1) Subject to the provisions of section 60, the Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency matters of individuals and firms shall be the Debt Recovery Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the individual debtor actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and can entertain an application under this Code regarding such person.”


# 12. Sub-section (1) begun with the expression subject to the provision of Section 60, the Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency matters of individuals and firms shall be the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The Notification dated 15.11.2019 came for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain vs. Union of India and Ors. – (2021) 9 SCC 321 where different aspects of insolvency resolution of Personal Guarantor have been examined and gone into. In Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.2282 of 2024 – Anita Goyal vs. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd. & Anr. one of the question raised by the Personal Guarantor was that with regard to insolvency resolution process of Personal Guarantor, the Adjudicating Authority is the Debt Recovery Tribunal and not the NCLT. This Tribunal in the said Appeal vide its judgment dated 23.02.2025 examined the aspect of the matter while relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain has come to the conclusion that Adjudicating Authority for Personal Guarantors of the CD is the NCLT. In the above judgment, the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee March 2018 was noticed, which has noticed the link between the insolvency resolution of the CD and the Personal Guarantor. In paragraph-22 of the judgment in Anita Goyal, following has been noticed:

  • “22. For answering the issue raised in the Appeal(s) we need to first notice the ambit and scope of Section 60, which is the basis of the submission. We need to notice the Report of Insolvency Law Committee, March 2018, which noticed that Section 60 create a link between the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy process of the Corporate Debtor and the Personal Guarantor and the matters relating to same debt are dealt in the same Tribunal. The Committee recommended for certain amendments. Paragraph 23 of the Report provides as follows:

  • “23. LINKING PROCEEDINGS OF CORPORATE GUARANTOR WITH CORPORATE DEBTOR 

  • 23.1 Section 60 of the Code requires that the Adjudicating Authority for the corporate debtor and personal guarantors should be the NCLT which has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the corporate debtor is located. This creates a link between the insolvency resolution or bankruptcy processes of the corporate debtor and the personal guarantor such that the matters relating to the same debt are dealt in the same tribunal. However, no such link is present between the insolvency resolution or liquidation processes of the corporate debtor and the corporate guarantor. It was decided that section 60 may be suitably amended to provide for the same NCLT to deal with the insolvency resolution or liquidation processes of the corporate debtor and its corporate guarantor. For this purpose, the term “corporate guarantor” will also be defined.””


# 13. This Tribunal noticed the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain, where Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken the view that Parliamentary intent was to treat Personal Guarantors differently from other categories of individuals, which is referred in Part-III, i.e. Section 78 of the IBC. The relevant paragraph of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain has been noticed by this tribunal in Anita Goyal’s judgment. It is useful to notice paragraphs 31, 32, 33 and 34 of Anita Goyal’s judgment, which are as follows:

  • “31. The above Notification dated 15.11.2019 came to be challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain vs. Union of India & Ors. (Transferred Case (Civil) No.245/2020). One of the grounds to challenge the notification was whether provisions of IBC against Personal Guarantors have been enforced, which is discriminatory and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In reference to challenge to the aforesaid Notification, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the Scheme of IBC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed the 2018 amendment and the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee. In paragraph 92 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made following observation:

  • “92. As noticed earlier, Section 60 had previously, under the original Code, designated the NCLT as the adjudicating authority in relation to two categories: corporate debtors and personal guarantors to corporate debtors. The 2018 amendment added another category: corporate guarantors to corporate debtors. The amendment seen in the background of the report, as indeed the scheme of the Code (i.e., Section 2 (e), Section 5 (22), Section 29A, and Section 60), clearly show that all matters that were likely to impact, or have a bearing on a corporate debtor’s insolvency process, were sought to be clubbed together and brought before the same forum. Section 5 (22) which is found in Part II (insolvency process provisions in respect of corporate debtors) as it was originally, defined personal guarantor to say that it “means an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.”…”

  • 32. In paragraph 96 of the judgment, following has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

  • “96. This court in V. Ramakrishnan (supra), noticed why an application under Section 60(2) could not be allowed. At that stage, neither Part III of the Code nor Section 243 had not been notified. This meant that proceedings against personal guarantors stood outside the NCLT and the Code. The non-obstante provision under Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect over other prevailing enactments. This is perhaps the rationale for not notifying Section 243 as far as personal guarantors to corporate persons are concerned. Section 243(2) saves pending proceedings under the Acts repealed (PIA and PTI Act) to be undertaken in accordance with those enactments. As of now, Section 243 has not been notified. In the event Section 243 is notified and those two Acts repealed, then, the present notification would not have had the effect of covering pending proceedings against individuals, such as personal guarantors in other forums, and would bring them under the provisions of the Code pertaining to insolvency and bankruptcy of personal guarantors. The impugned notification, as a consequence of the non obstante clause in Section 238, has the result that if any proceeding were to be initiated against personal guarantors it would be under the Code.

  • 33. The observation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the last line is relevant which reads “The impugned notification, as a consequence of the non obstante clause in Section 238, has the result that if any proceeding were to be initiated against personal guarantors it would be under the Code”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that Parliamentary intent was to treat personal guarantors differently from other categories of individuals. The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of the two separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, from whom the Adjudicating authority was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee. In paragraphs 100 and 101, following was laid down:

  • “100. It is clear from the above analysis that Parliamentary intent was to treat personal guarantors differently from other categories of individuals. The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of two separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the Adjudicating authority was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee. The fact that the process of insolvency in Part III is to be applied to individuals, whereas the process in relation to corporate debtors, set out in Part II is to be applied to such corporate persons, does not lead to incongruity. On the other hand, there appear to be sound reasons why the forum for adjudicating insolvency processes – the provisions of which are disparate- is to be common, i.e through the NCLT. As was emphasized during the hearing, the NCLT would be able to consider the whole picture, as it were, about the nature of the assets available, either during the corporate debtor’s insolvency process, or even later; this would facilitate the CoC in framing realistic plans, keeping in mind the prospect of realizing some part of the creditors’ dues from personal guarantors.

  • 101. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the impugned notification is not an instance of legislative exercise, or amounting to impermissible and selective application of provisions of the Code. There is no compulsion in the Code that it should, at the same time, be made applicable to all individuals, (including personal guarantors) or not at all. There is sufficient indication in the Code- by Section 2(e), Section 5(22), Section 60 and Section 179 indicating that personal guarantors, though forming part of the larger grouping of individuals, were to be, in view of their intrinsic connection with corporate debtors, dealt with differently, through the same adjudicatory process and by the same forum (though not insolvency provisions) as such corporate debtors. The notifications under Section 1(3), (issued before the impugned notification was issued) disclose that the Code was brought into force in stages, regard being had to the categories of persons to whom its provisions were to be applied. The impugned notification, similarly inter alia makes the provisions of the Code applicable in respect of personal guarantors to corporate debtors, as another such category of persons to whom the Code has been extended. It is held that the impugned notification was issued within the power granted by Parliament, and in valid exercise of it. The exercise of power in issuing the impugned notification under Section 1(3) is therefore, not ultra vires; the notification is valid.”

  • 34. The above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also clearly emphasized that Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor has been treated as a separate species of individuals. Hence, provision regarding Personal Guarantor of the Corporate Debtor have been enforced and when we read Section 60, sub-sections (1) and (2), the conclusion is inescapable that for insolvency resolution process of personal guarantor, the jurisdiction is with the NCLT.”


# 14. Paragraphs 100 and 101 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain clearly noticed the intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of two separate process being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the Adjudicating Authority was common with the CD to whom they had stood guarantee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-100 laid down following:

  • “100. The amendment inserted the expression “or liquidation” before the words “or bankruptcy” and also inserted the expression “of a corporate guarantor … as the case may be, of” such corporate debtor. The interpretation of this expression has to be contextual. There is no question of liquidation of a personal guarantor, an individual. In such cases, this Court has ruled that the principle behind the maxim reddendo singula singulis applies. This Court had, in Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co. [Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255] quoted Black’s Interpretation of Laws, to explain the meaning of that maxim : (SCC p. 263, para 13)

  • “Where a sentence in a statute contains several antecedents and several consequences, they are to be read distributively, that is to say, each phrase or expression is to be referred to its appropriate object.”

  • Koteswar Vittal Kamath [Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255] was concerned with the interpretation of the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution of India which provided that:

  • “Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.”

  • The term “no Bill or amendment” was construed distributively. The Court held : (Koteswar Vittal Kamath case [Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., (1969) 1 SCC 255] , SCC pp. 263-64, para 14)

  • “14. … In our opinion, the High Court inKoteswar Vittal Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga & Co. [Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. Rangappa Baliga & Co., 1963 SCC OnLine Ker 132] did not correctly appreciate the position. The language of the proviso cannot be interpreted in the manner accepted by the High Court without doing violence to the rules of construction. If both the words “introduced” or “moved” are held to refer to the Bill, it must necessarily be held that both those words will also refer to the word “amendment”. On the face of it, there can be no question of introducing an amendment. Amendments are moved and then, if accepted by the House, incorporated in the Bill before it is passed. There is further an indication in the Constitution itself that wherever a reference is made to a Bill, the only step envisaged is introduction of the Bill. There is no reference to such a step as a Bill being moved. The articles, of which notice may be taken in this connection, are Articles 109, 114, 117, 198 and 207. In all these articles, whatever prohibition is laid down relates to the introduction of a Bill in the legislature. There is no reference at any stage to a Bill being moved in a House. The language thus used in the Constitution clearly points to the interpretation that, even in the proviso to Article 304, the word “introduced” refers to the Bill, while the word “moved” refers to the amendment.” (emphasis in original)”


# 15. The fact that process of insolvency in Part-III is to apply to individuals, whereas the process related to CD set out in Part-II, apply to CD, does not lead to incongruity. On the other hand, there appears to be sound reasons why for Forum for adjudicating insolvency process – the provisions of which are disparate – is to be common, i.e. through NCLT. When NCLT is the Forum for initiating the CIRP against the Personal Guarantor and the process against the Personal Guarantor are to be taken by the same Forum before whom the insolvency resolution process of the CD is to be held, we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that threshold for the Application to be filed by against the Personal Guarantor before the NCLT shall be Rs.1 crore. The threshold of Rs.1000/- has been provided for an Application under Section 78 with respect to matter relating to fresh start, insolvency and bankruptcy of individuals or partnership firms, with regard to whom the Adjudicating Authority is the Debt Recovery Tribunal. When clear exception has been carved out in Section 78 by providing adjudicating authority as NCLT for Personal Guarantors of the CD, the threshold of Rs.1000/- as provided for filing an Application by individuals and partnership firms are not applicable, when Application is filed under Section 95(1) before the NCLT.


# 16. On 15.11.2019 when Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 was notified, the definition of Adjudicating Authority in Section 3, sub-section (1) (a) provided as follows:

  • “3. Definitions. ― (1) In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires, –

  • (a) “Adjudicating Authority” means-

  • (i) for the purpose of section 60, the National Company Law Tribunal constituted under section 408 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013); or

  • (ii) in cases other than sub-clause (i), the Debt Recovery Tribunal established under sub-section (1A) of section 3 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (51 of 1993);


# 17. The Rules clearly contemplate that Adjudicating Authority for the purposes of Section 60 is National Company Law Tribunal and for other cases, it is Debt Recovery Tribunal.


# 18. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has referred to judgment of NCLAT, Chennai Bench in Mahendra Kumar Agarwal vs. PTC India Financial Services Ltd. & Anr. – (2023) SCC OnLine NCLAT 321 where also this Tribunal had occasion to consider Section 60, Section 179 and Section 95, sub-section (1). This Tribunal in Mahendra Kumar Agarwal referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalit Kumar Jain and has laid down following in paragraph 74:

  • “74. In ‘ Law’, ‘Guarantee’, is an ‘ independent obligation’ of the ‘Guarantor’, which is evident from the ‘Personal Guarantee’, and that there is ‘no requirement’, enabling a ‘Person’, to ‘exhaust’, any ‘remedy’, against a ‘Corporate Debtor’, prior to the issuance of ‘Demand’, in terms of ‘Personal Guarantee’ and in the present case, Clauses 3, 4 and 6 of the ‘Personal Guarantee’, cannot be lost sight off. In reality, Section 60 of the Code, provides for only a ‘Single Fora’, in respect of an ‘adjudication’ of ‘Insolvency Proceedings’, against both the ‘Corporate Debtor’ and the ‘Personal Guarantor’ of the ‘Corporate Debtor’, Viz. ‘Adjudicating Authority’/’Tribunal’.”


# 19. This Tribunal in the above case noticed that for Personal Guarantor Section 60 provides for Single Fora with regard to adjudication of insolvency proceedings against both the CD and the Personal Guarantor. The said judgment relied by the Appellant in no manner support the submissions of the Appellant. In Anita Goyal’s judgment, this Tribunal rejected the submission of the Appellant that NCLT has no jurisdiction to entertain Section 95 Application filed by the Financial Creditor against the Personal Guarantor.


# 20. Learned Counsel for the Respondent relied on judgment of this Tribunal in State Bank of Inida vs. Mahendra Kumar Jajodia – Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.60 of 2022 decided on 27.01.2022, where this Tribunal has held that Adjudicating Authority with regard to insolvency resolution process of Corporate Debtor including Corporate Guarantor or Personal Guarantor shall be the NCLT. In paragraph-10 of the judgment, following was laid down:

  • “10. Sub-Section 1 of Section 60 provides that Adjudicating Authority in relation to Insolvency or Liquidation for Corporate Debtor including Corporate Guarantor or Personal Guarantor shall be the NCLT having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the Registered Office of the Corporate Person is located. The substantive provision for an Adjudicating Authority is Section 60, sub-Section (1), when a particular case is not covered under Section 60(2) the Application as referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 60 can be very well filed in the NCLT having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the Registered Office of corporate Person is located.”


# 21. The learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied on another judgment of this Tribunal Shapoorji Pallonji Finance v. Rekha Singh – Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.397 of 2022, where the question arose regarding the maintainability of Section 95 Application. The question came for consideration as to whether against the CD, second insolvency of Section 95 Application could have been proceeded or not?. Submission of both the parties were noticed in paragraph 14 of the judgment, which is as follows:

  • “14. For argument sake, we proceed on the premise that on 31.03.2021 the asset size of the JFIL became Rs.407 Crores. The application under Section 95 was filed by Financial Creditor on 03.06.2021 on which date last audited Balance Sheet was only the Balance Sheet as on 31.03.2020. Last Balance Sheet referred to in the Notification dated 18.11.2019 has to be treated as last audited Balance Sheet from the date the application can be filed. In event, the Balance Sheet as on 31.03.2021 was audited after filing of the application and let us assume that the asset size is reduced to less than Rs.500 Crores, what will be the consequence, whether the Adjudicating Authority who has jurisdiction to proceed with the application, shall not be having any more jurisdiction to proceed with the application is the question which needs to be answered. It is submission of learned counsel for both the parties that jurisdiction to proceed against the Personal Guarantors under Section 95 shall be dependent on entitlement to proceed against the Financial Service Provider i.e. JFIL and in event there is no jurisdiction to proceed against the Financial Service Provider, there is no jurisdiction to proceed against the Personal Guarantors. We, thus, have to proceed to examine the issue as per above submission of learned counsel for the parties.”


# 22. This Tribunal held ultimately that Application under Section 7 was maintainable, hence, the Application under Section 95 was also maintainable. In paragraphs 33 and 34, following have been laid down:

  • “33. We having held that on the date when application was filed under Section 95 by the Financial Creditor against the Personal Guarantor an application could have filed against the Financial Service Provider on the basis of last Balance Sheet which had asset size of more than Rs.500, the application filed by the Financial Creditor against the Personal Guarantor was fully maintainable.

  • 34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the Adjudicating Authority has committed error in allowing the applications filed by the Personal Guarantors and dismissing the Company Petitions. All the Appeals are allowed. Order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 22.02.2022 is set aside. The Company Petitions CP No. (IB) – 25/95/JPR/2021, CP No. (IB) – 26/95/JPR/2021 and CP No. (IB) – 27/95/JPR/2021 are held maintainable and are revived before the Adjudicating Authority to be proceeded in accordance with law.”


# 23. Learned Counsel for the Respondent relied on the aforesaid judgment to support its submission that unless an Application against the CD for CIRP is maintainable under Part-II, no Application for insolvency of Personal Guarantor can be maintained. We have noticed above that personal insolvency of Personal Guarantor has been synchronized with insolvency of the CD. We, thus, are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that threshold for filing Section 95 Application against the Personal Guarantor is Rs.1000/- as provided in Section 78, only needs to be fulfilled.


# 24. We may refer to one judgment of this Tribunal in Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No.2121of 2024 in Aarti Singal vs. State Bank of India and Anr. dated 03.04.2025. The above Appeal was filed by Personal Guarantor challenging the order admitting Section 95 Application filed by the State Bank of India. The State Bank of India raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Appeal stating that order against Personal Guarantor having been passed under Part-III of the IBC, no Appeal is maintainable under Section 61 of the IBC. It was contended that the Appeal under Section 61 before this Tribunal is maintainable against an order passed under Part-II of the IBC. The said objection was noticed and parties were heard and the objection was rejected and it was held that proceedings against Personal Guarantor are initiated before the NCLT under Section 60 of the IBC, hence, the Appeal under Section 61 is maintainable and the objection that Personal Guarantors are covered by Part-III, no Appeal lies under Section 61 is rejected. In paragraphs 22 and 23, following was held:

  • “22. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in ‘Anita Goyal’ Vs. ‘Vistara ITCL (India) Ltd. & Anr.’ reported in 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 37, where the question was raised regarding the forum of initiating insolvency resolution process against the personal guarantor of the corporate debtor and this Tribunal after considering all relevant provisions of the IBC held that NCLT has jurisdiction to entertain Section 95 application filed by the financial creditor. Conclusions were recorded in paragraph 43, which are as follows:

  • “43. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are not proceeded to accept the submissions of the Appellant that NCLT Delhi has no jurisdiction to entertain Section 95 Application filed by the Financial Creditor against the Personal Guarantor for initiating insolvency resolution process. We do not find any substance in any of the submissions raised by the Appellant. There is no merit in the any of the Appeal(s). Both the Appeal(s) are dismissed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.”

  • 23. When NCLT is a forum for filing Section 95 application which legal position is not even refuted by the SBI, who itself has filed the application under Section 95, submission of the respondent that no appeal shall lie against said order cannot be accepted. The law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Lalit Kumar Jain’ (Supra) is clear and categorically lays down that insolvency resolution process of personal guarantor have been integrated in with the insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor and the forum being Section 60 i.e., NCLT, appeal against an order of NCLT shall lay to NCLAT.”


# 25. There is one more aspect, which cannot be ignored. Initiation of insolvency resolution process against the Personal Guarantor has serious consequences. Accepting the submission that on default of a debt of Rs.1000/-, personal insolvency against the Personal Guarantor should be permitted to be initiated, shall lead to innumerable cases of insolvency against Personal Guarantors, which shall frustrate the purpose, for which exception was carved for Personal Guarantors of Corporate Debtors.


# 26. We, thus, reject the submission of the Appellant that for insolvency resolution against the Personal Guarantor, threshold of only Rs.1000/- needs to be fulfilled.


# 27. We, thus, do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority, rejecting Section 95 Application filed by the Appellant, which was filed for a debt of Rs.10 lakhs, as not fulfilling the threshold. In result, the Appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

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